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Abstract 
 
 
Across three experiments, we sought to test the key assumption of Horton and Gerrig’s 
(2005a) memory-based model of common ground and audience design. Horton and Gerrig 
(2005a) argue that ordinary memory processes can serve as a proxy for more complex 
computations about common ground. Their key claim is that conversational partners act as 
memory cues for the retrieval of potentially relevant information through a process of 
resonance in episodic memory. Although studies have demonstrated effects in reference 
generation that are consistent with ordinary memory processes (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a), 
there has been no direct test to date of the key claim, which would require experimentally 
dissociating the effects of episodic memory from effects of common ground.  
Similarly to Horton and Gerrig (2005a), we hypothesised that memory plays a crucial role 
in audience design. Influenced by the work of Gann and Barr (2014), we formed an 
alternative retrieval fluency hypothesis for audience design. We predicted that the fluency 
with which a speaker’s expressions are retrieved would be dependent upon the degree that 
the referent and the retrieval context match the original encoding context (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). Our hypothesis proposed that expressions that were more fluent and had 
stronger memory signals would more likely be deemed contextually appropriate by the 
speaker – resulting in less consideration of context relative to expressions yielding weaker 
memory signals.  
To test this we used a referential communication game, with participants playing as 
‘Director’ providing descriptions to the ‘Matcher’ experimenter. In our first two 
experiments, we manipulated the visual context that target items appeared in. This was a 
communicatively irrelevant feature of the stimuli display that was presented to participants. 
Whilst these manipulations were salient to the Director they were not relevant to the actual 
description of the target objects. This enabled us to test whether visual features in the 
environment (that were irrespective of common ground) cued memory during audience 
design performance. In our third experiment, we manipulated the Director’s perceptual 
experience – a communicatively relevant cue that is normally strongly correlated with 
common ground. In this study, we de-confounded the visual appearance of a potential 
addressee from the speaker’s pragmatic knowledge of whom they were interacting with. 
Crucially, this enabled us to directly test the assumption that episodic effects are a key 
source of partner specificity in reference production (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 
2005a). 
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In Experiment 1, participants were shown a grid containing letters of various sizes and 
colours. We altered the appearance of the “competitor” and “foil” items, which alternated 
between training and test trials, so that participants had to adapt their descriptions at the 
test phase in order to avoid misspecifying descriptions. We expected speakers to 
experience greater retrieval fluency when the visual context in test trials was highly similar 
to the training trial configuration. It was predicted that this would result in them continuing 
to use the same description as before - making more descriptive errors than when presented 
with configurations that were dissimilar between the training and test phase. However, we 
found a lack of support for our hypothesis, as there was no main effect of visual context on 
reference production.  
In Experiment 2 minor adjustments were made to the configuration and sequencing of 
objects and the stimuli presented to participants. In this experiment, Directors described 
pictures of everyday objects to the Matcher. Experiment 2 provided weak statistical 
support in favour of the retrieval fluency hypothesis for audience design and suggested that 
visual context impacted upon reference generation. More specifically, participants 
appeared to rely on the strength of the memory signal present when designing descriptions 
for the listener.  
In Experiment 3, participants described target items to one of two Matchers using an 
interactive webcam design. At the test phase, the visual experience of the Director 
(participant) was controlled independently of the pragmatic situation, meaning that who the 
Director saw and whom they were speaking to did not always coincide. To the extent 
speakers use memory as a proxy for common ground, we expected misspecifications to be 
higher when participants viewed the same Matcher as they saw when they originally 
entrained on descriptions during training (effect of visual consistency). Furthermore, to the 
extent they use common ground, we expected misspecification to depend on their 
knowledge of who hears the description (effect of pragmatic consistency). Contrary to the 
memory-based model, there was no evidence that speakers misspecified more when 
viewing the same Matcher than when viewing a different Matcher. We also found no 
significant difference in misspecification rate when speakers believed that they had 
addressed the same Matcher versus a different Matcher.  
In all three experiments we found a high misspecification rate in referential descriptions, 
indicating clear evidence of reliance on episodic memory. However, we did not find 
evidence in support of the retrieval fluency hypothesis for audience design. Our results also 
failed to support the key claims outlined in Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based 
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model. In particular, the results of Experiment 3 cast doubt on the assumption of partner 
specificity in audience design. 
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Chapter 1 – 
Evidence for the Memory-Based Model of Referential 
Communication 
 
 
1.1 – Audience Design and the Cooperative Principle 
Reference is essential to successful communication – where a speaker attempts to enable 
the addressee to identify a particular referent in a given context (Horton & Keysar, 1996). 
Generally, we can assume that when someone speaks their main goal is to be successfully 
understood (Ferreira, 2008). However, successful communication between interlocutors 
often depends on the ability of the speaker to adapt their referential description to meet the 
addressees’ informational needs. For example, this could involve a simple alteration 
whereby the speaker talks louder in a busy environment to ensure that their description is 
audible. Alternatively, this process may involve a more complex alteration where the 
speaker adapts their terminology to benefit a more inexperienced addressee (Ferreira, 
Slevc, & Rogers, 2005). This process of “tailoring” information for the conversational 
partner is known as audience design (Clark & Murphy, 1982). When engaging in audience 
design the speaker will take into account the listener’s perspective in order to produce an 
utterance that the addressee is able to understand (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012).  
The traditional view of audience design in language production argues that speakers are 
beholden to Grice's (1975) “Cooperative Principle”. When an interlocutor successfully 
engages in audience design we can say that the speaker has fulfilled Grice’s Maxim of 
Quantity:  
1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange). 
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
According to these maxims speakers should consider the listener’s current knowledge 
when deciding how to design their utterance (Horton & Gerrig, 2002). Consequently, 
speakers should strive to provide “optimal” descriptions to the addressee – providing the 
minimally sufficient information required for the listener to identify the referent within a 
shared context.  
However, there are always numerous ways to describe the same referent (for example “the 
blue denim jeans” could refer to the same item as “the darker pair of jeans” or “the pair 
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on the left hanger”) so how do speakers decide what level of information is sufficient 
within a given context? Or to put it more succinctly – how does the speaker decide whether 
a description is optimal or not? 
1.2 – Establishing Common Ground 
Tailoring a description to suit the listener’s informational needs requires the speaker to 
account for audience-related factors such as previously established communicative 
conventions as well as the addressee’s own expertise (Fussell & Krauss, 1989a). Most 
interactions occur between interlocutors who have varying levels of prior 
acquaintanceship. Accordingly, communicators will establish their own framework of 
mutual knowledge, which will be determined by the extent of the interactions they have 
shared in the past. The private knowledge they share, coupled with more general 
knowledge, can be used to formulate message construction and understanding (Fussell & 
Krauss, 1989b). The information both interlocutors share can be termed as their common 
ground – the beliefs, assumptions and mutual knowledge shared by both the speaker and 
the addressee (Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Marshall, 1981). Thus in order for the 
speaker to tailor a description for the addressee, and therefore satisfy Grice’s Maxims, they 
must be able to anticipate what information the listener already knows – they must 
establish the extent of their common ground with the listener (Fussell & Krauss, 1992).  
During audience design speakers have been known to alter their speech to adapt their 
utterances for particular audiences (experts vs. novices: Isaacs & Clark, 1987, adults vs. 
children: Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 1966, native vs. non-native speakers: Bortfeld 
& Brennan, 1997) and will often use the information that lies within their common ground 
to do so. The extent to which interlocutors share common ground will impact upon the ease 
of communication – particularly if the information they wish to discuss involves unusual 
topics or very specific details (Fussell & Krauss, 1989a). If there is a broad consensus of 
common ground it therefore follows that the communicative process should be simpler – 
the speaker should have considerably less difficulty finding the right phrase or terminology 
to express a subtle meaning (Fussell & Krauss, 1989a).  
One aspect of dialogue that simplifies the process of audience design (and consequently 
can help to ascertain common ground between interlocutors) is the establishment of 
linguistic/referential precedents (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007, 2015) or 
lexical entrainment (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994). In dialogue it is common to make reference to the same entities multiple 
times within a given discourse. Thus interlocutors come to associate particular referential 
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expressions with specific referents, such as calling a particular item of clothing “the blue 
denim jeans”. 
Consider the following two excerpts from a conversation between Mark and Jane in the 
clothes department store: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Scenario (1) there appears to be a breakdown in communication between Mark and 
Jane. Jane asks for Mark to pass her “the blue denim jeans”. She appears to believe that 
Mark will understand her utterance. In this instance, however, it is clear that Jane and Mark 
have not yet established a common ground for referring to this particular item of clothing. 
As such, they have not yet established a referential precedent for “the blue denim jeans” 
which helps to explain why Mark seeks clarification from Jane (“Which ones?”).  
Scenario (2) contrasts with (1), as it appears that the two interlocutors have established a 
referential precedent for the phrase “the blue denim jeans”. Whether this is actually the 
case or not, Jane’s reference succeeds anyway as Mark clearly understands which pair of 
jeans she is referring to. He responds by letting her know that he prefers a different pair 
(“Okay but I prefer the black pair”). Referential precedents simplify the speaker’s task 
 
(1) 
M: Maybe you should look around more? 
J: No…pass me the blue denim jeans. 
M: Which ones?  
J: Uh…the pair on the left hanger. 
 
 
(2) 
M: Maybe you should look around more? 
J: No…pass me the blue denim jeans. 
M: Okay but I prefer the black pair… 
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because they need not decide how to conceptualise and describe a referent each time they 
encounter it. The process becomes easier as the speaker can just retrieve from memory the 
expression they used for that referent on a previous occasion - whilst doing some minimal 
checking to make sure that the precedent is still contextually adequate. 
One hallmark of the existence of referential precedents is that once speakers have entrained 
upon a particular description, they will continue using that description even when the 
context has changed in a manner which makes the expression over-informative (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982). This overspecification can cause the speaker to 
violate Grice's (1975) Maxim of Quantity by providing more information than is required 
(Van Der Wege, 2009). Consider the following excerpt from Scenario (3) – Jane has 
purchased her blue denim jeans and is now looking to complete her outfit: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we can see that whilst being unimpressed with Mark’s choice of clothing, Jane 
continues to use the previously entrained description for her new jeans – “the blue denim 
jeans”. Considering that she has purchased her jeans and is no longer looking at similar 
items in the department store, Jane has no need to continue to refer to her purchase as “the 
blue denim jeans”. In this instance Mark notices the overspecification and begins to 
develop a new referential precedent of his own by shortening the description to “jeans” – 
“It would definitely match your jeans!” 
Jane’s reference to “the blue denim jeans” highlights a common trait among interlocutors 
– speakers are more likely to overspecify as the result of an existing precedent when 
speaking to an addressee who shares the precedent than when speaking to a new addressee 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996). This finding has been taken as evidence of partner-specificity of 
precedents, according to which speakers choose their expressions based on the information 
they believe is mutually held with the addressee (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
 
(3) 
J: Do you think this t-shirt would match? 
M: Maybe…how about this one? 
J: I’m not sure it would go with the blue denim jeans. 
M: Sure it would…it would definitely match your jeans! 
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Most of the time conversations play out relatively smoothly. However, it is when 
addressees have difficulty following the speaker (such as the example in shown Scenario 
(1) above) that we can begin to see some of the problems that forming inadequate referring 
expressions can cause. If a speaker underspecifies their description by being too vague they 
can confuse the listener. On the other hand, overspecifying an utterance can prove to be 
unhelpful or even insulting for the addressee (Horton, 2008).  
Generally, it is likely that speakers will try to abide by the Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 
1975) and as a consequence of this, the listener will have particular expectations of the 
speaker (Clark, 1992). Listeners will expect the speaker to provide a suitable amount of 
information to enable referent identification and will therefore be perturbed by 
underspecifications (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006). As such, listeners will assume 
that speaker’s descriptions have been optimally designed for their specific needs (Clark, 
Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). Thus if a modifier is used it should be relevant to the 
contextual setting (Engelhardt et al., 2006; Levison, 2000).  
When misspecification does occur however, speakers appear more likely to overspecify 
their utterance rather than leave addressees with an underspecified description (Deutsch & 
Pechmann, 1982; Ferreira et al., 2005; Gann & Barr, 2014). Various studies have shown 
that overspecification is a common feature of referential descriptions and occurs when 
contextual support is available to speaker but not the addressee (Horton & Keysar, 1996; 
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & 
Ferreira, 2006) and also when contextual support is completely unavailable to the speaker 
(Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Pechmann, 1989).  
For example, Deutsch and Pechmann (1982) found that overspecifications were 
commonplace and were produced frequently on over one quarter of trials in their study. 
The authors argued that these misspecifications were actually beneficial for the listener and 
that rather than hinder listeners’ understanding, overspecification led to a more effective 
performance. Conversely, Engelhardt et al. (2006) found a similar rate of overspecification 
in their study (speakers overspecified descriptions on nearly one third of trials) but argued 
that participants’ eye movements revealed confusion with overly-specific descriptions. 
Engelhardt (et al., 2006) and Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers and Carlson, (1999), have 
argued that overspecifications may lead to a lack of comprehension and an impairment in 
communication.  
Whilst there has been debate over the merit of overspecifying descriptions, research 
indicates that speakers will frequently adapt unsuitable or misspecified descriptions based 
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on feedback received from the addressee. For example, in a referential communication 
game, Horton and Gerrig (2002) had participants describe items to two separate matchers 
who had different subsets of knowledge. In test trials participants were tasked with 
describing referents to the alternative matcher from the one that they had established a 
precedent with. The authors found greater audience design after the second partner switch 
compared to the first switch. This indicated that the feedback speakers received from the 
first switch motivated them to consider the listener’s needs more carefully in subsequent 
interactions (Barr & Keysar, 2006; Horton & Gerrig, 2002). In a similar referential task 
Gann and Barr (2014) found that participants relied on feedback (when available) to 
moderate their referential descriptions to addressees. However, when feedback was 
unavailable, speakers depended on their own self-assessments of referential adequacy. 
Gann & Barr (2014) suggest that in these instances, speakers will often rely on a process 
monitoring and adjustment to incrementally adapt utterances in order to suit the listener’s 
referential needs.  
1.3 – Clark’s “Optimal Design” vs. The Monitoring and Adjustment Model 
Herbert H. Clark and colleagues (Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & 
Murphy, 1982; Clark et al., 1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) have provided the most 
influential account of common ground in communication. Similarly to Grice (1975), Clark 
et al. (1983) highlight the conversational goal of “The Principle of Optimal Design” (p. 
246) - the speaker must design his utterance in a way which he believes is optimal for the 
listener. Accordingly, as a consequence of this principle, the listener must be able to 
understand the meaning of the utterance in coordination with the rest of the common 
ground they share with the speaker. It is argued that interlocutors use a series of co-
presence heuristics to decipher what information lies within their common ground (Clark 
& Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 1982). These co-presence heuristics are used to short-
circuit a potentially infinite recursive process and enable interlocutors to solve the mutual 
knowledge paradox (see Clark & Marshall, 1981 for a background summary).  
The heuristics relied upon can be split into three main categories: 
(a) Community membership: this depends upon information that is part of the socio-
cultural background that two interlocutors share. Each shared community/sub-
community (for example Mark and Jane are both Glaswegians) will have a 
common body of knowledge, assumptions and beliefs that those in that particular 
community will assume to be universally known. In the example above we can 
conclude that Mark and Jane both have a shared knowledge of the city of Glasgow. 
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(b) Physical co-presence: information that is shared or experienced in the physical 
environment. For example, Mark and Jane both visit the clothes department store 
together. The department store therefore forms part of their common ground. When 
Jane refers to something she sees on display, she can assume that Mark has a 
common understanding of the scene she is referring to. 
(c) Linguistic co-presence: information that is shared as part of a conversation. Once 
Mark has understood which item Jane is referring to with the phrase “the blue 
denim jeans” both interlocutors can assume that this term (and the item associated 
with it) is now part of their common knowledge.  
Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981) state that the complex process of definite reference 
requires a particular type of memory representation which helps the individual to encode 
whether information in a particular scenario meets the triple co-presence heuristics. Thus 
Clark and colleagues suggest that communicators use a reference diary to keep track of 
this process. In order for interlocutors to design and understand references they must 
consult their reference diary to do so (Clark & Marshall, 1978; Clark & Murphy, 1982).  
Accordingly, this “diary” helps an individual to keep note of the events in which they have 
taken part with others. Consider once again the interaction between Mark and Jane. In 
order for Jane to now refer to “the cashier” she must be sure that Mark had been present 
when she interacted with the cashier at the till of the clothes department store. If Jane does 
not have this event stored within her reference diary (or if she does not have another basis 
for common ground readily available) she cannot be certain that Mark will understand that 
“the cashier” is part of their common ground (Clark & Murphy, 1982). Using her reference 
diary Jane will tailor utterances towards her common knowledge with Mark. Furthermore, 
in accordance with this model, it is likely that when interacting with Jane, Mark will also 
confine the information he considers to mutual knowledge (Clark & Carlson, 1981).  
The concept of a reference diary is appealing as it identifies memory encoding and 
retrieval as having a crucial role in the formation of descriptions in conversational common 
ground (Horton, 2008). That is, knowledge of one’s own experiences in combination with 
an understanding of the knowledge and beliefs that others hold must be stored and 
retrieved in some manner. However, although idea of a reference diary is a useful 
construct, it does not fully explain how memory and common ground interact to help the 
speaker to produce optimal descriptions for the listener (Horton, 2008; Horton & Gerrig, 
2016).  
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The main critique of Clarks et al.’s (1983) Principle of Optimal Design is that it assumes 
that communicators are capable of maintaining very detailed records of individuals, which 
are readily available in memory to help the speaker to design their utterances. Moreover, 
Clark’s Optimal Design theory does not explain how an individual decides what the correct 
level of detail to encode would be, as evidence of triple co-presence is likely to be 
available in most instances (Horton, 2008). If individuals encoded triple co-presence in 
every possible occasion then the information stored in one’s reference diary would quickly 
become representationally unbounded. Furthermore, if information was encoded in a more 
selective manner then it would be unclear what the selection criteria would be (Horton, 
2008). 
Horton and Keysar (1996) attempted to build on the insights offered by Clark et al.’s 
(1983) by proposing an alternative model that attempts to outline the role of common 
ground in language production. The authors argue that the Optimal Design Model is flawed 
as it focuses on the final product of the production system without considering the role of 
common ground in the production process. Horton and Keysar (1996) compare and 
contrast the Initial Design Model (incorporating the principle of optimal design proposed 
by Clark et al. 1983) to their alternative Monitoring and Adjustment Model. Whilst the 
Initial Design Model takes the addressees’ perspective into account (the speaker uses only 
information which is incorporated in the common ground) the Monitoring and Adjustment 
Model does not consider common ground in the initial planning of utterances. Horton and 
Keysar (1996) argue that knowledge of what the conversational partner does or does not 
know may be too costly to use routinely when planning descriptions. Additionally, in some 
cases the information that is available to the speaker may already form part of the 
speaker’s common ground with the listener. 
Thus the Monitoring and Adjustment Model argues that speakers plan descriptions by 
using information that is readily available to themselves irrespective of whether the listener 
shares this information in their common ground with the speaker (Horton & Keysar, 1996). 
If a speaker adopts this model then it is likely that they will occasionally include 
information in their description that is not comprehensible to the listener. Horton and 
Keysar (1996) therefore assume that the speaker will monitor their speech and adjust any 
descriptions that contain content which lies outwith the mutual knowledge between the 
speaker and the addressee. The Monitoring and Adjustment model argues that common 
ground functions as a correction mechanism during referential communication.  
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Notably, even if speakers follow the alternative Initial Design Model (in line with Clark et 
al. 1983), there will be occasions where the speaker may make an error and produce an 
utterance that falls outwith the common ground. Therefore the role of monitoring in the 
Initial Design Model is simply to detect any errors made. Accordingly, in the Initial Design 
Model speakers rely on common ground as utterances are planned using mutual knowledge 
from the offset (Horton & Keysar, 1996).  
Horton and Keysar (1996) directly tested both models in an experiment which required the 
participant to play the role of the speaker in a communication game with a confederate 
who played the role of the listener. Participants had to describe a series of objects for the 
confederate to identify. In order to tailor descriptions towards the listener’s referential 
needs the speaker was required to occasionally add an adjective into their description when 
the stimuli appeared in the “shared context” condition (for example “it’s the small circle”). 
However, on other occasions when the stimuli appeared in the “privileged context” it was 
not necessary for the speaker to provide an adjective in their utterance.  
Horton and Keysar’s (1996) study provided evidence showing that interlocutors followed 
the Monitoring and Adjustment Model. Results indicated that when participants were not 
under any time constraints they seemed to incorporate common ground in their 
descriptions. However, when time constraints were added, participants appeared to discard 
their consideration of common ground. These results suggest that under pressure speakers 
lack the sufficient resources and time to monitor their utterances for correction. As a result 
of this, they tend to fall back on their initial egocentric descriptions (Keysar, Barr, & 
Horton, 1998). Thus utterances which initially looked like they were specifically tailored 
for the listener only happened to appear like they were designed in such a way.  Horton and 
Keysar (1996) argue that this is evidence that speakers were not engaging in audience 
design by accounting for common ground in the initial planning of descriptions – they 
were following the Monitoring and Adjustment model and adapting descriptions for the 
addressee when necessary. 
1.4 – Common Ground in Comprehension  
Although the initial proposal of common ground in language use (Clark & Carlson, 1981, 
1982) was heavily challenged (Johnson-Laird, 1982; Sperber, 1982; Sperber & Wilson, 
1982) most researchers now agree that it is a concept which plays an important role in 
comprehension (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998). Since Clark and Carlson’s early work 
there have been a number of influential studies that have developed the original theory and 
enhanced our understanding of common ground in referential communication. In 
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particular, studies that reveal how common ground impacts upon comprehension have 
provided important insights into how common ground affects language production in 
audience design. 
For example, Keysar et al. (1998) conducted two experiments in which participants played 
the role of addressee and interpreted instructions from a confederate speaker. The authors 
introduced two alternative hypotheses that outline the role of common ground in audience 
design. The Restricted Search Hypothesis proposes that the search for referents in 
conversation is limited to items which are in common ground. Keysar et al. (1998) note 
that it would be logical for listeners to limit their search to referents within the common 
ground as speakers are expected to follow the principle of optimal design (Clark et al., 
1983). Thus under this hypothesis, pragmatic knowledge of common ground will lead the 
search for conversational referents from the very beginning of the interaction (Keysar et 
al., 1998).  
The Unrestricted Search Hypothesis offers an alternative view of the role of common 
ground. This hypothesis suggests that when addressees understand definite reference their 
search for referents is not guided by mutual knowledge. For example, under this hypothesis 
when Jane refers to “the cashier” when talking to Mark, Mark’s unrestricted search will 
select an available “cashier” regardless of whether or not he/she is in common ground with 
Jane. This hypothesis is supported by previous findings (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, 
1994, 1998; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998) and suggests that under certain conditions 
comprehenders do not assume speakers follow the Principle of Optimal Design. 
Consequently, it is proposed that communicators do not rely on common ground unless 
they make an error (Keysar et al., 1998). Similarly to Horton and Keysar’s (1996) 
Monitoring and Adjustment Model, the authors propose the Perspective Adjustment Model. 
This model argues that speakers monitor their descriptions and if a violation of common 
ground is detected their utterance plans are revised.  
The results obtained supported the Perspective Adjustment Model. Reaction time and error 
rate data provided evidence for the Unrestricted Search Hypothesis – when participant’s 
own privileged knowledge provided them with a potential referent which was inaccessible 
to the speaker, their unrestricted search caused greater response times and more errors 
when responding to the questions put forward by the speaker (Keysar et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, in a second experiment, results indicated that when a potential competitor 
referent was visible to the listener (but not to the speaker) saccade launch towards the 
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target item was delayed for an average of 180ms – further indicating that participants 
followed the Unrestricted Search Hypothesis (Keysar, et al., 1998).  
These results suggest that when the interlocutors had differing perspectives the addressee’s 
unrestricted search selected the wrong referent and required the listener to correct their 
initial search. Keysar et al. (1998) argue that the slow response times to correct mistakes 
reflected the interference of non-mutual referents. Accordingly, the Perspective 
Adjustment Model explains this pattern of results - common ground acts as a correction 
mechanism for interpretation errors (Keysar et al., 1998). Similarly to the participants in 
Horton and Keysar’s (1996) study, addressees were shown to interpret descriptions from 
an egocentric perspective (Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998).  
Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner (2000) also found evidence indicating that interlocutors 
follow an “unrestricted search” when interpreting language in conversation. Keysar et al. 
(2000) proposed that addressees will occasionally use an egocentric approach which will 
lead them to consider potential referents which are not in common ground with the 
speaker. In this study participants played the role of the addressee in a communication 
game with a confederate director. The director received a photograph of the grid (showing 
where the objects were supposed to be placed) and instructed the addressee in moving the 
objects around the grid to match the photograph.  
During the trial the director provided the addressee with an ambiguous instruction – for 
example “move the small candle”. Importantly, the addressee had a shared perspective with 
the director that enabled them to view one potential referent. However, the addressee also 
had their own privileged perspective that provided an additional potential referent which 
was occluded from the director’s view. It was hypothesised that if the participant initially 
considered the candle which was occluded from the director, this would suggest that the 
addressee was adopting an egocentric interpretation in their search for referents (see Figure 
1 for example of stimuli). 
The results of the eye tracking study revealed that participants fixated on the object (which 
was occluded from the confederate speaker) nearly twice as often when it contained a 
competitor referent (e.g. another candle) compared to the control condition when the 
location contained a non-referent. Furthermore, participants spent 242ms longer fixating on 
the occluded item in the competitor condition compared to the control condition (Keysar et 
al., 2000). The egocentric approach appeared to be so compelling for participants that it 
was able to override their knowledge that the speaker could not possibly see the occluded  
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item. Thus the results of Keysar et al. ( 2000) further demonstrate that listeners are prone to 
using an egocentric perspective when interpreting referential descriptions and do not 
always take into account their common ground with the speaker.  
Whilst Keysar and colleagues provide substantial evidence which supports the Perspective 
Adjustment Model, both Hanna, Tanenhaus, and Trueswell, (2003) and Nadig and Sedivy, 
(2002) argue that these findings also support the Partial Constraint Hypothesis. This 
hypothesis assumes that common ground is one of a number of cues influencing the 
comprehension system. According to this model, the effects of common ground are 
immediate but only partial, as other cues may be available to the individual that provide 
additional information which is not in the common ground of the two interlocutors (Hanna 
et al., 2003; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002).  
Nadig and Sedivy (2002) supported this hypothesis by recording the eye movements of 
five year old children whilst they played in a referential communication game with an adult 
confederate speaker. Similarly to Keysar et al. (2000), the authors found interference from 
private knowledge but also found strong evidence indicating that children consulted 
common ground in both comprehension and language production. Nadig and Sedivy 
(2002) argue that their findings indicate that children use rapid common ground constraints 
in comprehension and therefore refute Horton and Keysar, (1996) and Keysar et al.'s 
Figure 1: Stimuli from the Keysar et al. (2000) study. The occluded slots in the grid ensure that the 
addressee and director have distinct views of the grid. The addressee has privileged information as 
they can see behind the occluded slots which block the director’s view. In this example the 
addressee hears a key instruction (referring to “the small candle”).  Based on this description, the 
addressee may potentially pick out a different candle (the occluded candle) from the one the director 
is referring to (the shared candle). Taken from Keysar, Barr, Balin and Brauner (2000). 
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(1998) suggestion that common ground is delayed to a later “monitoring” stage in 
processing. Hanna et al. (2003) found similar results when testing adult participants in an 
eyetracking study. During the early stages of comprehension listeners were more likely to 
look at the target shape which was in common ground compared to a matching shape 
which was only visible to the participant. Together these findings appear to support the 
Partial Constraint Hypothesis and suggest that interlocutors do not adopt a completely 
egocentric approach to referential communication (Barr & Keysar, 2006). 
Notably, Pickering and Garrod's (2004) Interactive Alignment Model also provides an 
alternative account which differs from the traditional view of common ground posited by 
Clark and colleagues (Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 
1982; Clark et al., 1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). The Interactive Alignment Model 
proposes that conversational representations between interlocutors become aligned at 
different linguistic levels at the same time. Communicators do this by utilising each other’s 
choice of sounds, words, meanings and grammatical forms (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). 
During referential communication the overlap between communicators’ representations is 
such that a particular contribution by the speaker will result in the appropriate changes 
being made in the listener’s own representation or will initiate the process of interactive 
repair (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Interlocutors therefore build up a series of aligned 
representations which form the implicit common ground (information shared between 
interlocutors). The formation of implicit common ground means that communicators do 
not have to develop separate representations for themselves and their communicative 
partner (Garrod & Pickering, 2004).  
Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that speakers adapt their utterances only when 
information is accessible from their own situational model. This accessibility is from 
aligned representations which reflect the implicit common ground and can therefore be 
incidentally helpful to the listener. This idea is similar to previous research which has 
suggested that speakers can produce utterances that may appear to be helpful for the 
listener without the speaker actually designing their description with the listener in mind 
(e.g. Brown & Dell, 1987; Horton & Keysar, 1996). 
Pickering and Garrod (2004) believe that implicit common ground is built up through an 
automatic process and is utilised in straightforward processes of repair. Communicators 
only rely on full common ground when it is absolutely necessary. Thus full common 
ground acts to repair misalignment. This interpretation is in line with the view of Horton 
and Keysar (1996) and Keysar et al. (1998) who argue that common ground acts as a 
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correction mechanism. Full common ground is predominantly only used in times of 
difficulty when interlocutors have become radically misaligned (Pickering & Garrod, 
2004).  
1.5 – Challenging Clark’s Principle of Optimal Design 
The research reviewed thus far indicates that although there are varying accounts detailing 
the role of common ground in referential communication most appear to differ with Clarks 
et al’s. (1983) original view of “Optimal Design”. As previously noted, the “Optimal 
Design” model assumes that speakers adhere to the Principle of Optimal Design which 
specifies that speakers will only include information in their description which is included 
in the common ground of the speaker and addressee (Clark et al., 1983). The studies 
outlined by Horton and Keysar (1996), Keysar et al. (1998); Keysar et al. (2000) and 
Pickering and Garrod (2004) diverge from this view and tend to support the idea that “full” 
common ground (Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 1982; 
Clark et al., 1983, Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) may be unnecessary for routine referential 
communication. Both Horton and Keysar (1996) and Pickering and Garrod (2004) agree 
that the process of assessing common ground is “too costly” to incorporate regularly into 
every single interaction with another interlocutor. Instead consideration of common ground 
is viewed as an optional process which may be undertaken by the speaker when resources 
are not too taxing.  
Keysar et al. (1998) go further by challenging Clark and Carlson’s (1981) assumption 
about optimality in common ground. Keysar et al. (1998) argue that their Perspective 
Adjustment Model may in fact be considered “optimal” if one accounts for the additional 
cost associated with consulting common ground throughout an interaction in Clark and 
Carlson’s (1981) “Optimal Design” approach. The additional demand that common ground 
places on an individual’s cognitive resources may make following the Perspective 
Adjustment Model worthwhile – even if it results in the occasional referential error 
(Keysar et al. 1998). 
The idea that speakers choose their utterances based on information which is more readily 
accessible to themselves, rather than their addressee, is supported by a large variety of 
evidence suggesting egocentric tendencies in language production (Engelhardt et al., 2006; 
Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Gann & Barr, 2014; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Wardlow 
Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006; Wardlow Lane & Liersch, 2012). These findings will 
be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 4. Importantly, they imply that speakers will 
frequently include information in their descriptions that is unhelpful or misleading for the 
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listener (Gann & Barr, 2014). For instance, there is no evidence that speakers who have 
entrained on calling a very typical candle as “the unmelted candle” are any more likely to 
revert spontaneously and autonomously to the basic-level description “the candle” when 
the precedent is not in common ground with the listener as compared to when it is (Gann & 
Barr, 2014, see also Brennan & Clark, 1996). Thus consideration of the addressee’s 
informational needs is only one factor which governs whether or not a speaker continues to 
follow an established precedent or whether the speaker tailors their description to suit the 
current context of the interaction. 
1.6 – A Memory-Based Approach to Common Ground and Audience Design 
Following this initial debate, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) introduced an alternative model 
which reconceptualised the role of common ground in referential communication. In their 
influential paper “Conversational Common Ground and Memory Processes in Language 
Production” Horton and Gerrig argue that the characteristics frequently attributed to 
conversational common ground are actually properties of ordinary memory processes. 
Crucially, the memory-based model emphasises the role that ordinary encoding and 
retrieval processes play in communication (Horton, 2008; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b).  
The authors outline two separate processes - Commonality Assessment and Message 
Formation, which they argue represent the different aspects involved in tailoring 
descriptions for addressees. Horton and Gerrig (2005a) identify both commonality 
assessment and message formation as playing a key role in audience design. When a 
speaker considers commonality assessment they take into account the likelihood that a 
specific piece of information is shared with the addressee. For example, when Jane turns to 
Mark and says “I’m going to Naomi’s flat later” she assumes that Mark knows who 
“Naomi” is. According to the memory-based model, commonality assessment frequently 
develops from the speaker’s automatic recognition that particular information can be 
considered familiar or not with a specific context. This apparent familiarity can also 
influence message formation – with speakers more likely to use certain forms of reference 
if the appropriate linguistic representations are accessible at that particular time (Horton & 
Gerrig, 2016).  Importantly, when the speaker engages in message formation they consider 
how best to construct their description in relation to their commonality belief. Thus when 
Jane refers to “Naomi” she has to consider whether this utterance is the most effective way 
of referring to her friend. Without providing any surname or additional detail Jane assumes 
that Mark can uniquely identify “Naomi” by her first name alone.  
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Horton and Gerrig (2005a) note that although both commonality assessment and message 
formation are related they involve separate and unique aspects of audience design. Jane’s 
belief that she shares knowledge with Mark differs from her consideration of how to design 
utterances which account for this belief (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). Importantly, the success 
of the speaker’s memory retrieval will determine whether commonality assessment 
functions effectively or not. Commonality assessment is dependent upon the normal 
episodic memory traces that are encoded during everyday interactions. Conversely, 
message formation is influenced by the speaker’s estimation of the information which is 
accessible in the addressee’s own memory (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). 
In addition to this, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) argue that the establishment of both 
commonality assessment and message formation as separate concepts helps to identify two 
possible ways in which audience design could fail. Firstly, audience design may fail if the 
speaker incorrectly assumes commonality between themselves and the listener. For 
example, if Mark replies to Jane by saying -“Naomi…who?” it becomes clear that Jane has 
incorrectly assumed that Mark shares commonality with her. Alternatively, Jane may 
provide too much detail and assume that she does not share commonality with Mark - “I’m 
going to Naomi Mawson’s flat later”. This may even cause Mark to correct Jane – “Yes I 
know who Naomi is!”  
Secondly, audience design can fail due to the speaker’s inability to successfully adjust their 
message formation. In such an instance the speaker will provide an utterance which is 
unsuccessful in specifying who the intended referent is, despite the referent being mutually 
known to both interlocutors. In this case, Mark would have to seek clarification from Jane 
– “Which Naomi are you talking about?” Arguably, both of these possible failures in 
audience design highlight ways in which the speaker may adopt a more egocentric 
approach to language production by producing utterances which are comprehensible to 
themselves without fully accounting for the addressee’s referential needs. 
1.7 – Partner Specificity in Audience Design 
Central to Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) theory is the idea that conversational partners can 
act as memory cues for the retrieval of information. This retrieval takes place via a process 
known as resonance – a quick, passive and effortless mechanism that enables cues in 
working memory to interact in parallel with information stored in long term memory 
(Horton, 2008; Ratcliff, 1978). Previously, Brennan and Clark (1996) proposed a similar 
idea to this by underlining the role of partner specific conceptual pacts between 
interlocutors. Accordingly, Brennan and Clark (1996) argue that when communicators 
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entrain on a description, the mapping between the referent and the entrained expression is 
linked with the interlocutors involved in the entrainment, thus making it part of their 
common ground (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Clark, 1992, 1996, Clark 
& Marshall, 1978, 1981). Similarly, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) argue that individuals 
function as highly salient cues and can enable the automatic retrieval of associated 
information. Crucially, according to this model, memories that are most frequently and 
consistently associated with a particular cue will be most likely to be available for 
reference production (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a).  
Following Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) initial paper, Horton (2007) argued that 
conversational partners can act as contextual cues in the same manner that different rooms 
or physical contexts can cue automatic retrieval of information. In a picture-naming task, 
Horton (2007) found that naming latencies were shortest for responses which were 
associated with the original partner the description had been entrained with compared to 
descriptions associated with a new conversational partner. In this study, Horton (2007) 
suggests that the salience of conversational partners as memory cues influences the 
accessibility of lexical and conceptual information associated with that individual even in 
the absence of an intent to communicate with that person. Thus the key idea behind the 
memory-based model is similar to that of Brennan and Clark (1996): if an interlocutor 
develops a strong enough association between their conversational partner and relevant 
information there is a high likelihood that the information will be regarded as shared 
knowledge between both communicators (Horton, 2008). However, whilst this is an 
appealing idea, recent work by Brown-Schmidt and Horton (2014) failed to replicate 
Horton’s original findings - raising some doubt over the proposal that conversational 
partners can act as memory cues in referential communication.  
Brennan and Hanna (2009) highlight that the memory-based model gains support from 
studies which show that common ground established with a specific partner can be 
considered in the earliest moments of language processing (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004;  
Hanna, Tanenhaus & Truswell, 2003; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). 
However, the authors also note that the memory-based model’s assertion of partner 
specificity is incompatible with Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) alignment theory which 
argues that precedent, not the speaker’s identity, is important. Partner specificity also lacks 
support from two-stage models, which argue that early language processing is egocentric 
in nature and that partner specific adjustments materialize later as more effortful 
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amendments or repairs (e.g. Brown & Dell, 1987; Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Horton & Keysar, 
1996; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, Barr, Balin, et al., 1998; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007). 
In line with the two-stage model approach to reference production, researchers have found 
an overall lack of empirical support for the memory-based model. For example, Barr and 
Keysar (2002) failed to find evidence supporting the role of partner specificity in 
entrainment. The authors argued that if entrainment is partner specific then a precedent 
established with a speaker should be constrained when an entirely new speaker uses a 
previous expression. Barr and Keysar (2002) predicted that a new speaker would cause 
addressees to be slower to look at and reach out for target objects in their experiment. The 
results of the study showed that addressees were equally as fast to look at and reach out for 
objects irrespective of whom the speaker was. The authors concluded that this was because 
addressees relied on referring precedents because they were available in memory and not 
because they were partner specific (Barr & Keysar, 2002). Additionally, further evidence 
indicates that entrainment effects reflect general expectations about language use which are 
not linked to a listener’s partner specific beliefs (Kronmüller & Barr, 2007). 
However, other researchers have challenged these findings. For example, Metzing and 
Brennan (2003) questioned the methodological validity of Barr and Keysar’s (2002) results 
and found evidence for partner specificity in memory using a similar paradigm. 
Furthermore, Brown-Schmidt (2009) suggests that the lack of live interaction between the 
participant and confederate in Barr and Keysar’s (2002) study may have impacted upon 
performance in their experiment. In Barr and Keysar’s (2002) design participants moved 
objects around a grid according to the instructions provided by a confederate. Brown-
Schmidt (2009) argues that this prevented participants from collaboratively establishing 
entrained descriptions.  Additionally, Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, and Ryskin, (2015) provide a 
similar argument noting that the conversational partner is more likely to be encoded with 
information when they are  communicatively relevant to the conversation. The authors 
suggest that this enables the partner to become more strongly bound in memory. Brown-
Schmidt et al. (2015) note that partner specific effects are absent or reduced in experiments 
that incorporate limited partner interaction in their design (e.g. Barr, 2008; Barr & Keysar, 
2002; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brown & Dell, 1987; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007) in 
comparison to studies which involve extensive interactions between participants and show 
greater partner specific effects (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller, Grodner, 
& Tanenhaus, 2008; Lockridge & Brennan, 2002). 
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Taking into account the disparity in these findings we felt it was necessary to further test 
the concept of partner specificity in audience design. In the remainder of this thesis, I set 
out to investigate an alternative retrieval fluency hypothesis which seeks to further our 
understanding of how memory influences audience design and tests some of the key 
assumptions of Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model. 
1.8 – Thesis Motivation and Hypothesis 
Our decision to develop an alternative hypothesis is motivated by a lack of conclusive 
evidence in favour of Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model. Several studies 
have failed to support the assumption of partner specificity in common ground (e.g. Barr & 
Keysar, 2002; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007, 2015). Other research has shown that partner 
specificity only occurs in interactive dialogue settings and suggests that stimulus 
characteristics and the number of critical trials in the study may also effect the outcome 
(Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Furthermore, we note that support for the memory-based model 
has frequently been based on Horton's (2007) study (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2009, 2012; 
Brown-Schmidt et al., 2015; Gorman et al., 2013; Horton, 2008; Horton & Slaten, 2012). 
Notably, the findings from Horton’s study are characterised by a low effect size and have 
recenlty failed to replicate (Brown-Schmidt and Horton, 2014).  
As mentioned previously, resonance plays an important role in Horton and Gerrig’s 
(2005a) theory and helps to facilitate the concept of partner specificity in audience design. 
Since resonance involves a parallel search of memory, this makes it possible for a range of 
associated information to become available on the basis of relatively local cues (Horton, 
2008). Horton (2008) notes that the memory-based model draws on previous evidence 
from the memory literature. For example the “Search of Associative Memory” (SAM, 
Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) and the “Retrieving Effectively from Memory” (REM, Shiffrin 
& Steyvers, 1997) models both identify memory retrieval as being a cue dependent search 
of long-term memory. In particular, the REM states that contextual information available 
when encoding is very likely to be be incorporated as part of relevant memory traces 
(Horton, 2008; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997). 
Accordingly, along with partner specificity, the memory-based model therefore suggests 
that interlocutors will store additional episodic representations of the contextual 
information of a conversation in their memory (e.g. context of surroundings, lighting in the 
room, colour of objects) and depending on the strengh of these memories, these factors 
should all influence how the speaker produces a description for the listener. Crucially, 
although some authors (e.g. Gorman, Gregg-Harrison, Marsh, & Tanenhaus, 2013; Hanna 
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et al., 2003; Metzing & Brennan, 2003) have found evidence supporting partner specificity 
in common ground, we note that research thus far has failed to account for the effect that 
these additional episodic representations may have on audience design performance. In 
order to determine whether partner specificity plays a significant role in audience design, it 
is important to de-confound these additional contextual effects available in memory, from 
common ground. Thus to provide more conclusive evidence in favour of Horton and 
Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model, and in particular their supposition of partner 
specificity in audience design, experiments testing this theory must be able to distinguish 
between effects of memory and effects of common ground. If additional  episodic 
representations are not controlled for, merely showing that memory can impact upon 
communication does not  provide support for Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based 
model. 
In this thesis, I set out an alternative hypothesis which proposes that during audience 
design, rather than repeatedly consulting their common ground with a conversational 
partner, speakers make snap judgements regarding the contextual appropriateness of a 
referring expression using heuristic assessments. We suggest that speakers will often avoid 
generating new descriptions by using a form of attribute substitution (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002) – using a previous description that is more readily available in their 
memory. Thus speakers will often provide descriptions which appears to be shaped with 
the addressee’s informational needs in mind, when in fact they are actually basing their 
utterances on the heuristic attribute of “ease of recall” (Barr, 2014). In particular, we test 
whether speakers judge the appropriateness of a given expression as a function of retrieval 
fluency - the relative ease or difficulty with which they are able to process information 
(Oppenheimer, 2008). A key factor which may influence the speaker’s likelihood to use 
the retrieval fluency heuristic is the impact that episodic representations (contextual cues 
available in the environment e.g. colour of objects, visual similaity between past and 
present contexts) may have on memory. Our hypothesis accounts for the effect these 
representations may have during audience design and therefore serves as a further test of 
Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model. In the following chapter, I will outline 
our retrieval fluency hypothesis in further detail and provide an overview of the logic and 
design of the experiments that will follow. 
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Chapter 2 – 
The Retrieval Fluency Hypothesis 
 
 
2.1 – Retrieval Fluency as a Theoretical Concept 
As outlined in Chapter 1, our alternative hypothesis enables us to further test the key 
assumptions of Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model. Our hypothesis 
proposes that rather than continually consulting their common ground with an addressee 
during audience design, speakers make snap judgments regarding the contextual 
appropriateness of a referring expression using heuristic assessments. Following recent 
work by Gann & Barr (2014), we investigate the hypothesis that speakers judge the 
appropriateness of a given referring expression as a function of retrieval fluency - of how 
easily that expression comes to mind (Oppenheimer, 2008) when attempting to 
linguistically encode the referent. However, before we outline our retrieval fluency 
hypothesis in full, it is important to highlight the research that has influenced the 
development of our theory. 
The notion of fluency as a cue in decision making has a long history (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008), but it has received little attention in the context 
of audience design and language production. Processing fluency is defined as an 
individual’s subjective experience of the ease or difficulty with which they are able to 
process information (Oppenheimer, 2008). According to (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 
220) all cognitive tasks can be labelled along a continuum from “effortless” to “highly 
effortful” which creates a parallel metacognitive experience ranging from “fluent” to 
“disfluent”. Furthermore, Alter & Oppenheimer (2009) identify five “tribes of fluency” 
which can impact upon an individual’s experience: perceptual fluency, embodied cognitive 
fluency, linguistic fluency, higher order cognitive fluency and memory-based fluency (see 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 for a comprehensive overview). With respect to our retrieval 
fluency hypothesis it is the latter of these “tribes” – memory-based fluency (i.e. retrieval 
fluency) that we are primarily interested in.  
As a sub-category of processing fluency, retrieval fluency can be understood as the relative 
ease with which an individual is able to bring to mind expressions or examples which 
conform to a specific rule (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Therefore we can surmise that 
expressions which have stronger levels of fluency (more fluent) are more easily retrievable 
in memory in comparison with expressions that have weaker levels of fluency (disfluent).   
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Perhaps the most notable example of retrieval fluency is provided by Tversky & 
Kahneman (1973) in their seminal paper detailing the role that the availability heuristic 
plays on an individual’s judgements. Although Tversky & Kahneman don’t use the 
specific term “fluency” in their paper, their work clearly demonstrates the role that 
retrieval fluency plays on memory (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). For example, 
participants were asked to retrieve words from memory that either began with the letter 
“K” or had “K” as the third letter in the word (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Participants 
were significantly better at retrieving words beginning with the letter “K” due to the ease 
of retrieval (greater retrieval fluency) experienced in their memory. This led to participants 
judging words beginning with the letter “K” to be more frequent in comparison to those 
which had “K” as the third letter. In line with this, research has indicated that fluency can 
have an effect upon judgements across a wide range of domains (Oppenheimer, 2008). 
These include judgements on intelligence (Oppenheimer, 2006), truthfulness (McGlone & 
Tofighbakhsh, 2000; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), likability (Bornstein & Dagostino, 1992; 
Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Zajonc, 1968) and famousness (Jacoby, Woloshyn, 
& Kelley, 1989). 
2.2 – Episodic Memory and the Encoding Specificity Principle 
Since the early 1970’s researchers have made the distinction between episodic and 
semantic memory (Tulving, 1972, 2002). Unlike semantic memory, which enables us to 
store our general knowledge (Ashcraft & Radvansky, 2010) episodic memory refers to the 
ability to learn, store and retrieve information about our own personal experiences 
(Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2010). Since its theoretical conception, researchers have 
focussed on understanding how episodic experiences are stored and processed in memory. 
For example, early work by (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) focussed on the idea that storage in 
episodic memory is influenced by depth of processing. This theory suggests that 
information that is processed at a shallow level (receiving only incidental attention) is 
stored less effectively than information processed at a deeper level. The authors proposed 
that deeper processing (which involves the elaboration of the representation of information 
stored in memory) is associated with more detailed, stronger and longer lasting memory 
traces (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Ashcraft & Radvansky, 2010).  
Other research has focussed on how episodic memory stores specific types of information. 
For example, Palmeri, Goldinger, and Pisoni (1993) studied the role of episodic memory in 
voice and speech encoding. Their results suggested that voice information is encoded in 
memory automatically without conscious or strategic processes. Through episodic 
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memory, voice information can be stored in robust multidimensional representations that 
are retained in long-term memory for prolonged periods of time (Palmeri et al., 1993). In 
later research Goldinger (1996), extended this finding by showing that episodic traces of 
spoken words can impact upon recognition memory for a day and perceptual identification 
for up to a week after initial encoding. 
Logan, (1988, 1990, 1992, 1997) took a different approach in investigating the function of 
episodic memory by developing a model outlining how memory can be utilised in the 
development of expert performance and automaticity in skill acquisition. In Logan’s 
Instance Theory of Automaticity (ITA), episodic memory functions as a learning 
mechanism. Experience with a task builds separate memory traces that can then be 
retrieved when the task is repeated (Logan, 1997). Logan argues that task performance 
becomes automatic when it is based on the memory retrieval of past solutions to a problem. 
Thus when these solutions become reliable enough, performance can be based entirely on 
episodic memory retrieval (Logan, 1997).  
More recently, work by Yonelinas (1994) has focussed on recognition in episodic memory. 
The Dual-Process Signal Detection Model (DPSD) differentiates between recollection and 
familiarity in memory. The model asserts that recollection and familiarity differ in relation 
to the type of memory information that they provide (Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 
2010). Familiarity reflects “quantitative” memory strength and emulates a signal detection 
process where new items produce a Gaussian distribution of familiarity values. 
Accordingly, old items are therefore recognised as being more familiar than new items. In 
contrast to this, recollection is viewed as a threshold retrieval process in which 
“qualitative” information about a previous event is retrieved (Yonelinas et al., 2010). If 
recollective strength falls below a threshold then recollection will fail to produce any 
discerning evidence that an item has been encountered previously. When this occurs, 
individuals will be unable to retrieve information that discriminates between old and new 
items (Yonelinas et al., 2010).  
Building on this past research, our retrieval fluency hypothesis also draws on the 
importance of retrieval strength in memory. In particular we were influenced by the work 
of Gann and Barr (2014) who speculated that when determining how to encode a referent, 
speakers might use the strength of the memory signal associated with a particular linguistic 
expression as an index of its contextual appropriateness. The assumption that memory 
signals correlate with informational adequacy is derived from the encoding specificity 
principle of episodic memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). According to this principle, 
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events are encoded into a deeper memory representation which includes the context the 
item was in during initial encoding (Ashcraft & Radvansky, 2010). Thus the strength of a 
memory signal is a function of the similarity between encoding and retrieval contexts 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  
Evidence in support of the encoding specificity principle comes from a range of studies in 
the memory literature. For example, in Godden and Baddeley's (1975) famous scuba 
diving study, participants learned a list of words either in water or on land. Half of the 
participants recalled words in the same context that they had learned the words in, whereas 
the other half of participants recalled words in the alternative context. Crucially, the 
authors found that recall was better when participants were in the same context the 
information was originally encoded in (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). More recently, fMRI 
research has also provided evidence in support of encoding specificity principle. Vaidya, 
Zhao, Desmond, & Gabrieli (2002) found that the cortical areas which are initially 
involved in the perception of a visual experience become part of the long term memory 
trace for that particular experience, thus suggesting a neural basis for encoding specificity 
in memory (Vaidya et al., 2002).  
In line with this evidence, Gann and Barr (2014) have applied the encoding specificity 
principle to audience design performance. Accordingly, the fluency with which a speaker’s 
expressions are retrieved should depend upon the degree that the referent and the retrieval 
context match the original encoding context (see Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Gann & Barr 
(2014) propose that memory retrieval may influence the speaker’s propensity to engage in 
audience design when producing utterances for the addressee. The authors argue that 
expressions with a strong memory signal would be more likely to be deemed contextually 
appropriate by the speaker, resulting in less consideration of context and less delay in 
production, relative to expressions yielding weak memory signals.  
Gann and Barr’s (2014) retrieval fluency proposal is similar to Horton and Gerrig’s 
(2005a) memory-based theory. Crucial to Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) theory, is the idea 
that memory acts as a proxy for common ground. Accordingly, the “effects typically 
ascribed to conversational common ground are emergent properties of ordinary memory 
processes acting on ordinary memory representations” (p. 2). Horton and Gerrig (2005a) 
argue that memories that are frequently associated with a particular cue will become most 
readily available for the speaker when that cue is presented. Importantly, resonance is 
influential to the extent that the relevant cue is available within the context – with enough 
strength to reach threshold (Horton & Gerrig 2005a).  
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Similarly to the retrieval fluency proposal Horton and Gerrig (2005a) argue that the 
strength of memory associations can impact upon judgments of common ground in 
audience design. Thus the overall collection of memories encoded with a particular 
addressee (as well as the strength of these memories) will influence the probability that 
speakers will be compelled to take on strategic control of both message formation and 
commonality assessment (Horton & Gerrig, 2016). Accordingly, in the memory-based 
account, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) argue that when associations between interlocutors 
and other information are weak commonality assessment will be likely to fail.  
2.3 – Instance Theory of Automaticity 
Crucially, Gann and Barr’s (2014) proposal draws on Logan’s (1988) Instance Theory of 
Automaticity (ITA). In the section above we briefly highlighted Logan’s key idea. Logan 
(1988) argues that automaticity is memory retrieval – that performance becomes automatic 
when it is grounded in directly accessed memory retrieval of past solutions. Logan's (1988) 
theory suggests that individuals start with a general algorithm that adequately completes 
the task at hand. Individuals gain experience of specific solutions to a problem these are 
then retrieved when the same problem occurs on a separate occasion. Automization is 
therefore reflected in the switch from “algorithm-based performance to memory-based 
performance” (Logan, 1988, p. 493). For example, when an individual is first asked to 
solve a maths problem - “What is 13 x 21?” they may take a few seconds or so to compute 
their answer. Following Logan’s logic once they have figured out the solution (13 x 21 = 
273) they are likely to switch to a memory-based approach and retrieve their previous 
answer if presented with the same problem again at a later date.  
Logan (1988) argues that both encoding and retrieval are connected through attention - 
thus the same act of attention that produces encoding also produces retrieval. The ITA has 
three important assumptions: (1) memory encoding is an unavoidable, obligatory 
consequence of attention, (2) retrieval from memory is also an unavoidable, compulsory 
consequence of attention and that (3) each time an individual encounters a stimulus their 
experience is encoded, stored and retrieved separately. Thus following ITA theory, Gann 
and Barr (2014) suggested that speakers store episodic representations in memory 
involving a referent, a context, and an expression.  
The authors outline how the ITA can be applied to audience design - when the speaker first 
encounters a referent they are likely to adopt a reasoned approach in an attempt to find an 
adequate description which separates it from alternative referents. In turn, the chosen 
description then becomes linked to the cognitive antecedent conditions which represented 
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the original referential process. Accordingly this “processing episode” is then stored in the 
speaker’s memory (Gann & Barr, 2014). Subsequently, when the same antecedent 
conditions appear again this will prompt the obligatory retrieval of the previous 
description.  
Logan’s theory argues that when an individual is attempting to complete a goal within the 
same context as they were previously, they can choose how to respond. They can do this 
either by opting to recall information from memory or they can run off an algorithm which 
computes a response to the task at hand. Logan (1988) views this choice as a “race” 
between memory and the algorithm and suggests that eventually memory will always 
dominate the algorithm, as over time more and more memory instances will join the race. 
This framework also suggests that each stored episode in memory races against other 
encoded episodes. Accordingly, the interlocutor can respond using their memory 
immediately after the first episode is retrieved (Logan 1988).  
It is predicted that in a communicative environment, the greater the similarity between the 
original context and the current setting - the more likely the speaker will re-use their 
previous description (Gann & Barr, 2014; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). As mentioned 
previously, this theory proposes that speakers’ will utilise the strength of the memory 
signal associated with a particular context as a way of determining how much 
consideration they need to apply when planning their description. Gann & Barr (2014) 
suggest that the strength of the memory signal obtained - otherwise known as retrieval 
fluency, acts as a heuristic for audience design. When speakers experience a strong signal 
(greater retrieval fluency) it indicates that their previous description is likely to be 
contextually adequate – resulting in less effort being allocated to utterance planning. Thus 
the strength of the memory signal helps to gauge the need for further planning before the 
interlocutor begins to speak. When the signal is highly fluent in memory the speaker is 
likely to begin their description before they fully engage in audience design (Gann & Barr, 
2014). Thus when interlocutors experience greater levels of retrieval fluency they will be 
more likely to provide descriptions that may appear to be egocentric in nature. When the 
memory signal is weaker (less fluency in memory) speakers’ will give more consideration 
to their utterance and engage more fully in audience design before beginning their 
description.  
Importantly, the more effort the speaker allocates to a referential description, the more 
likely they are to monitor the current context and check that their description is sufficient. 
Conversely, less checking of the current conversational context would mean that the 
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speaker is more reliant on the strength of the retrieval fluency signal they experience which 
may in turn lead to more descriptive errors in audience design.  
2.4 – Retrieval Fluency as a Heuristic 
Our retrieval fluency hypothesis seeks to build upon Gann and Barr’s (2014) theory. We 
follow the suggestion that the strength of the memory cue plays an important role in 
audience design performance and propose that the algorithmic vs. memory retrieval route 
(Logan, 1988) need not be considered as a “race”. Our hypothesis suggests that if the 
memory signal associated with a particular expression crosses a threshold then this will be 
likely to cue the previous description used in that context. Thus rather than fully engaging 
in audience design (using common ground to tailor descriptions to the listener’s specific 
needs) speakers will be likely to re-use previously established descriptions formed with the 
addressee. Crucially, this will pre-empt a “race” between memory and the algorithmic 
route and prevent a thorough search of common ground for a contextually relevant 
descriptive term.  
We argue that the retrieval fluency heuristic is likely to be used as part of a default process 
that is largely performed on an unconscious level by the speaker. However, we note that 
whilst fluency can be used routinely as a useful heuristic, it is not an obligatory process. 
Occasionally, speakers may opt to consciously override the fluency effects that they 
experience and engage more fully in the process of audience design. Since the likelihood 
of using retrieval fluency as a heuristic is influenced by the strength of the memory cue 
available, the retrieval fluency hypothesis reflects an individual’s propensity to engage in 
the audience design process. Thus when the speaker experiences a weaker memory signal 
they will be less likely to use the retrieval fluency heuristic as a substitute for audience 
design. 
When the memory signal is weaker or alternatively when the speaker is confronted with a 
scenario in which no previous description comes to mind, we would expect participants to 
provide generic-listener adaptations for the listener. As outlined by Dell and Brown (1991), 
these adaptations are designed to benefit comprehension for a generic listener and are 
formed by consulting a model of the generic listener in the language community (Barr & 
Keysar, 2006). Should speakers have to rely on this approach we would expect them to 
engage in a form of monitoring and adjustment (Horton & Keysar, 1996) in an attempt to 
ensure that they provide an adequate description to the addressee. Only in circumstances 
where monitoring and adjustment fails to produce an adequate description would we then 
expect speakers to engage in full audience design by using their knowledge of their 
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common ground with the addressee to design a suitable utterance. Consistent with previous 
models (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin, et al., 1998) we argue that in these 
instances common ground is likely to function as a correction mechanism in language 
production. 
We note that our retrieval fluency hypothesis could be consistent with the Interactive 
Alignment Model proposed by Pickering and Garrod (2004). As outlined in Chapter 1, 
Pickering and Garrod’s theory argues that over time interlocutors align situation models 
during dialogue. This alignment is the result of communicators producing and interpreting 
expressions in a similar fashion to their conversational partner (Pickering & Garrod, 2006). 
We believe that our retrieval fluency hypothesis could help to explain how alignment is 
facilitated. Through conversation speakers entrain on particular descriptions of objects. As 
these descriptions are re-used speakers form stronger memory traces for these utterances, 
resulting in greater levels of retrieval fluency, which makes them more likely to be recalled 
during later interactions. This idea is consistent with work by Knutsen & Le Bigot (2012) 
who argue that reference re-use depends upon accessibility in memory, with more 
accessible references being more likely to be used again. This greater re-use of descriptions 
(due to a stronger memory signal) may help to facilitate alignment by increasing the 
likelihood that interlocutors will become more familiar with each other’s utterances. 
In summary, accounting for the background literature reviewed above, our retrieval 
fluency hypothesis has two interesting theoretical components: (1) that speakers store 
“referring episodes” that link together referents, contexts, and expressions; and (2) that 
speakers make use of the strength with which referents and contexts cue retrieval of 
expressions as one index of the extent to which such expressions are contextually 
appropriate. In the section below I detail each of our three experiments and our attempt to 
investigate the retrieval fluency hypothesis. 
2.5 – Experiment Overview: Testing the Retrieval Fluency Hypothesis 
The work contained in this doctoral thesis is intended as a direct follow-up to Gann and 
Barr’s (2014) study and serves to further test the memory-based model first put forward by 
Horton and Gerrig (2005a). The three experiments outlined in the following chapters 
document our attempt to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis: that speakers use retrieval 
fluency as a heuristic for audience design in referential communication. A key feature of 
both Experiments 1 and 2 was the manipulation of a communicatively irrelevant aspect of 
the context that stimuli items appeared in. In this way, we de-confounded memory from 
common ground use. This enabled us to test whether visual features in the environment 
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acted as a cue for memory during audience design performance. Importantly, Horton and 
Gerrig (2005a) highlight that resonance is a key part of the retrieval process in their 
memory-based model. It produces a parallel search of memory which enables a wide range 
of associated information to become accessible to the interlocutor (Horton, 2008). 
Therefore if the memory-based model is correct, altering the visual context should have an 
impact on the way in which participants access encoded information – to the extent that a 
more similar context should produce successful retrieval of previous descriptions for the 
listener. Our first two experiments tested this assumption. 
In Chapter 3, I outline the methodology and rationale behind Experiment 1. In this study, 
we presented participants with a grid containing letters of various sizes and colours. 
Participants played the role of “Director” and were tasked with describing a highlighted 
target letter to the “Matcher” confederate. Crucially, we manipulated the appearance of the 
“competitor” and “foil” items which alternated between training and test trials in such a 
way that participants would have to adapt their descriptions at the test phase in order to 
avoid misspecifying descriptions. For example, participants were shown a target letter “A” 
during training but were presented with two contrasting letters during the test phase – “A” 
vs. “a”. In this instance they would have to modify their description (e.g. “the big A”) in 
order to provide an adequate description to the addressee. We expected participants to 
experience greater retrieval fluency when the test trial configuration was highly similar to 
the training trial configuration, leading them to continue to use the same description and 
therefore make more descriptive errors than when presented with configurations that were 
dissimilar between the training and test phase. The results of this study failed to 
significantly support the retrieval fluency hypothesis. However, there was some suggestion 
of a potential effect of fluency on audience design, which prompted the motivation for our 
second experiment.  
Chapter 4 details Experiment 2. In this study we made some minor adjustments to the 
configuration and sequencing of objects and altered the stimuli presented to participants. In 
this experiment our results offered weak statistical support for the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis for audience design and indicated that participants relied on the strength of the 
memory signal present when constructing descriptions for the listener. However, the effect 
we detected was small and merited further investigation. Thus we opted to carry out one 
additional experiment which aimed to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis in a more 
communicatively relevant setting. 
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Chapter 5 outlines Experiment 3, which enabled us to apply our theory to practice. In this 
study, we had participants describe target items to one of two Matchers (both confederates) 
using an interactive webcam design. This enabled us to further test the concept of partner 
specificity (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a) whilst also assessing audience design 
using a task which de-confounded the effects of memory from the effects of common 
ground. At the test phase in this task the visual experience of the Director (participant) was 
controlled independently of the pragmatic situation, so that who the Director saw and who 
the Director was speaking to did not always coincide. Our design was fully interactive with 
participants developing their own descriptions for target objects with one of the two 
Matchers during the training phase. This set-up enabled us to test whether the speaker used 
the conversational partner they spoke to during training as a memory cue when providing 
descriptions at the test phase (e.g. Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). Crucially, this 
study allowed us address concerns raised by Brown-Schmidt (2009) and Brown-Schmidt et 
al. (2015) regarding a lack of live interaction in previous experiments which failed to find 
evidence in support of partner specificity (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2002; Kronmüller & Barr, 
2007). Our results in this experiment were in the opposite direction predicted and failed to 
support the retrieval fluency hypothesis. These findings have important implications for the 
retrieval fluency hypothesis and challenge the key assumptions of Horton and Gerrig’s 
(2005a) memory-based model for common ground and audience design.  
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the key findings from all three experiments, 
final remarks and an outline of future directions for the study of audience design in 
referential communication. 
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Chapter 3 – Experiment 1 
	
	
3.1 – Background 
3.1.1 – Audience Design in Language Production 
Chapter 1 outlined the idea that speakers choose their descriptions based on information 
that is more readily accessible to themselves, rather than their addressee. This is supported 
by research showing egocentric tendencies in speech production. Egocentrism in language 
is often demonstrated through misspecified descriptions, providing more or less 
information than the listener needs - with speakers more likely to overspecify than 
underspecify utterances for listeners (Deutsch & Pechman, 1982; Ferreira et al., 2005). As 
noted previously, Engelhardt et al. (2006) found that participants provided unnecessary, 
overspecified descriptions to a confederate in almost one third of trials. The authors note 
that speakers will overspecify when their expression encapsulates the relevant situation 
from their perspective. This means that they will fail to engage in audience design and will 
not attempt the process of adjusting their description to make it suitable for the listener. 
Further evidence shows that speakers are often unable to prevent themselves from 
providing addressees with privileged information when delivering referential descriptions - 
even when it results in a loss of points during an experimental game (Wardlow Lane et al., 
2006). These findings indicate that speakers’ failure to take into consideration their own 
unique perspective when providing descriptions is caused by autonomous, low-level 
processes which result in privileged knowledge becoming unintentionally incorporated into 
utterances (Wardlow Lane et al., 2006).  
Wardlow Lane and Liersch (2012) replicated this finding and showed that even when 
speakers are offered a monetary reward for concealing privileged information from 
addressees, they were unable to do so. Similarly to Deutsch and Pechmann (1982), the 
authors argue that overspecification may have communicative benefits - by reducing 
privileged information and increasing common ground between interlocutors. However, 
they also note that overspecified descriptions can also lead to referential errors and 
confusion for the listener, a conclusion which is supported by Engelhardt et al. (2006) and 
Sedivy et al. (1999). In addition to this, Engelhardt, Demiral and Ferreira's (2011) found 
evidence that reaction times were significantly longer when addressees heard descriptions 
that contained overspecifications. ERPs indicated a centroparietal negativity (N400) that 
appeared 200-300ms after modifier onset suggesting that unnecessary pre-nominal 
modifying expressions had a negative effect on listeners’ comprehension. Nevertheless, 
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this remains a contentious issue with some evidence indicating that overspecification does 
have communicative benefits (e.g. Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Paraboni, Masthoff, & van 
Deemter, 2006; Sonnenschein, 1984; Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1982). 
In a series of experiments, Wardlow Lane and Ferreira (2008) further tested the effect of 
privileged information on speaker descriptions. In their study, two naive participants 
played as the speaker and the addressee in a referential communication task. The 
participants were shown sets of four line drawings that consisted of pairs of objects that 
differed only in size (e.g. big vs. small triangle) and single objects that did not have a 
partner. In this study, both participants could see three of the items in the set. The speaker 
was instructed to occlude the fourth item, thus creating an object that was in their  
privileged ground. Participants were then presented with contrasting trials (where the 
target object was the same type of item as the privileged object) and non-contrasting trials 
(where the target was distinctive and did not form part of a pair). The authors measured the 
percentage of trials where participants used size-modifying descriptions in the contrasting 
vs. non-contrasting conditions.  
The results were consistent with Wardlow Lane et al. (2006) and Wardlow Lane and 
Liersch (2012) – when privileged information was more salient for the speaker they found 
it harder to avoid using that information in their descriptions (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 
2008). This effect further demonstrates egocentrism in language production as participants 
continued to use privileged information in their utterances even though it hindered their 
attempts to provide a referentially successful description. The finding that speakers use 
descriptions which are not optimal for addressees’ understanding is further supported by 
research suggesting that speakers will often fail to include optional words in descriptions 
which would have helped to prevent temporary ambiguity for the addressee  (Ferreira & 
Dell, 2000). This finding emphasises a tendency for speakers to adopt descriptive 
terminology which suits their own conversational needs rather than the needs of the 
listener. 
More recently, Gann and Barr (2014) assessed audience design performance in partner 
adaptation. In this paper the authors viewed successful speech adaptation as a type of 
expert performance “in which skilled behaviour is the result of an interplay between 
memory and attention” (p. 744). Gann and Barr (2014) had participants play the role of 
speaker in a referential communication game. In this game, half of the participants played 
with one additional participant who was the addressee and the other half played with two 
extra participants who took turns at playing as the listener. Participants saw five pictures 
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that were shown at the corners of an imaginary pentagon. The speaker was privately 
informed which object was the target item to be described and was instructed to describe 
the object to the listener without providing details of its location on the computer monitor. 
Participants played through a series of “training” and “test” trial blocks. The training phase 
enabled participants to develop experience in describing each of the target items. In the test 
block speakers referred to these items again in addition to some new objects. Speakers 
referred to two types of target item: conventional (normal everyday objects) and 
unconventional items (abstract figures). These items provided speakers with opportunities 
to underspecify and overspecify target descriptions.  
During the training phase conventional items (e.g. candle) always appeared alongside a 
less prototypical version of the object (e.g. unmelted candle). Crucially, speakers were 
required to provide a description that distinguished between these two items. At the test 
phase the competitor item was not included in the display – meaning that using a 
previously modified description (e.g. “the unmelted candle”) would result in an 
overspecified utterance. Gann and Barr (2014) were interested in whether participants 
adapted their speech for new addressees during the test phase. The crucial question was: 
would speakers continue to use abbreviated descriptions formulated with the previous 
listener or would they adapt their utterances to suit the current listener? Additionally, the 
authors were interested in whether the overspecification rate would differ depending on the 
identity of the conversational partner. 
Results indicated that participants were much more likely to overspecify than underspecify 
referents. When describing unconventional items speakers successfully shortened 
descriptions but were also able to adapt these utterances for new addressees who were 
unfamiliar with the target object (Gann & Barr, 2014). Notably, when providing 
descriptions speakers relied on feedback from the addressee when it was permitted and 
relied on their own judgements when feedback was unavailable. Gann and Barr (2014) 
found that speakers overspecified old objects at similar rates for both old and new 
addressees. In line with Engelhardt et al. (2011) the authors found that addressees 
experienced more difficulty understanding overspecified descriptions in comparison to 
adequately described utterances (Gann & Barr, 2014). Together, these findings give us an 
insight into the difficulties speakers experience while attempting to engage in audience 
design. As the evidence suggests, speakers often fail to abide by Grice’s (1975) 
Cooperative Principle by providing overspecified, and potentially confusing, descriptions 
to the listener.  
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3.1.2 – Configuration of the Retrieval Fluency Experiment 
Whilst we have a general understanding of the processes involved in successful audience 
design, our knowledge is far from being complete. This is partially due to the fact that 
previous research has treated representational and processing issues separately (Gann & 
Barr, 2014). Thus memory-based models (e.g. Horton & Gerrig 2005a) largely focus on 
representational issues but lack consideration of how these representations are deployed, 
whereas Monitoring/Perspective Adjustment Models (e.g. Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar 
et al., 1998) emphasise the importance of processing issues whilst assuming the existence 
of suitably structured representations (Gann & Barr, 2014). Our focus on the impact of 
retrieval fluency on audience design addresses this issue by considering how expressions 
are structured in memory whilst also addressing the issue of how speakers may process 
these stored expressions to mediate their descriptions to the listener. 
In our first experiment, we attempted to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis by 
manipulating the level of fluency that the “Director” (participant) experienced whilst 
providing descriptions to the “Matcher” (experimenter). In this study each participant 
played in an interactive communication game - the participant and experimenter both faced 
away from one another and looked at separate computer screens. Each screen showed a 
grid containing various letters of varying colours and font sizes (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 
for examples). As in previous studies (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Gann & Barr, 2014) the 
Directors were entrained on particular ways of describing referents and then were 
presented with a test display in which the context had changed so that the entrained-upon 
description would no longer be appropriate. 
In our study, the objects being discussed were not everyday objects, but rather letters of the 
alphabet of varying colour and font size that were embedded in a display of other letters.  
Speakers entrained on descriptions either requiring a bare noun (“the u”) or a noun phrase 
with a size modifier (“the little u”, to distinguish it from a larger U in the display). In the 
test trial, the context changed in a way that invalidated the entrained-upon description (for 
example, the “large U” disappeared during the test phase, rendering the description “the 
little u” inadequate). Our main question was whether speakers would adapt their 
descriptions, and whether the likelihood of this adaptation depended upon the fluency with 
which context cued the entrained-upon description. 
We attempted to alter the fluency with which Directors retrieved descriptions for a 
particular target object by manipulating how much the context varies each time the 
description was used. The key idea was that Directors who entrained on a description 
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within a highly variable context would experience less fluent retrieval of that description 
than Directors who entrained on that same description within a low variability context. We 
attempted to do this by altering the Context Variability of the grid that our target items 
appeared in. This enabled us to test whether people were better at tailoring their 
descriptions to a listener’s informational needs when retrieval fluency processing levels 
were low compared to when retrieval fluency levels were high.  
In addition to this, we also incorporated a Shift Direction factor in our study. This factor 
was included to vary the amount of information that Directors would have to provide in 
test trials relative to training. Thus in some test trials, participants had to provide more 
information to the Matcher and in others, less. This variation was intended to prevent a 
situation in which Directors would learn that they need to alter the information at test in 
only one direction (e.g., always increase rather than reduce information): 
Context Variability Factor 
The trials were presented in two blocked sequences (with the order counterbalanced across 
participants): a “Low Context Variability” level and a “High Context Variability” level. 
The Low Context Variability trials contained filler letters within the grid which were 
arranged relatively consistently with the previous trials presented. In this level only two or 
three letters were varied at random and they were only moved to one adjacent square on 
the grid (see Figure 3). As the context was very similar to previous trials, it was expected 
that participants would experience greater retrieval fluency at this level. In the High 
Context Variability level, the filler letters within the grid were arranged inconsistently – 
appearing in completely random locations which ensured that they were relatively 
dissimilar to previous trials. It was expected that participants should experience weaker 
retrieval fluency at this level.  
Note that we opted to manipulate the position and colour of the filler letters in each 
display. These features were deemed to be salient to the Director (and thus impact 
retrieval) but were communicatively irrelevant. In particular, these features were chosen 
because they would not affect the description of the target item - speakers were made 
aware that the position of letters in each grid were set out in a different arrangement for the 
Matcher than the arrangement they saw. Additionally, the colour of the filler letters was 
not relevant to the descriptions of the target item (see section 4.2.4 – Materials for further 
details of the configuration of the stimuli included in each display). As highlighted in 
Chapter 2, this manipulation enabled us to de-confound potential effects of memory from 
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common ground and test whether visual configuration is an influential cue that affects 
memory in language production. 
Shift Direction Factor 
In each display, the target appeared with a “critical” letter, whose identity formed the 
second factor of Shift Direction.  This factor refers to whether speakers entrained upon 
unmodified descriptions (“the u”) and were tested in a context requiring a size modifier 
(“the small u”) or vice versa.  In the former level (Singleton-Contrast level; see Figure 3 
for example), the critical letter during training was a letter of the same colour but different 
identity from the target (e.g., if the target was a yellow “u”, the critical letter might be a 
yellow “p”), leading Directors to entrain upon a bare noun phrase (“the u”). We refer to 
this non-competitor letter as “the foil” as it was chosen to be perceptually similar (in shape 
and colour) to the competitor object used in the test trial but was clearly not the same letter 
(see Figure 3 for an example of the stimuli). For the test trial in this level, the foil letter 
was changed to have the same identity as the target but was of a different size (e.g., “a 
small u” vs. “a large U”), thus requiring the introduction of the modifier “small”.  In the 
Contrast-Singleton level this order was reversed: the critical object during the training 
trials was the competitor (see Figure 3). The competitor had the same identity as the target 
letter but contrasted in size during training (e.g., “a small u” vs. “a large U”), leading 
speakers to entrain upon a size-modified expression. This competitor was then replaced 
with the foil at the test phase, meaning that that the Director was no longer required to 
include a size modifier in their description.  
 
If participants follow Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle then we would expect Directors 
to adapt their description to suit the Matcher’s referential needs. Previous research has 
informed us that interlocutors are more likely to overspecify than underspecify their 
descriptions (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Ferreira et al., 2005) and so the introduction of 
both Singleton-Contrast and Contrast-Singleton levels allow us to test for this effect. 
During the test phase it was predicted that there would higher misspecification in the 
Contrast-Singleton level compared to the Singleton-Contrast level. Thus in line with 
previous research, it was expected that the rate of overspecification (in the Contrast-
Singleton level) would be greater than the rate of underspecification (in the Singleton-
Contrast level). 
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3.1.3 – Pilot Study and Pre-registered Predictions 
The basis for our predictions was a pilot study containing 22 participants (with 24 
sequences per participant, whereas our main study contained 48 sequences). This pilot 
study is available on the github site for the experiment 
(https://github.com/dalejbarr/EESP2) as well as in our files on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF: https://osf.io/4akir/). We pre-registered all our predictions on the OSF 
(outlined in section 3.3.4).  Our main prediction was that speakers would be more likely to 
misspecify referents in the Low Context Variability level than in the High Context 
Variability level; in other words, we predicted a main effect of Context Variability.  
3.2 – Method 
3.2.1 – Participants  
In total 36 subjects completed the experiment (24 Females, M=24.1 years). All subjects 
were recruited from the campus at the University of Glasgow. Participants were paid £6 or 
received 4 “participation credits” (course credits) for taking part in the study. Eleven 
participants in total had to be replaced. Ten were replaced due to the use of ineffective 
descriptions during the task (continuously failing to adapt their utterances for the listener, 
please see Section 3.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant Responses for more details). 
One additional participant was replaced due to the use of excessively long descriptions on 
each trial. Subjects gave written informed consent before beginning the experiment and 
were fully debriefed after the experiment had finished. Our procedures fully complied with 
the ethical code of conduct of the British Psychological Association.         
3.2.2 – Experimental Setup and Task     
The experiment was interactive with the participant playing the role of the ‘Director’ (the 
speaker) and the experimenter playing the role of the ‘Matcher’ (the listener). The Director 
and the Matcher sat in different areas of the testing room and looked at separate computer 
monitors throughout the experiment. Both were seated facing in opposite directions so that 
they were unable to see each other’s display (please see Figure 2 for an example of the set-
up). In each trial, the Director was asked to describe a highlighted target letter, which 
appeared on their monitor, to the Matcher. The Matcher then identified this letter on his 
own screen and selected it using a computer mouse. The target letter appeared on the 
Director’s screen within a grid among other ‘filler’ letters (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The 
Director was informed that in each trial the listener would have the same letters on their 
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monitor but that they may be arranged in a different format compared to the grid that 
appeared on their screen. 
3.2.3 – Design  
There were two factors in the design, Context Variability (Low and High) and Direction of 
Shift (Singleton-Contrast and Contrast-Singleton), forming a full-factorial 2x2 within-
participant design.  
3.2.4 – Materials  
The parameters governing each display in the experiment are defined in the sqlite3 
database EESP2.db in the github repository (https://github.com/dalejbarr/EESP2). 
Each display consisted of a five-by-four grid containing uppercase letters (A-Z) of 
different font size and colour (see Figure 3 for examples). All letters appeared in Arial 
font. The font sizes were randomly generated for each trial and we describe them as either 
‘small’ (font size varying 64 - 96pts) or ‘large’ (font size always 32pts higher than the 
smaller letter in a pair, maximum size was 128pts).  
The experiment contained 48 “sequences” of trials, each consisting of a number of training 
trials followed by a single test trial. The term “sequence” is used to refer to the collection 
of training and test trials all associated with a single target/competitor pair. Twenty-four 
sequences appeared in the Low Variability Context level, and the remaining 24 in the High 
Variability Context level. Each participant was given a unique set of randomly generated 
displays; in other words, displays did not repeat across participants (thus obviating a by-
items analysis). For each training sequence, the number of trials was randomly selected, 
with a range from 6 to 9. The motivation for varying training sequence length was to make 
the occurrence of the test trial unpredictable. Given these parameters, each experimental 
session could have contained between 336 (7 x 48) and 480 (10 x 48) trials. 
The sequences for each of the 36 sessions were randomly generated in advance. Each 
sequence for each session was based on a randomly generated original “prototype” display, 
which was used as the test trial. The training trials were all distortions of this prototype.  
Each sequence had a target letter whose identity, colour, and size were fixed across all 
displays. The identity of the target letter for each sequence was chosen randomly, with the 
constraint that the same letter could not be used as target more than once within each block 
of 24 sequences formed by the Context Variability factor. After the selection of the target 
for a given sequence, a “foil” letter which acted as a competitor was selected from the 
remaining set of letters, with the probability of selection inversely proportional to its 
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similarity to the target, as derived by norms given in (Simpson, Mousikou, Montoya, & 
Defior, 2013).  
By biasing the selection toward visually similar letters, we attempted to increase the 
likelihood that Directors would fail to detect the difference between a letter with the same 
identity (e.g., target=”O”, competitor=”Q”). The random selection process also meant that 
each participant would get mostly distinct letter pairs, which allows us to treat items as a 
fixed effect in our analyses (Clark, 1973). The pairings for each session are stored in the 
table LetterPairs table within the EESP2.db database (available on github). 
The target/competitor letters always appeared in the same colour and position across all 
training and test displays. In addition to these two letters, there were three sets of 
“distractor” letters scattered among the other squares in the grid. The distractor letters were 
randomly chosen from the set of letters excluding the target and competitor. Each set in 
each sequence had letters of a different colour, each randomly chosen (without 
replacement) from a palette of ten colours. The first set was of the same colour as the target 
and competitor, and had either four or five letters. The second set was of a different colour 
and also had either four or five letters. The third set was also of a different colour and had 
one or two letters. The sizes of the “distractor” letters that appeared within the grid were 
randomly generated (between 64-128pts). The information used to generate each prototype 
and sequence is stored in the table	SeriesInfo	in	EESP2.db. 
Next, the letters for each prototype were assigned positions within the display. The 
assignment of the target and competitor positions was random, with the constraint that they 
must be at least four spaces apart (using a city-block metric). The positions of the distractor 
letters were assigned randomly. The prototypes are contained in the table	Prototypes	in	
EESP2.db.	
The training trials were created for each sequence by distorting the prototype, with the 
number of distortions randomly selected from a uniform distribution of integers from six to 
nine. In the Low Context Variability level, the distortion was created by randomly 
selecting two to three distractor letters, and moving them in the grid to an adjacent empty 
space. Any letter that was “locked in” (i.e., all surrounding spaces occupied) was never 
selected to move.   
In the High Context Variability level, the positions of all of the distractor letters were 
randomly reassigned. Also, in this level the colours of two of the distractor sets could be 
swapped. There is an entry for each created display in the table	SessionGrids,	with the 
corresponding parameters for generating each display in the table Grids. These parameters 
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were used by a script written in the programming language PHP	 (imgcreate.php)	 to 
generate the actual image files that were displayed to participants. The matchers’ grids 
were created simply by randomizing the positions of the letters in the director’s grids. 
Thus, while the locations of the target/competitor were fixed within each series for the 
director, they varied from trial to trial for the matcher. 
Finally, we wanted to make it more difficult for directors to identify the competitor letter 
using peripheral vision. To this end, we added a slight Gaussian blur to the directors’ 
images using the	convert	command within the ImageMagick suite of command-line tools 
(version 8:6.7.7.1, www.imagemagick.org), with the sigma parameter set to 8 and radius 
set to 0 (0x8). 
3.2.5 – Apparatus 
The experimental stimuli were presented on a 19” LCD Dell desktop computer monitor 
(4:3 aspect ratio, resolution 1024 x 768 pixels).  Participants were seated 45-55cm away 
from the monitor.  A microphone was placed above the participant’s computer monitor to 
record their descriptions of the target letter for each trial. The audio was tagged using 
Audacity 2.0.6 software. Eye movements were recorded during each trial using an Eyelink 
1000 (SR Research) eye tracker (sampling rate 500Hz). 
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Figure 2: Outline of experimental set up and procedure for Experiment 1. 
Panel A shows the Director (participant) and Matcher (experimenter) during the training 
phase (6-9 trials). Each grid of letters presented on the left-hand side shows an example of 
a training trial from the Director’s perspective. Each of the grids shown on the right-hand 
side show the corresponding trials viewed by the Matcher. Both the Director and Matcher 
face in opposite directions looking at separate computer monitors. Once the Director has 
provided a description (“click on the u”) the Matcher will select the appropriate target 
letter on their screen in order to move onto the next trial. Panel B shows the test phase of 
the sequence - a competitor letter appears (the large U) and the Director is required to 
adapt their description to the Matcher. Stimuli are shown at the Low Context Variability 
and Singleton-Contrast levels. 
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Figure 3: Overview of trials in both Context Variability and Shift Direction Factors. 
Panel A shows an example of 3 training trials followed by a single test trial in the Singleton-Contrast 
level. On the left hand side we can see view of the Director (participant). The right hand side shows 
the view of the Matcher (experimenter). During the training trials the Director is shown each grid 
with the target letter highlighted in a yellow rectangle – in this case the letter “u”. The Director is 
presented with 6-9 training trials before being shown the test trial. The test trial (bottom grid on Panel 
A) presents participants with the target letter “u” again but also introduces a new larger “U” letter. 
This test trial may prompt the Director to underspecify their description of the target letter to the 
Matcher - ‘click on the u’ whereas the description “click on the small u” would be more appropriate 
in this instance. These trials show stimuli in the Low Context Variability level - only 2-3 filler letters 
on each grid are varied. Panel B shows a similar set up in the Contrast-Singleton level. The target 
letter in this case is the letter “X”. Note that there is also a contrasting letter present in the grid – the 
“small x”. The test trial presents participants with the target letter “X” again, but unlike the training 
trials the “small x” is no longer present. In the test trial the Director may overspecify their description 
of the target letter to the Matcher – “click on the big X’. The description “click on the X” would be 
more appropriate in this instance. These trials show stimuli in the High Context Variability level – 
filler letters arranged in a completely random order. Note that although the letters are arranged 
differently for the Director and Matcher, the same letters appear on both grids in each trial.  
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3.2.6 – Sequencing of Trials 
Each of the two blocks of trials (in which 24 sequences were presented) was further 
divided up into six sub-blocks, each of which contained the training and test trials for four 
sequences. The motivation for this was to have all of the training/test trials for a given 
block in relative proximity within the sequence, but to also make the position of the test 
trial for each sequence unpredictable. Trials for the first five of the six sub-blocks were 
sequenced as follows. First, the last fifteen trials of the sub-block were created, consisting 
of (a) the four test trials from the four sequences, at serial positions three, seven, eleven, 
and fifteen within the fifteen trial sequence; (b) the last training trial for three of the four 
sequences, with one at position four or five (randomly chosen), another at position eight or 
nine (randomly chosen); and the third at position twelve or thirteen (randomly chosen); (c) 
the third and fourth training trials for each of the four sequences in the next sub-block, 
which filled up the remaining empty slots of the final fifteen. After the final fifteen trials 
were determined in this way, the remaining training trials from the current four sequences, 
as well as the first two training trials from the next four sequences, were randomly shuffled 
to form the first part of the sub-block. 
The sixth sub-block within each block was determined similarly, with the exception that 
there were no new training trials from the next sub-block to be intermingled. For this 
block, the last nine trials were constructed first, with test trials for each of the four 
sequences appearing at serial positions one, five, eight, and nine. Positions six and seven 
had the last two training trials for the sequence tested at eight and nine; position two had 
the last training trial for the sequence tested at position five; and positions three and four 
had the second to last training trials for the series tested at eight and nine. 
3.2.7 – Procedure 
Upon arrival each participant was given an ‘instruction’ sheet detailing the task and their 
role during the experiment (see Appendix 1 for an example). Participants sat opposite the 
eye tracker and computer screen. The experimenter sat behind the participant facing a 
separate computer monitor. The layout of the room was designed so as to ensure that 
neither the participant nor the experimenter were able to see the each other’s monitor. The 
participant played the role of Director and the experimenter played the role of the Matcher.   
In each trial the Director was asked to verbally describe a target letter so that the Matcher 
could identify the item on their monitor and select it using a mouse. In order to 
discriminate the target letter from the filler letters, the target was highlighted within a 
yellow square in the Director’s display (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). As the Matcher’s 
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display was not identical to that of the Director the speaker had to describe the features of 
the highlighted letter, rather than use the target’s grid location as a description.   
At the start of any given trial, an empty grid appeared on the Director’s screen, with a 
yellow square marking the location for where the target would appear. After one second, 
the preview screen was replaced with the main display. Audio recording of the Director’s 
response began simultaneously with the presentation of the main display. The trial ended 
when the Matcher selected the object designated by the Director. The Director could not 
see the Matcher’s screen or mouse pointer, and received no feedback regarding whether the 
trial was completed correctly. If the Director failed to provide sufficient information to 
identify the target, the Matcher asked the director for clarification (“Which one do you 
mean?”). Any such clarification exchanges appeared in the audio recording for the trial 
and were noted during later transcription. 
Each block of trials (alternating between Low Variability Context and High Variability 
Context) contained both training and test phases. The training phase consisted of 6 – 9 
trials where the target letter used in the test phase, appeared 4 – 5 times. The test phase 
comprised of a single trial. The order of the test trials was randomly generated by a 
computer script at the beginning of the experiment. Of the 48 test trials shown, 24 featured 
in the Low Variability Context (12 in Singleton-Contrast level, 12 in Contrast-Singleton 
level) and 24 featured in the High Variability Context (12 in Singleton-Contrast level, 12 
in Contrast-Singleton level).  
 
3.3 – Predictions and Data Analysis 
3.3.1 – Main Measurements 
Our analysis focussed on three categories of measurements: (1) speech content; in 
particular, use of a size modifier (big/small) and speech fluency (2) speech onset latency, 
defined as the time taken to produce the first content word as measured from the onset of 
the display and (3) eye gaze behaviour. 
3.3.2 – Transcription and Coding of Audio Files 
For each of the 48 sequences for each Director, we transcribed and coded the audio 
recordings for two trials: (1) the last trial of the training sequence; and (2) the test trial. The 
last training trial was needed in order to provide baseline data for the speech onset latency 
in the test trial. Each trial was transcribed and coded for fluency and adjective use. Fluency 
was coded into one of four categories, as shown in the Table 1 below: 
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Speech 
Code 
Description  Example(s) 
FL Fluent speech “the small Z”, “the Z”, “Z” 
UP Unfilled pause (occurring after speech onset) “the... big Z” 
FP Filled pause (um/uh) “um... big Z” 
RE Repaired utterance “Z... yeah Z”, “Z... uh small Z” 
Table 1: Outline of speech fluency categories 
Furthermore, we coded whether or not a size modifier was used by the speaker, defined by 
the following categories: 
Modifier 
Code 
Description Example(s) 
NO No size modifier “Z”, “the Z”, “the red Z” 
PR Pre-nominal modifier “small Z”, “large Z” 
PO Post-nominal modifier “Z that is small”, “Z, big” 
DE Deleted adjective “sm-- uh just the Z” 
AS Addition due to self-repair “Z... Big Z” 
AO Addition due to other-repair “Z...” [Matcher: “Which one?”] “Oh…the larger 
one” 
Table 2: Outline of size modifier categories 
Onset times of utterances were identified and entered into a data table in milliseconds (ms). 
The following criteria were applied when identifying utterance onsets: 
1. Trials were discarded if the speech was unidentifiable. 
2. Any filled pauses or articles were ignored (um, uh, the); speech onset was 
identified as the first content word (e.g., adjective or noun), even if the adjective 
referred to colour rather than size (e.g., for “uh…the blue Z” onset was taken to be 
at the onset of the word “blue”). 
3. If Directors corrected themselves after an error (e.g. “pink Z...eh sorry red Z”) 
onset of the correction (i.e. “blue”) was recorded. However, such repaired 
utterances were not used in the analysis of speech onset. 
3.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant Responses 
One concern was that some Directors may have opted for a “lazy” strategy of always using 
a size modifier regardless of whether or not there was another letter of the same identity in 
the display. Indeed 3 of our 22 pilot participants did this. The problem with this behaviour 
is that on test trials in the Singleton-Contrast level, Directors could simply continue using 
the modified description, which would then spuriously appear to be appropriately 
specified. We identified these participants by coding whether or not they inappropriately 
used size modifiers in the final training trials for each sequence in the Singleton-Contrast 
level. We removed all data from speakers who did this on more than half of these trials and 
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replaced these participants. A list of the subjects removed (and their percentages of 
inappropriately used modifiers) is provided in Appendix 2.  
For all remaining participants, we also excluded on a trial-by-trial basis any test trials in 
the Singleton-Contrast level where speakers used a size modifier on the last training trial. 
In the Contrast-Singleton level, this was less of an issue because speakers must use size 
modifiers during training or the addressee will be unable to resolve the reference; however 
when speakers repaired an utterance (for example “the U… uh the small U”) in the last 
training trial for this level, we discarded the following test trial. 
3.3.4 – Pre-registered Analysis and Predictions 
Our pre-registration document specified that we would fit a generalized linear mixed 
model with maximal random effects, including a logit link and assumption of binomially 
distributed error variance, using the “bobyqa” optimizer. From our pilot data, we estimated 
the conditional odds of overspecification as being 1.763 times higher in the Low 
Variability level (z = 1.436, two-tailed p = .151). As power is so much lower for binary 
data than for continuous data, we pre-registered a one-tailed and not a two-tailed test for 
misspecification rate in the main study, with the alpha level for this test set at .05. We 
conducted power analyses for a difference of the observed size by simulating new datasets 
based on the model estimates, with 24, 36, or 48 participants (1,000 simulations for each 
N). Results are in the Table 3 below:	 	
 N=24 N=36 N=48 
one-tailed .684 .854 .939 
two-tailed .572 .767 .893 
Table 3: Power analysis for difference of the observed size for misspecification rate. 
 
A one-tailed test with N=36 yields approximate power of .854 (linear interpolation).   
Our second main prediction concerned the differential speech onset latency for 
appropriately specified descriptions. Onset latency is defined as the time taken to produce 
the first content word as measured from the onset of the display. Our prediction was that 
speakers would experience more difficulty shifting from the entrained description to a 
more contextually appropriate description in the Low Context Variability level than in the 
High Context Variability level, due to a more fluent retrieval of the entrained response. 
This analysis excluded trials where the size aspect of the target was misspecified (e.g., 
using a size adjective when it was unneeded, or failing to use it when needed). Parameters 
were estimated under maximum likelihood (REML=FALSE) using a linear mixed effects 
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model with identity link and Gaussian variance. The dependent variable was the speech 
latency for the test trial minus the speech latency for the final training trial for that 
sequence; in other words, the change in speech latency incurred by abandoning the 
entrained description. Our pilot data suggested that speakers were about 97 milliseconds 
slower to begin speaking in the Low Context Variability level than in the High Context 
Variability level (z=1.803, two-tailed p=.0714). A power analysis of these data yielded the 
following estimates: 
 
 N=24 N=36 N=48 
one-tailed .889 .964 .996 
two-tailed .808 .929 .983 
Table 4: Power analysis for difference of the observed size for differential onset latency 
We used a two-tailed test on these data with N=36; estimated power (linear interpolation) 
is .929. 
For the eyetracking data, we predicted a lower proportion of gazes to non-target letters in 
the grid prior to the onset of speech in the Low Context Variability level than in the High 
Context Variability level on test trials; this would reflect less consideration of context due 
to a strong memory signal. Note that we analysed eye tracking data from trials that were 
appropriately specified (speech that contained no misspecifications). We did not have any 
pilot eye tracking data for this task, and so it was difficult (and fairly arbitrary) to estimate 
power. 
 
In sum, we had two key predictions that were pre-registered on the OSF: 
(1) A greater misspecification rate in the Low vs. High Context Variability level, 
alpha=.05, one-tailed; 
(2) A greater increase (relative to the last training trials) in speech onset latency for the 
Low Variability level relative to High Variability, alpha=.05, two-tailed; 
We also made two additional (less critical) predictions: 
(3) Higher misspecification in the Contrast-Singleton level than in the Singleton-
Contrast level (main effect of Shift Direction), alpha=.05, two-tailed; 
(4) Fewer non-target fixations prior to speech onset in the Low Variability level than in 
the High Variability level, alpha=.05, two-tailed. 
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3.4 – Results 
3.4.1 – Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis for the production data (modifier use and speech onset) was 
performed using linear mixed-effects models with Directors (subjects) as a random factor 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). All analyses attempted to use the maximal random 
effects structure justified by the design (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), which 
implies by-subject random intercepts and by-subject random slopes for both main effects 
(Context Variability and Shift Direction) and their interaction. Item effects are not needed 
as the items were not repeated across participants (Clark, 1973). We derived p-values using 
the t-to-z heuristic (i.e., deriving p-values from the standard normal distribution for the t 
statistic), as that enabled us to perform one-tailed tests. Models were estimated using the 
lme4 package in R (version 1.1-7 or higher). Our analysis of the eye-tracking data used a 
Poisson regression model to analyse non-target fixations prior to speech onset. Similarly to 
the production analysis, we used the maximal random effects structure justified by the 
design. By-subject random intercepts and by-subject random slopes were used for both 
main effects (Context Variability and Shift Direction) and their interactions. Directors 
(subjects) were treated as a random factor in this model. The formula for each of our 
analysis models can be viewed in our pre-registration files on the Open Science 
Framework: https://osf.io/4akir/. 
3.4.2 – Misspecification Rate 
The results of the linear mixed-effects model did not reveal any evidence indicating that 
Directors followed a retrieval fluency heuristic, pre-registered one-tailed test: z = -1.05, p = 
0.15 (see Figure 4). The overall misspecification rate was the same in both the Low 
Context Variability (17%) and High Context Variability (17%) levels (see Table 5 for the 
grand means of misspecification rate (%) broken down by Shift Direction and Context 
Variability). However, contrary to previous findings (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Ferreira 
et al., 2005; Gann & Barr, 2014) speakers were more likely to underspecify referents in the 
test trial than overspecify. Thus our predication that there would be higher misspecification 
in the Contrast-Singleton level than in the Singleton- Contrast level was not supported. 
This surprising finding resulted in a main effect of Shift Direction in the opposite direction 
than we had predicted. In the Contrast-Singleton level participants entrained on 
descriptions (e.g. “the big X”) and then overspecified in the test trial (where the modifier 
“big” is not necessary) at a rate of 9%.  
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This was significantly lower than the underspecification rate of 24% in the Singleton-
Contrast level where participants entrained upon unmodified descriptions (e.g. “the u”) and 
then encountered a test trial which required a modifier in the description (e.g. “the small 
u”), z = 4.67, p < 0.01 (Table 6 shows the rate of misspecification (%) broken down by 
Shift Direction and Modifier Code). Analysis revealed no significant interaction between 
Context Variability and Shift Direction, z = 1.73, p = 0.08. 
Shift Direction Modifier Code Misspecification Rate (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Self-repair 60.3 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Other-repair 14.6 
Singleton-Contrast No Size Modifier 7.5 
Singleton-Contrast Deleted Adjective 17.6 
Contrast-Singleton Addition due to Self-repair 5.1 
Contrast-Singleton Post-Nominal Modifier 16.5 
Contrast-Singleton Pre-Nominal Modifier 54.4 
Contrast-Singleton Deleted Adjective 24.1 
Table 6: Misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and type of modifier. 
Shift Direction Context Variability  Misspecification Rate (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Low Variability 22.8 
Singleton-Contrast High Variability 25.1 
Contrast-Singleton Low Variability 10.6 
Contrast-Singleton High Variability  8.2 
Table 5: Grand mean misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and Context Variability factors.	
Figure 4: Misspecification rate (%) on test trials shown in both Shift Direction and Context 
Variability factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles 
represent the grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Context Variability 
factors.  
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3.4.3 – Speech Fluency Analysis 
Fluent speech (FL) is categorised as speech that does not contain any misspecifications or 
filled/unfilled pauses. Our analysis revealed that there was a similar mean percentage of 
fluent trials in both the Low Context Variability (94%) and High Context Variability 
(92%) levels. Table 7 displays the fluent trials (%) broken down by Shift Direction and 
Context Variability. Whilst there was no significant effect of Context Variability (Low vs. 
High) on speech fluency, z = -0.45, p = 0.65 there was a significant effect of Shift 
Direction on speech fluency. 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Fluent trails (%) by Shift Direction and Context Variability. 
 
Results indicated that participants were significantly less fluent in the Singleton-Contrast 
level (91%) compared to the Contrast-Singleton level (95%), z = -1.97, p = 0.05. Table 8 
displays the percentage of trials (%) broken down by speech code. Figure 5 displays the 
fluent trials (%) across both Shift Direction and Context Variability factors. There was no 
significant interaction between Context Variability and Shift Direction, z = -0.13, p = 0.89. 
Shift Direction Context Variability  Fluent Trials (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Low Variability 91.7 
Singleton-Contrast High Variability 90.3 
Contrast-Singleton Low Variability 95.2 
Contrast-Singleton High Variability  94.2 
Figure 5: Fluent trials (%) in both Shift Direction and Context Variability factors. Note that 
each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the average percentage 
across each level of the Shift Direction and Context Variability factors.  
	 63	
Table 8: Percentage of trials (%) for each category of speech code in the Shift Direction factor. 
 
3.4.4 – Differential Speech Onset Latency 
Analysis of the differential speech onset latency (mean test trial onset – mean onset of final 
training trial of non-misspecified trials) did not produce any significant main effects. Thus 
we did not find any evidence supporting our prediction that there would be a greater 
increase (relative to the last training trials) in speech onset latency in the Low Context 
Variability level (average 174.6ms) relative to the High Context Variability level (average 
173.5ms), t = -0.50, p = 0.62 (see Figure 6). Further analysis also revealed no significant 
effect of Shift Direction on onset latency, Singleton-Contrast (134.3ms) vs. Contrast-
Singleton (207.2ms), t = -1.28, p = 0.2. Table 9 displays the mean onset change for each 
condition of Context Variability and Shift Direction. Finally, there was no significant 
interaction between Context Variability and Shift Direction, t = -1.65, p = 0.1. 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shift Direction Speech Code Percentage of Trials (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Fluent Speech 91.0 
Singleton-Contrast Filled Pause 7.9 
Singleton-Contrast Unfilled Pause 1.1 
Contrast-Singleton Fluent Speech 94.7 
Contrast-Singleton Filled Pause 4.6 
Contrast-Singleton Unfilled Pause 0.1 
Contrast-Singleton Other 0.5 
Figure 6: Differential speech onset latency (ms) in both the Shift Direction and Context 
Variability factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles 
represent the grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Context Variability 
factors. 
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3.4.5 – Eye Tracking Analysis 
Analysis of the eye-tracking data focussed on non-misspecified descriptions on test trials in 
the experiment. There was no significant effect of Context Variability on non-target 
fixations prior to speech onset. We did however, find a slight trend in the direction 
predicted, with fewer non-target fixations in the Low Variability level (mean = 3.66) than 
in the High Variability level (mean = 3.76), z = 0.66, p = 0.51. There was a significant 
effect of Shift Direction on non-target fixations with participants fixating more on non-
target items in the Contrast-Singleton level (mean = 3.93) compared to the Singleton-
Contrast level (mean = 3.46), z = -4.7, p < 0.01. Figure 7 displays the number of fixations 
across both Shift Direction and Context Variability factors. Table 10 displays the mean 
number of non-target fixations broken down by Shift Direction and Context Variability. 
There was no significant interaction between Context Variability and Shift Direction, z = -
0.57, p = 0.57.  
Table 10: Mean number of fixations by Shift Direction and Context Variability. 
No. Trials Shift 
Direction 
Context 
Variability 
Training 
Onset 
Test 
Onset 
Mean Onset 
Change (ms) 
325 Singleton-
Contrast 
Low 
Variability  
1128.4 1286.5 158.1 
308 Singleton-
Contrast 
High 
Variability 
1153.6 1262.9 109.2 
378 Contrast-
Singleton 
Low 
Variability 
1092.7 1281.4 188.7 
379 Contrast-
Singleton 
High 
Variability 
1101.8 1327.4 225.7 
Table 9: Mean onset change (ms) by Shift Direction and Context Variability.	
Shift Direction Context Variability  Mean Number of Non- 
Target Fixations 
Singleton-Contrast Low Variability 3.47 
Singleton-Contrast High Variability 3.45 
Contrast-Singleton Low Variability 3.83 
Contrast-Singleton High Variability  4.02 
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3.5 – Discussion 
Experiment 1 sought to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis: that speakers’ use retrieval 
fluency as a heuristic for audience design in referential communication. We attempted to 
manipulate the fluency with which Directors retrieved descriptions for target objects by 
altering how much the context varied each time the description was used. In our study we 
used the Context Variability (Low vs. High) factor in order to test whether speakers used 
retrieval fluency as a heuristic when generating descriptions for the addressee. The key 
idea in this experiment was that Directors who entrained on a description within a highly 
variable context would experience less fluent retrieval of that description than Directors 
who entrained on that same description within a low variability context. Our main 
prediction was that this would cause greater misspecifications in the Low Context 
Variability level compared to the High Context Variability level.  
Our analysis did not reveal evidence that participants followed a retrieval fluency heuristic. 
The overall misspecification rate was numerically same in both the Low Context 
Variability (17%) and High Context Variability (17%) levels. Nevertheless, this does 
suggest that speakers did rely on their memory of previously encoded descriptions to a 
Figure 7: Non-target fixations prior to speech onset in both the Shift Direction and Context 
Variability factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles 
represent the grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Context Variability 
factors. 	
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certain extent. Had speakers not been influenced by their memory, it is unlikely that we 
would have seen such misspecification at the test phase. Our eye tracking analysis only 
considered data for non-misspecified descriptions on test trials in each block of trials. 
Analysis revealed that speakers made fewer non-target fixations prior to speech onset in 
the Low Variability level (mean = 3.66) compared to the High Context Variability level 
(mean = 3.76), however this was not a statistically significant difference. There was no 
significant difference in onset change between the Low (174.6ms) and High  (173.5ms) 
Context Variability levels.  
Further analysis of the eye tracking data showed that participants made significantly fewer 
non-target fixations prior to speech onset in the Singleton-Contrast level (mean = 3.46) 
compared to the Contrast-Singleton level (mean = 3.93). Since participants were already 
primed to check the context for a competitor letter at the training phase in the Contrast-
Singleton level, it is likely that this result reflects similar behaviour at the test phase. 
Participants’ speech was significantly less fluent in the Singleton-Contrast level (91%) 
compared to the Contrast-Singleton level (95%). However, it should be noted that due to 
the low effect size of this speech fluency effect we are reluctant to draw any firm 
conclusions from this result. Our results revealed that Directors were significantly more 
likely to underspecify referents in the test trial than overspecify. Participants 
underspecified at a rate of 24% (Singleton-Contrast level) compared to an 
overspecification rate of 9% (Contrast-Singleton level). 
Although it contradicts Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle, speakers are often likely to 
overspecify their descriptions by providing more information than is required to identify 
the target object (Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2011). The traditional cognitive 
view of referential behaviour argues that speakers will design their utterances in order to 
enable the addressee to efficiently locate the target object (Arnold, 2008). Thus speakers 
may adopt an “addressee oriented” approach to referential descriptions. In line with this 
argument speakers will overspecify in order to enable the addressee to find referent objects 
more quickly (Koolen et al., 2011). As mentioned previously, this view is supported by a 
number of studies which show that addressees find it easier to identify an object when the 
speaker overspecifies their description (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Paraboni, Masthoff, & van 
Deemter, 2006; Sonnenschein, 1984; Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1982).  
It was therefore surprising that we found the opposite effect in our study with 
underspecifications occurring more frequently than overspecifications. It was expected that 
if participants misspecified in their descriptions then overspecification would have been 
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more likely as underspecifying can often confuse addressees (Horton, 2008). Note that 
participants’ speech was also less fluent in the Singleton-Contrast level. The 
underspecification effect is underlined by the finding that participants’ speech contained 
more misspecifications and filled/unfilled pauses in this level of the Shift Direction factor. 
In the Singleton-Contrast level participants are expected to provide additional information 
in their description at the test trial (e.g. going from “the u” - > “the small u”). Notably, 
participants altered their own descriptions (AS) at rate of 60% in this level. Furthermore, 
the Matcher requested additional information (AO) at a rate of 15%. In comparison in the 
Contrast-Singleton level where participants are expected to shorten their descriptions (e.g. 
going from “the big X” - > “the X”) participants altered their own descriptions (AS) at a 
rate of 5% and were never asked for additional information (AO) from the Matcher. In the 
Singleton-Contrast level participants’ speech was less fluent (FL = 91%) and contained 
more filled pauses (FP = 8%) compared to the Contrast-Singleton level where fluency was 
higher (FL = 95%) and filled pauses (FP = 5 %) were at a lower rate. 
We are uncertain as to why we found a significant underspecification effect. It is possible 
that due to the nature of the stimuli in the experiment (all items were letters of varying font 
size and colour) participants became overly familiar with contents of the grid in each trial 
presentation. Perhaps this led participants to adopt a lackadaisical approach when 
describing target items causing them to put less effort into their descriptions in the 
Singleton-Contrast level. It is also possible that the reduced use of post-nominal modifiers 
(in comparison to pre-nominal modifiers) in this experiment had an impact on the 
misspecification rate – this is an aspect we discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 6. 
Furthermore, the stimuli set used in this experiment may have hindered the development of 
retrieval fluency associations within memory. Participants may have failed to develop 
strong memory associations with the descriptions they used for each target item. This may 
have resulted in an overall lack of retrieval fluency effect which would explain why the 
misspecification rate was similar in both the Low Context and High Context Variability 
levels.  
An additional concern for our experiment was that the order and sequencing of training 
trials may have prevented participants from developing stronger memory associations with 
target objects. Each sub-block of trials contained a mix of stimuli in both Low Context and 
High Context Variability levels. It is possible that this mix of trials in each sub-block 
counteracted each other, resulting in an overall lack of effect of the Context Variability 
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factor on misspecification rate. This could have reduced the level of retrieval fluency 
participants experienced at the Low Context Variability level.  
In order to address some of these concerns, we decided to revaluate the design of our study 
for Experiment 2. We opted to change a number of aspects of the design and presentation 
of our experiment. Most notably we altered our stimuli set and decided to use more 
distinguishable target objects as opposed to letters in each grid. We also altered the 
sequencing of trials in the training phase of the experiment. In the following chapter, I will 
outline our alternative design which formed our second attempt to test the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis. 
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Chapter 4 – Experiment 2 
 
4.1 – Background 
4.1.1 – Retesting the Retrieval Fluency Hypothesis 
Experiment 2 marks our second attempt to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis: that 
attending to a referent with the goal of referential encoding elicits retrieval of previous 
referential expressions used for a particular referent, proportionally to the match between 
encoding and retrieval contexts. Accordingly, this hypothesis proposes that speakers use 
the strength/fluency of these memory signals as a cue to their informational adequacy in 
the current communicative situation. As outlined in Chapter 3, we derive the assumption 
that memory signals correlate with informational adequacy from the encoding specificity 
principle of episodic memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), whereby the strength of a 
memory signal is a function of the similarity between encoding and retrieval contexts. We 
also draw on Logan’s (1988) Instance theory of Automaticity (ITA) which argues that 
performance becomes automatic when it is grounded on directly accessed memory 
retrieval of past solutions. Thus the retrieval fluency hypothesis assumes that speakers who 
experience strong retrieval fluency associated with a particular expression in a particular 
context will engage in less assessment of its contextual adequacy. It follows that speakers 
experiencing strong fluency will be less likely to notice a change in the communicative 
situation that invalidates the informational adequacy of the retrieved expression, leading 
them to misspecify referents at a higher rate than speakers who experience weaker fluency. 
As this was our second attempt to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis we made several 
changes to the design and presentation of the experiment. Firstly, we replaced the stimuli 
set with an entirely new collection of target items (with matched foil and competitor item 
pairs). These were normed by a separate group of volunteers beforehand (see section 4.2.2 
- Norming of Test Items for more details). Similarly, to previous studies (e.g. Engelhardt, 
Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Gann & Barr, 2014; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000) we 
opted to use everyday objects as our stimuli (e.g. car, apple, bat). We were concerned that 
one of the reasons that participants failed to demonstrate a retrieval fluency effect in 
Experiment 1 was due to the nature of the stimuli in the experiment (all target items and 
fillers were letters of varying font size and colour). Our new target objects were carefully 
selected to ensure that each object was unique in identity from other target items. As 
participants were encoding different types of objects we expected their memory traces for 
each item to be more distinctive. Directors were required to use different types of 
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modifiers in their utterances (e.g. “the family car” vs. “the sports car”) in comparison to 
Experiment 1 where they were only ever required to provide a size modifier (e.g. “the 
small u” vs. “the big U”). Since these objects had more distinctive features we expected 
participants to build up stronger memory traces for their utterances thus creating more 
fluent memories of the descriptions used with each target item.  
An additional alteration concerned the presentation sequence of trials in the Context 
Variability factor. Each sub-block in Experiment 1 contained a mix of trials from both the 
Low Context and High Context Variability levels. This may have prevented the 
development of a fluency effect in the Low Variability Context level and help to explain 
why we found no main effect of retrieval fluency on audience design in Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 2, we decided to alter this format. We replaced the Context Variability factor 
with a new Training-Test Consistency factor. This factor reconfigured the arrangement of 
trials in the training phase of the experiment. Details of all modifications are outlined in the 
section below. 
4.1.2 – Formulation of Alternative Design 
Similarly to our first experiment, Experiment 2 contained two factors in the design. Shift 
Direction (Singleton-Contrast vs. Contrast-Singleton) remained in the same format as the 
previous experiment and Training-Test Consistency (Training Consistent vs. Training 
Inconsistent) formed the second factor: 
 Shift Direction Factor 
In each sequence, the target object appeared with a “critical” object, whose identity formed 
the factor of Shift Direction. This factor refers to whether speakers entrained upon 
descriptions for a target object in a context where modifiers were not required (“the car”) 
and then tested in a context requiring a modifier (“the family car”) or vice versa. In the 
former level (Singleton-Contrast; see Figure 9), the critical object during the training phase 
was a non-competitor object, leading directors to entrain upon a bare noun phrase (“the 
car”). We refer to this non-competitor object as “the foil” as it was chosen to be 
perceptually similar (in shape and colour) to the competitor object used in the test trial, but 
clearly represented a different category of object (e.g., the computer mouse, which has the 
same shape and colour as the competitor car, see Figure 8 and Figure 9 for an example of 
the foil). For the test trial in this level, the foil was replaced with the competitor object, 
which was another object from the same category as the target (e.g., a car) but differed in 
some critical way (e.g., a sports car), thus requiring speakers to modify their descriptions 
(“the car” -> “the family car”). 
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In the Contrast-Singleton level (see Figure 9 for an example) this order was reversed: the 
critical object during training was the competitor (e.g., the “sports car”), leading speakers 
to entrain upon a modified expression during training. At test, the competitor was then 
replaced with the foil, such that participants were able to simplify their description of the 
target item (“the family car” -> “the car”). Similarly to the design implemented by Gann 
and Barr (2014), the Shift Direction factor enabled us to provide opportunities for 
participants to underspecify (Singleton-Contrast) or overspecify (Contrast-Singleton) 
descriptions on test trials. 
In addition to the critical item, each display also contained other filler items (objects 
unrelated to the target item in each display). The relation of the arrangement of these items 
during training to their arrangement during test formed the critical manipulation of 
Training-Test Consistency.  
Training-Test Consistency 
The trials were presented in blocked sequences with the order counterbalanced across 
participants. Unlike our previous experiment, all training trials presented had a relatively 
stable arrangement during training; what we varied instead in this experiment was whether 
that training arrangement was similar or dissimilar to the arrangement at test. In the 
Training Consistent level (previously the “Low Context Variability” level in Experiment 1) 
the configuration of items in the display at training was highly similar to the configuration 
presented at test. In the Training Inconsistent level, the configuration of items in the 
training displays were highly dissimilar to test. In line with our hypothesis in Experiment 
1, we reasoned that in attempting to referentially encode the target item at test, speakers in 
the Training Consistent condition should experience a stronger memory signal associated 
with the expression used in training, based on the higher similarity between training and 
test arrangements. 
Across all training trials, the positions of the target and filler items was fixed, with the 
exception that the position of the critical item (Competitor or Foil) would swap with the 
position of one of the filler items. This was to prevent speakers from learning where to 
look to check for the presence of a competitor (see Figure 9 for an example). 
 
4.1.3 – Pre-registered Predictions 
As in Experiment 1 the basis for our predictions was a pilot study containing 22 
participants (with 24 sequences per participant, whereas our main study contained 48 
sequences). This pilot study is available on github (https://github.com/dalejbarr/EESP2) as 
	 72	
well as in our files for Experiment 2 on the Open Science Framework (OSF: 
https://osf.io/uq4k7/). We pre-registered all our predictions on the OSF (outlined in section 
4.3.4 – Pre-registered Analysis and Predictions). Our main prediction was that speakers 
would misspecify referents at a higher rate in the Consistent Training-Test level than in the 
Inconsistent Training-Test level.  
 
4.2 – Method 
4.2.1 – Participants  
Thirty-six subjects completed the experiment (24 Females, M=23.2 years). All subjects 
were recruited from the campus at the University of Glasgow. Unlike Experiment 1, all 
subjects were Native English speakers. Participants were paid £6 or received 4 
“participation credits” (course credits) for taking part in the study. One participant was 
replaced due to the use of ineffective descriptions during the task (continuously failing to 
adapt their utterances for the listener, please see Section 4.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for 
Participant Responses for more details). Subjects gave written informed consent before 
beginning the experiment and were fully debriefed after the experiment had finished. Our 
procedures fully complied with the ethical code of conduct of the British Psychological 
Association.         
4.2.2 – Norming of Test Items 
Target and Competitor items were normed beforehand by 68 Native English speaking 
volunteers using the web-based surveyor SurveyMonkey. A number of items were updated 
or replaced based on our norming feedback. Four entirely new stimuli pairs were added to 
our original list (please see Appendix 3 for a complete list of the Target and Competitor 
objects used). 
4.2.3 – Experimental Setup and Task     
Similarly to our first study, the experiment was interactive with the participant playing the 
role of the “Director” (the speaker) and the experimenter playing the role of the “Matcher” 
(the listener). In this experiment, the Matcher was played by either a male or a female lab 
assistant. The Director and the Matcher sat in different areas of the testing room and 
looked at separate computer monitors throughout the experiment. Both were seated facing 
in opposite directions so that they were unable to see each other’s display (see Figure 8). In 
each trial, the Director was asked to describe a target object which was highlighted on their 
monitor to the Matcher. The Matcher then identified this object on his/her own screen and 
	 73	
selected it using a computer mouse. The target object appeared on the Director’s screen 
within a grid among other “filler” objects (see Figure 9). The Director was informed that in 
each trial the Matcher had the same objects on their monitor but that they may be arranged 
in a different format compared to the grid that appeared on their screen.  
4.2.4 – Design  
There were two factors in the design, Training-Test Consistency (Training Consistent and 
Training Inconsistent) and Direction of Shift (Singleton-Contrast and Contrast-Singleton), 
forming a full-factorial 2x2 within-participant design.  
4.2.5 – Materials  
The parameters governing each display in the experiment are defined in tables within the 
sqlite3 database EESP3.db in the github repository at https://github.com/dalejbarr/EESP3. 
Each display consisted of a five-by-four grid containing objects of different size and colour 
(see Figures 8 and 9). The experiment contained 48 “sequences” of trials, each consisting 
of a number of training trials followed by a single test trial (the term “sequence” to refers 
to the collection of training and test trials all associated with a single target/competitor/foil 
triplet). Each sequence appeared an equal number of times in all four conditions of the 2x2 
design, counterbalanced across participants. 
For each sequence, the number of training trials was randomly selected, with a range from 
6 to 9. The motivation for varying training sequence length was to make the occurrence of 
the test trial unpredictable. Given these parameters, each experimental session could have 
contained between 336 (7 x 48) and 480 (10 x 48) trials. For each sequence, 7 to 10 filler 
items were randomly chosen from a database of stimulus images. The displays were then 
checked manually by two lab assistants to ensure that the filler items were sufficiently 
dissimilar to the target so as not to influence descriptions of the target. 
4.2.6 – Apparatus 
The experimental stimuli were presented on a 19” LCD Dell desktop computer monitor 
(4:3 aspect ratio, resolution 1024 x 768 pixels). Participants were seated 45-55cm away 
from the monitor. A microphone was placed above the participant’s computer monitor to 
record their descriptions of the target object for each trial. The audio was tagged using 
Audacity 2.0.6 software. Eye movements were recorded during each trial using an Eyelink 
1000 (SR Research) eye tracker (sampling rate 500Hz). 
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4.2.7 – Sequencing of Trials 
Each of the two blocks of trials (in which 24 sequences were presented) was further 
divided up into six sub-blocks, each of which contained the training and test trials for four 
sequences. The motivation for this was to have all of the training/test trials for a given 
block in relative proximity within the sequence, but to also make the position of the test 
trial for each sequence unpredictable. Trials for the first five of the six sub-blocks were 
sequenced as follows. First, the last fifteen trials of the sub-block were created, consisting 
of (a) the four test trials from the four sequences, at serial positions three, seven, eleven, 
and fifteen within the fifteen trial sequence; (b) the last training trial for three of the four 
sequences, with one at position four or five (randomly chosen), another at position eight or 
nine (randomly chosen); and the third at position twelve or thirteen (randomly chosen); (c) 
the third and fourth training trials for each of the four sequences in the next sub-block, 
which filled up the remaining empty slots of the final fifteen. After the final fifteen trials 
were determined in this way, the remaining training trials from the current four sequences, 
as well as the first two training trials from the next four sequences, were randomly shuffled 
to form the first part of the sub-block.  
The sixth sub-block within each block was determined similarly, with the exception that 
there were no new training trials from the next sub-block to be intermingled.  For this 
block, the last nine trials were constructed first, with test trials for each of the four 
sequences appearing at serial positions one, five, eight, and nine.  Positions six and seven 
had the last two training trials for the sequence tested at eight and nine; position two had 
the last training trial for the sequence tested at position five; and positions three and four 
had the second to last training trials for the series tested at eight and nine.  
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Figure 8: Outline of experimental set up and procedure for Experiment 2. 
Panel A shows the Director (participant) and Matcher (experimenter) during the 
training phase (6-9 trials). Each grid of objects presented on the left-hand side 
shows an example of a training trial from the Director’s perspective. Each of the 
grids shown on the right-hand side show the corresponding trials viewed by the 
Matcher. Both the Director and Matcher face in opposite directions looking at 
separate computer monitors. Once the Director has provided a description (“click 
on the car”) the Matcher will select the appropriate target letter on their screen in 
order to move onto the next trial. Panel B shows the test phase of the sequence - 
a competitor object appears (the sports car) and the Director is required to adapt 
their description for the Matcher. Stimuli are shown at the Training Consistent 
and Singleton-Contrast levels. 
A 
B 
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Figure 9: Overview of trials in both Training-Test Consistency and Shift Direction Factors. 
Panel A shows an example of 3 training trials followed by a single test trial in the Singleton-Contrast 
level. The column on the left shows the Director’s view of the stimuli where the test trial is consistent 
with the arrangement in the training phase - the Training Consistent level. The middle column shows the 
alternative Training Inconsistent level. The column on the right shows the Matcher’s view. The training 
trials highlight the target object in a green rectangle – in this case the “the car”. The test trial presents 
participants with the target object “the car” again, but unlike the training trials it also introduces a new 
“sports car” object. This may prompt the Director to underspecify their description of the target object to 
the Matcher - “click on the car” whereas the description “click on the family car” would be more 
appropriate in this instance. Note that the training trials also present the “computer mouse” which acts as 
a foil for the “sports car” during the training phase. The Matcher’s view remains fixed throughout the 
training and test phase with the “sports car” replacing the “computer mouse” in the test trial. Panel B 
shows an example of 3 training trials followed by a single test trial in the Contrast-Singleton level. The 
column on the left shows the Director’s view of the stimuli at the Training Consistent level. The middle 
column shows the alternative Training Inconsistent level. The column on the right shows the Matcher’s 
view. The training trials highlight the target object - “the car”. Note that the “sports car” is also present 
in the grid. Participants are likely to differentiate between the two cars during the training phase - “click 
on the family car”. The test trial presents participants with the target object “the car” again, but unlike 
the training trials the computer mouse foil replaces the “sports car”. This may prompt the Director to 
overspecify their description of the target object to the Matcher. The description “click on the car” would 
be sufficient in this instance. The Matcher’s view remains fixed throughout the training and test phase 
with the “computer mouse” replacing the “sports car” in the test trial.  
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4.2.8 – Procedure 
Upon arrival each participant was given an ‘instruction’ sheet detailing the task and their 
role during the experiment (see Appendix 4). Participants sat opposite the eye tracker and 
computer screen. The experimenter sat behind the participant facing a separate computer 
monitor. The layout of the room was designed so as to ensure that neither the participant 
nor the experimenter were able to see the other’s monitor (please see Figure 8 for an 
example of the layout). The participant played the role of “Director” and the experimenter 
played the role of the “Matcher”.    
Similarly to Experiment 1, in each trial the Director was asked to verbally name the target 
object so that the Matcher could identify the item on their monitor and select it using a 
computer mouse. In order to discriminate the target object from the filler objects, the target 
was highlighted within a green square in the Director’s display (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). 
The participant was told that the arrangement of images within the Matcher’s grid would 
differ in an unpredictable way from the images shown on their own screen. Thus the 
Director was informed that he/she would have to describe the features of the highlighted 
target item, rather than use the target’s grid location as a description. Unbeknown to the 
participant, the Matcher’s view of the stimuli was fixed for each sequence so that the 
objects always appeared in the same location across the training and test trials – with the 
foil/competitor item trading places with each other on the test trial (see Figure 9). This 
alteration was influenced by performance in Experiment 1. Occasionally in the first 
experiment, the Matcher took longer to find the intended target item within the grid - even 
when the Director had provided an adequate description. We were concerned that this may 
have led speakers to incorrectly believe that they had provided an inadequate description to 
the Matcher. To prevent this from becoming a factor which influenced descriptions in 
Experiment 2, the Matcher’s view was fixed to enable the experimenter to quickly identify 
the target object without disrupting the build-up of retrieval fluency effects experienced by 
the participant.  
Unlike Experiment 1, which had a preview of the target location before the full set of 
images appeared, the location of the target object appeared at the same time as the rest of 
the images within the grid. Audio recording of the Director’s response began 
simultaneously with the presentation of the main display. Each trial ended when the 
Matcher selected the object designated by the Director. The Director could not see the 
Matcher’s screen or mouse pointer, and received no feedback regarding whether the trial 
was completed correctly.  If the Director failed to provide sufficient information for the 
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Matcher to identify the target, the Matcher asked the Director for clarification (e.g. “which 
one do you mean?”). Any such clarification exchanges appeared in the audio recording for 
the trial and were noted during later transcription (see section 4.3.2 – Transcription and 
Coding of Audio Files for details). 
 
4.3 – Predictions and Data Analysis 
4.3.1 – Main Measurements 
Our analysis focussed on three categories of measurements: (1) speech content and 
performance; in particular, use of a descriptive modifier and speech fluency; (2) speech 
onset latency, defined as the time taken to produce the first content word as measured from 
the onset of the display; and (3) eye gaze behaviour.  
4.3.2 – Transcription and Coding of Audio Files 
For each of the 48 sequences for each Director, we transcribed and coded the audio 
recordings for two trials: (1) the last trial of the training sequence; and (2) the test trial.  
The last training trial was needed in order to provide baseline data for the speech onset 
latency in the test trial. Each trial was transcribed and coded for fluency and adjective use.  
Fluency was coded into one of five categories, as shown in the table below. We included a 
new category of fluency in this experiment (LE for lengthened speech) in addition to the 
four categories we used previously in Experiment 1.  
 
We also coded whether or not a descriptive modifier was used, defined by the following 
categories:  
 
 
Speech 
Code  
Description  Example(s)  
FL  Fluent speech “the family car”, “the car”, “car”  
UP  Unfilled pause (occurring after speech onset)  “the... silver car”  
FP  Filled pause (um/uh)  “um...  the car”  
RE  Repaired utterance  “car... yeah the family car”,       
“car...   uh…family car”  
LE Lengthened speech “the s(ssss…)ilver car” 
Table 11: Outline of speech fluency categories. 
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Modifier 
Code  
Description  Example(s)  
NO  No modifier  “car”, “the car”, “the silver car” * 
PR  Pre-nominal modifier  “family car” , “normal car” 
PO  Post-nominal modifier  “car, the family car”, “car, family one”  
DE  Deleted adjective  “fa—uh… just the car”  
AS  Addition due to self-repair  “car... family car ”  
AO  Addition due to other-repair  “car...” [Matcher: “Which one?”] “Oh, the family  
one”  
Table 12: Outline of item modifier categories. 
* Note that a colour description was not coded as a modifier if it did not distinguish the target object from the 
competitor (for instance both the family car and the sports car were silver in colour). 
Similarly to Experiment 1, onset times of utterances were measured in milliseconds (ms).  
The following criteria were applied when identifying utterance onsets:  
• Trials were discarded if the speech was unidentifiable. 
• Any filled pauses or articles were ignored (um, uh, the); speech onset was 
identified as the first content word (e.g., adjective or noun), even if the adjective 
referred to colour rather than size (e.g., for “uh, the silver car” onset would be 
taken as the onset of the word “silver”).  
• If Directors corrected themselves after an error (e.g. “white car...eh sorry silver 
car”) onset of the correction (i.e. “silver”) was recorded. However, such repaired 
utterances were not used in the analysis of speech onset.  
4.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant Responses 
Similarly, to Experiment 1 we were concerned that some Directors may have opted for a 
strategy of “hyper-describing” target objects i.e. providing long, rich descriptions that 
would differentiate targets from nearly any possible competitor objects; moreover, doing 
so even when there is no competitor in the display. The problem with this behaviour is that 
on test trials in the Singleton-Contrast level, Directors could simply continue using the 
modified description, which would then spuriously appear to be appropriately specified. 
We identified any participants doing this by coding whether or not in the final training trial 
for each sequence in the Singleton-Contrast level, they inappropriately described the 
modifier in a way that would have differentiated the target from the (absent) competitor. 
We removed all data from speakers who made this error on more than half of the training 
trials and replaced these participants. Unlike Experiment 1 where 11 participants were 
replaced, only 1 subject was replaced in this study (please see Appendix 5 for details). 
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For all of the remaining participants, we also excluded on a trial-by-trial basis any test 
trials in the Singleton-Contrast level where on the last training trial speakers used a 
modifier that distinguished the target from the competitor. In the Contrast-Singleton level, 
this was less of an issue because the speakers had to use size modifiers during training or 
the addressee would have been unable to resolve the reference. However, for any trials 
where the speaker repaired an utterance (for example “the car, uh the family car”) in the 
last training trial for this condition, we discarded the following test trial from the analysis.  
Furthermore, we also checked the quality of the materials to determine whether there were 
certain stimulus items that should be excluded. In particular, we considered the last 
training trial of each series for each item in which the critical object was a foil, and 
removed from the analysis any target item for which more than 50% of speakers used a 
description that distinguished it from the corresponding competitor. In total eight of our 
stimuli pairs (target and competitor items) were removed (please see Appendix 5 for a full 
list of the items).  
4.3.4 – Pre-registered Analysis and Predictions 
We pre-registered our analysis and predictions on the Open Science Framework. The basis 
for our estimate of a sample size of 36 participants (power = .85) was derived from our 
pilot study conducted prior to Experiment 1 (see section 3.3.4 - Pre-registered Analysis 
and Predictions outlined in Chapter 3 for details). Similarly to our main prediction of 
Context Variability (a greater rate of misspecification in the Low vs. High Context 
Variability condition) in Experiment 1, our main prediction in this study concerned the 
Training-Test Consistency factor. Specifically, we predicted that speakers would 
misspecify referents at a higher rate in the Consistent Training-Test level than in the 
Inconsistent Training-Test level.  
To maximize power (which was especially important given that the dependent variable for 
this analysis was binary, 1 = modifier used in description, 0 = no modifier), we opted to 
test for the main effect of Training-Test Consistency using a one-tailed test (see the 
methodology for Experiment 1 for further information about the power calculation). 
Although Experiment 1 was unsuccessful, we believed that the design was not ideal, 
because the re-use of letter stimuli as targets could have led to crosstalk in memory across 
sequences that masked any effects of retrieval fluency. With the numerous changes made 
to the procedure to improve sensitivity we did not see any reason to increase our sample 
size for this experiment. 
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Similarly to Experiment 1, our second main prediction concerned the differential speech 
onset latency for appropriately specified descriptions. Our prediction was that speakers 
would experience more difficulty shifting from their entrained description to a more 
contextually appropriate description in the Consistent Training-Test level than in the 
Inconsistent Training-Test level, due to a more fluent retrieval of the entrained response. 
This analysis only included trials where the target was appropriately specified both at test 
as well as in the last training trial before test.  The dependent variable was the speech 
latency for the test trial minus the speech latency for the final training trial for that 
sequence; in other words, the change in speech latency incurred by abandoning the 
entrained description. Our previously conducted power analysis suggested .93 power for a 
two-tailed test with N = 36. 
For the eye tracking data, we predicted a lower proportion of gazes to non-target images in 
the grid prior to the onset of speech in the Consistent Training-Test level than in the 
Inconsistent Training-Test level in the test phase; this would reflect less consideration of 
context due to a strong memory signal. Note that we analysed eye tracking data from trials 
that were appropriately specified (i.e. speech that contained no misspecifications). 
In sum, we had two key predictions:  
(1) A main effect of Training-Test Consistency on misspecification, with more frequent 
misspecification in the Consistent level, alpha=.05, one tailed;  
(2) For appropriately specified descriptions, a main effect of Training-Test Consistency on 
differential onset latency (relative to the last training trial), with longer relative delays in 
the Consistent level, alpha=.05, two-tailed;  
We also made two additional (less critical) predictions:  
(3) Greater rate of underspecification than overspecification (based on the result from 
Experiment 1); in other words, a higher rate of misspecification in the Singleton-Contrast 
level than in the Contrast-Singleton level, alpha=.05, two-tailed;  
(4) Fewer non-target fixations prior to speech onset in the Training-Test Consistent level 
than in the Inconsistent level, alpha=.05, two-tailed.  
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4.4 – Results 
4.4.1 – Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis for the production data (modifier use and speech onset) was 
performed using linear mixed-effects models with Directors (subjects) and sequence 
(stimuli items) as crossed random factors (Baayen et al., 2008). All analyses attempted to 
use the maximal random effects structure justified by the design (Barr, et al.,  2013), which 
implies by-subject and by-item random intercepts and by-subject and by-item random 
slopes for both main effects (Training-Test Consistency and Shift Direction) and their 
interaction. We derived p-values using the t-to-z heuristic (i.e., deriving p-values from the 
standard normal distribution for the t statistic), as that enabled us to perform one-tailed 
tests. Models were estimated using the lme4 package in R (version 1.1-7 or higher). All 
independent variables were deviation coded. The analysis of modifier use assumed a logit 
link and binomial variance function, whereas the analysis of onset times used an identity 
link with a Gaussian variance function. Our analysis of the eye-tracking data used a 
Poisson regression model to analyse non-target fixations prior to speech onset. For this 
analysis we used the maximal random effects structure justified by the design. By-subject 
random intercepts and by-subject random slopes were used for both main effects (Training-
Test Consistency and Shift Direction) and their interactions. Directors (subjects) and 
sequence (stimuli items) were treated as random factors in this model. The formula for 
each of our analysis models can be viewed in our pre-registration files on the Open Science 
Framework: https://osf.io/uq4k7/. 
4.4.2 – Misspecification Rate 
Analysis revealed a main effect of retrieval fluency on misspecification. The overall 
misspecification rate was considerably higher than in Experiment 1. Misspecification in the 
Consistent Training-Test level (previously Low Context Variability in Experiment 1) was 
at 85% compared to the Inconsistent Training-Test level (previously High Context 
Variability) which was at 80% (pre-registered one-tailed test: z = 1.89, p = 0.03). Figure 10 
shows a breakdown of the misspecification rate by Shift Direction and Training-Test 
Consistency. This result suggests that Directors experienced greater levels of retrieval 
fluency in the Consistent Training-Test level causing them to make significantly more 
errors in their descriptions to the Matcher (see Table 13 for the grand means of 
misspecification rate (%) broken down by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency).  
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In line with previous research (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Ferreira et al., 2005; Gann & 
Barr, 2014) we found that when participants misspecified they were more likely to 
overspecify descriptions than underspecify. This result was in contrast to Experiment 1. In 
the Contrast-Singleton level participants entrained on descriptions (e.g. “the family car”) 
and then overspecified in the test trial at a rate of 89% (e.g. where the utterance “the car” 
was adequate). This was significantly higher than the underspecification rate of 74% in the 
Singleton-Contrast level where speakers entrained upon unmodified descriptions (“the 
car”) and then encountered a test trial which required a modification (z = 5.05, p < 0.01). 
Thus our prediction (based on the results of Experiment 1) that there would be higher 
misspecification in the Singleton-Contrast level than in the Contrast-Singleton level was 
not supported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shift Direction Training-Test Consistency Misspecification Rate (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Consistent 77.5 
Singleton-Contrast Inconsistent 70.0 
Contrast-Singleton Consistent 91.0 
Contrast-Singleton Inconsistent  88.0 
Table 13: Grand mean misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency factors. 
Figure 10: Misspecification rate (%) on test trials shown in both Shift Direction and Training-
Test Consistency factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles 
represent the grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency 
factors. 
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Table 14 shows the rate of misspecification (%) broken down by Shift Direction and 
Modifier Code. Analysis revealed no significant interaction between Training-Test 
Consistency and Shift Direction, z = -0.03, p = 0.97. 
Table 14: Misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and type of modifier. 
 
4.4.3 – Speech Fluency Analysis 
Fluent speech (FL) is categorised as speech which does not contain any misspecifications 
or filled/unfilled pauses. Our analysis revealed a similar mean number of fluent trials in 
both the Consistent (6%) and Inconsistent (8%) Training-Test Consistency levels. Table 15 
displays the percentage of trials (%) broken down by speech code. Table 16 displays the 
fluent trials (%) broken down by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency. There was 
no significant effect of Training-Test Consistency (Consistent vs. Inconsistent) on speech 
fluency, z = -0.83, p = 0.41. However, results did show a significant effect of Shift 
Direction (Singleton-Contrast vs. Contrast-Singleton), z = -2.16, p = 0.03 on speech 
fluency. Participants were significantly more fluent in the Singleton-Contrast level (9%) 
compared to the Contrast-Singleton level (6%). Figure 11 displays the fluent trials (%) 
across both Singleton-Contrast and Contrast-Singleton conditions. Finally, there was no 
significant interaction between Training-Test Consistency and Shift Direction, z = -0.43, p 
= 0.67. 
	
Shift Direction Modifier Code Misspecification Rate 
(%) 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Self-repair 25.6 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Other-repair 66.7 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Other/Self 1.1 
Singleton-Contrast Post-Nominal Modifier 0.2 
Singleton-Contrast  Pre-Nominal Modifier 0.2 
Singleton-Contrast No Modifier 4.9 
Singleton-Contrast Deleted Adjective 0.2 
Singleton-Contrast Deleted adjective/Addition self 0.2 
Contrast-Singleton Post-Nominal Modifier 13.4 
Contrast-Singleton Pre-Nominal Modifier 83.1 
Contrast-Singleton No Modifier 1.3 
Contrast-Singleton Deleted Adjective 1.0 
Contrast-Singleton Deleted Adjective/Addition Self 0.3 
Contrast-Singleton Other 0.8 
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Shift Direction Speech Code Percentage of 
 Trials (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Fluent Speech 33.5 
Singleton-Contrast Filled Pause 40.5 
Singleton-Contrast Filled Pause/Lengthened speech 1.3 
Singleton-Contrast Lengthened Speech 6.3 
Singleton-Contrast Lengthened Speech/Unfilled Pause 0.6 
Singleton-Contrast Unfilled Pause 3.8 
Contrast-Singleton Fluent Speech 55.4 
Contrast-Singleton Filled Pause  32.4 
Contrast-Singleton Unfilled Pause 4.1 
Shift Direction Training-Test Consistency Percentage of 
Fluent Trials (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Consistent 6.5 
Singleton-Contrast Inconsistent 11.0 
Contrast-Singleton Consistent 5.4 
Contrast-Singleton Inconsistent  6.3 
Table 15: Percentage of trials (%) for each category of speech code in the Shift Direction factor. 
Table 16: Fluent trials (%) by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency. 
Figure 11: Fluent trials (%) in both Shift Direction and Context Variability factors. Note that each 
grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the average percentage across each 
level of the Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency factors. 
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4.4.4 – Differential Speech Onset Latency 
Analysis of the differential speech onset latency (mean test trial onset – mean onset of final 
training trial) revealed a main effect of Training-Test Consistency, t = -2.09, p = 0.04. 
Participants took significantly longer in the Inconsistent level (average 948.2ms) compared 
to the Consistent level (average 672.2ms) to provide an adequate description to the 
addressee in the test phase. Further analysis also revealed a significant effect of Shift 
Direction (Singleton-Contrast vs. Contrast-Singleton) on onset latency, t = -4.44, p = 
<0.01. Participants took longer to begin their descriptions in the Singleton-Contrast level 
(1032ms) compared to the Contrast-Singleton level (420.5ms). Table 17 shows the mean 
onset change broken down by each level of Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 displays the differential speech onset latency for each condition of Training-Test 
Consistency and Shift Direction. Finally, there was no significant interaction between 
Training-Test Consistency and Shift Direction, t = 0.22, p = 0.83. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Differential speech onset latency (ms) in both Shift Direction and Context Variability 
factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the grand 
means across each level of the Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency factors.	
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4.4.5 – Eye Tracking Analysis 
Analysis of the eye-tracking data revealed no significant effect of Training-Test 
Consistency on non-target fixations prior to speech onset. Similarly to Experiment 1, 
analysis focussed on non-misspecified descriptions at the test phase of the experiment. We 
found a slight trend in the direction predicted - with fewer non-target fixations in the 
Training Consistent level (mean = 6.09) than in the Training Inconsistent level (mean = 
6.43), but this difference was not significant, z = -0.72, p = 0.47. There was no significant 
effect of Shift Direction on non-target fixations. However, speakers did fixate more on 
non-target items in the Contrast-Singleton level (mean = 6.79) compared to the Singleton-
Contrast level (mean = 6.04), z = 1.68, p = 0.09. Figure 13 displays the number of fixations 
across both Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency factors. Table 18 displays the 
mean number of non-target fixations broken down by Shift Direction and Training-Test 
Consistency. Finally, there was no significant interaction between Shift Direction and 
Training-Test Consistency z = -0.52, p = 0.6.  
No.  
Trials 
Shift 
Direction 
Training-Test 
Consistency 
Training 
Onset (ms) 
Test Onset 
(ms) 
Differential 
Onset Latency 
(ms) 
69 Singleton-
Contrast 
Consistent  1582.3 2457.5 842.1 
89 Singleton-
Contrast 
Inconsistent 1514.3 2670.9 1173.2 
32 Contrast-
Singleton 
Consistent 1749.7 2148.9 278.0 
42 Contrast-
Singleton 
Inconsistent 1667.8 2210.1 509.5 
Table 17: Mean onset change (ms) by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency. 
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Shift Direction Training-Test Consistency Mean Number of Non-Target 
Fixations 
Singleton-Contrast Consistent 5.91 
Singleton-Contrast Inconsistent 6.13 
Contrast-Singleton Consistent 6.46 
Contrast-Singleton Inconsistent 7.03 
Table 18: Mean number of fixations by Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency. 
 
4.5 – Discussion 
Experiment 2 was our second attempt to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis. This 
hypothesis proposes that attending to an object with the goal of referential encoding elicits 
retrieval of previous referential expressions used for that particular referent. Accordingly, 
speakers use the strength/fluency of these memory signals as a heuristic for audience 
design in referential communication. Our previous results from Experiment 1 did not 
reveal a main effect of fluency on misspecification rate and therefore failed to find 
evidence supporting the retrieval fluency hypothesis. Experiment 2 marked an improved 
attempt to test for the retrieval fluency effect.  
Figure 13: Non-target fixations prior to speech onset in both the Shift Direction and Training-
Test Consistency factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles 
represent the grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Training-Test Consistency 
factors. 	
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In this experiment we made a number of important alterations in an attempt to increase the 
level of retrieval fluency experienced by participants. In particular, we made two 
significant modifications to the design – firstly we altered the stimuli set presented to 
participants. Instead of the letters (of varying colours and size) that were presented in 
Experiment 1, we introduced a new range of objects with more distinguishable features. 
The main idea behind this alteration was that these objects may have enabled participants 
to build up stronger, more fluent memories of the descriptions used with each target item. 
The second change was in relation to the presentation and sequencing of trials. In this 
experiment we replaced the Context Variability factor (Low vs. High Variability) from 
Experiment 1 with the Training-Test Consistency factor (Training Consistent vs. 
Inconsistent). This new factor reconfigured the arrangement of trials in the training phase 
of the experiment. In contrast to Experiment 1, the training trials remained relatively stable 
in presentation and we altered whether the training arrangement was similar (Consistent) or 
dissimilar (Inconsistent) during the test phase. 
The results of Experiment 2 provided weak statistical support for the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis. There was a significant main effect of Training-Test Consistency on 
misspecification rate with participants misspecifying more frequently in the Consistent 
level (85%) compared to the Inconsistent level (80%). Participants struggled to adapt their 
descriptions to suit the conversational context when the training phase was contextually 
consistent with the test phase and often used the same description as before even though it 
was no longer contextually appropriate. This suggests that participants used a retrieval 
fluency heuristic and relied on their memory of their previous utterance to generate 
descriptions for the addressee.  
The eye tracking analysis of non-misspecified test trials revealed that speakers made fewer 
non-target fixations in the Training-Test Consistent level (mean = 6.09) compared to the 
Training-Test Inconsistent level (mean = 6.43). However, this difference was not 
significant. We also found that participants made more non-target fixations in the Contrast-
Singleton level (mean = 6.79) compared to the Singleton-Contrast level (mean = 6.04) of 
the Shift Direction factor. However, unlike Experiment 1, there was no statistically 
significant difference between these two levels. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is likely that 
this pattern of results reflects the fact that the training trials had effectively primed 
participants to check the context for a competitor letter in the Contrast-Singleton level, 
unlike the training trials in the Singleton-Contrast level where there was no competitor 
present. 
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Notably, the misspecification rate in this experiment was considerably higher than the rate 
of misspecification in Experiment 1 (Low Context Variability, 17%; High Context 
Variability, 16%). Further analysis revealed that participants were more likely to 
overspecify than underspecify referents. Participants overspecified at a rate of 89% in the 
Contrast-Singleton level of the Shift Direction factor compared to a 74% rate of 
underspecification in the Singleton-Contrast level. Although we predicted the opposite 
result (based on our findings from Experiment 1) it was not surprising that we found this 
effect since overspecification is common in referential communication (Deutsch & 
Pechmann, 1982; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Gann & Barr, 2014; Horton & Keysar, 1996; 
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). This result can perhaps be explained by the notion that when 
speakers misspecify utterances they usually prefer to overspecify than run the risk of 
underspecifying descriptions to listeners. Providing too little information may be 
considered more communicatively costly as it requires addressees to guess at the speaker’s 
meaning – and potentially causes more confusion and misunderstanding for the listener 
(Gann & Barr, 2014).  
Our second main prediction for this experiment focussed on the differential speech onset 
latency. We predicted that there would be a main effect of Training-Test Consistency on 
speech onset latency with participants experiencing more difficulty shifting from their 
entrained description to a more appropriate description in the Consistent Training-Test 
level. However, we obtained a significant effect in the opposite direction. Mean onset 
latency in the Inconsistent level was greater (948.2ms) than in the Consistent level 
(672.2ms). Although we obtained an unexpected effect in the Training-Test Consistency 
factor our results could nevertheless still be interpreted as support for the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis – on being presented with test trials which were inconsistent with the 
arrangement shown during the training phase participants experienced less fluent retrieval 
(weaker memory signals) of their previous description and therefore took longer to adapt 
their description to suit the conversational context. Whilst this is entirely possible, we are 
tentative about this result and would be cautious about interpreting this finding in such a 
way. Instead we acknowledge that this result perhaps reveals a flaw in our prediction as a 
significant effect in either direction could be interpreted as support for the fluency 
hypothesis.  
Analysis also revealed an effect of Shift Direction on differential onset latency with 
participants taking significantly longer to provide descriptions in the test phase in the 
Singleton-Contrast level (1032ms) in comparison to the Contrast-Singleton level 
(420.5ms). This result reflects the likelihood that participants took longer to think carefully 
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and adapt their description (by adding a modifier to their speech) in the Singleton-Contrast 
level. In contrast, participants were quicker in the Contrast-Singleton level and gave less 
consideration to the content of their description. As mentioned previously, this is reflected 
in the higher rate of misspecification in the Contrast-Singleton level (89%) compared to 
the rate of misspecification in the Singleton-Contrast level (74%). Notably, we found no 
effect of Training-Test Consistency on speech fluency. However, there was a significant 
effect of Shift Direction on speech fluency. Participants were significantly more fluent 
(FL) in the Singleton-Contrast level (9%) in comparison to the Contrast-Singleton level 
(6%). This is in contrast to Experiment 1 where speech fluency was higher in the Contrast-
Singleton level (95%) compared to Singleton-Contrast (91%).  
Overall, these results provide weak evidence supporting the retrieval fluency hypothesis 
for audience design. However, due the low effect size of our main effect of Training-Test 
Consistency on misspecification (Consistent level 85% vs. Inconsistent level 80%) we 
were motivated to carry out an additional experiment which sought to further test the 
retrieval fluency hypothesis.  
In our third study, we attempted to advance our current findings and develop our paradigm 
to reflect a more naturalistic conversational setting. To reach this goal, Experiment 3 was 
designed with a new completely new format. Specifically, we introduced an additional 
Matcher to the experimental design. This enabled us to introduce two new experimental 
factors (Pragmatic Consistency and Visual Consistency) to test how factors in the 
speaker’s communicative environment affect how the speaker linguistically encodes 
referential information. Whilst the results of Experiment 2 offered some support for our 
hypothesis we acknowledge that the Training-Test Consistency factor in this study lacks 
communicative relevance in the context of a normal day-to-day interaction.  
In Experiment 3 we attempted to address this issue by manipulating a more relevant cue - 
the appearance of the conversational partner that the Director spoke to. Thus in our final 
experiment we manipulated the visual consistency of the addressee in a further attempt to 
influence the level of retrieval fluency that the speaker experienced whilst providing 
referential descriptions. Importantly, by incorporating this manipulation into our design, 
Experiment 3 enabled us to further test the concept of partner specificity (the proposal that 
conversational partners can act as contextual cues for memory in common ground) 
advocated by Horton (2007) and Horton and Gerrig (2005a). The following chapter details 
the methodology and results of our final retrieval fluency experiment.  
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Chapter 5 – Experiment 3 
	
 
5.1 – Background 
5.1.1 – Does the Conversational Environment Affect Referential Encoding? 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 failed to provide compelling evidence indicating that 
the episodic effects of memory influence the speaker’s production of referential 
descriptions during audience design. Although we did obtain a significant main effect of 
retrieval fluency on misspecification rate in Experiment 2, the effect size for this result was 
small. Our efforts to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis have thus far focussed on 
manipulating communicatively irrelevant cues in the speaker’s environment (e.g. similarity 
between contexts in training vs. test phase, colour and position of letters in an array). We 
acknowledge that the manipulations implemented in our first two experiments lack 
communicative relevance in the context of a normal everyday interaction between two 
interlocutors. In this study, we sought to address this issue by manipulating a referential 
cue that is normally strongly correlated with common ground – the speaker’s perceptual 
experience when addressing a listener.  
Who the speaker is looking at during conversation can be considered to be an influential 
cue in helping the speaker to generate referential descriptions. As noted in Chapter 1, a key 
component of Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model is the argument that 
conversational partners act as contextual cues for the automatic retrieval of information 
(Horton, 2007). This idea is supported by evidence indicating that common ground 
established with a specific partner can be considered in the early stages of language 
processing (e.g. Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). If the memory-
based approach is correct, it implies that perceptual experiences can serve as a proxy for 
common ground. Thus the visual appearance of the addressee should act as a cue for 
partner specificity. However, in everyday conversation, pragmatic knowledge of the 
identity of the intended addressee is almost perfectly correlated with the perceptual 
experience of seeing the person one is speaking to. Studies which support the supposition 
of partner specificity in audience design (e.g. Gorman et al., 2013; Hanna et al., 2003; 
Horton, 2007) often fail to take this into account. Thus in our final experiment we 
attempted to de-confound the visual appearance of a potential addressee from the 
pragmatic knowledge of who the speaker was interacting with. In this way, our experiment 
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enabled us to further test Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) assumption of partner specificity in 
audience design. 
Our design for this study was influenced by a gesture production experiment by Mol, 
Krahmer, Maes, and Swerts' (2011) that explored the idea of de-confounding the effects of 
seeing from being seen using webcam technology which simulated eye contact between 
communicators. Interestingly, Mol et al. (2011) found that speakers produced more 
gestures only when they knew that they were visible to the addressee. Recent research by 
Barr et al., (2014) also implemented a similar de-confounding technique. Taking advantage 
of the naturally occurring common ground that exits between university students, the 
authors recruited pairs of friends to play in a referential communication game along with a 
lab assistant. In this experiment one of the friends heard the name of a mutually known 
person and had to click on the corresponding photograph that appeared on a computer 
monitor. Crucially, on some trials Barr et al. (2014) de-coupled the voice that read out the 
name of the mutually known person from the actual designer of the message for the 
addressee. Results revealed that addressees looked at the target picture more quickly and 
reliably when the name of the target person was read out by the addressee’s friend. This 
was irrespective of whether the name was selected by the friend or the lab assistant (Barr, 
2014; Barr et al., 2014).  
5.1.2 – Adapting the Retrieval Fluency Experiment 
As with previous experiments in this line of research (e.g. Gann & Barr, 2014) the study 
was designed to enable the Director to build up experience describing a certain set of 
objects during a ‘training’ phase with one of the two Matchers. At a later test phase we 
assessed whether Directors drew upon this experience when describing the target object 
(depending on whether they spoke to the same or a different addressee and additionally, in 
the current case, who they saw on screen). As with Experiments 1 and 2, we aimed to 
assess the degree to which Directors rely on memory when providing descriptions by 
examining referential misspecifications during the test phase (i.e., whether Directors 
provided more or less information than is optimal for identifying the target within the 
current referential array). The extent to which Directors misspecify referents in the test 
phase indexes the degree to which they are relying on remembered expressions from the 
training phase rather than tailoring their expressions to the current visually available set of 
objects.  
Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2, trials were organised into a series of blocks which were 
then each divided, in turn, into a “training” and “test” phase (this division into phases was 
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not readily apparent to participants). The purpose of the training phase was for Directors to 
entrain on particular referential expressions with a given addressee for particular targets in 
specific referential arrays. During the training phase in this study Directors always saw 
(through the webcam link) the same Matcher with whom that they were entraining on 
descriptions; the other Matcher was off-screen. The off-screen Matcher was not able to 
hear the Director’s descriptions nor see the array of objects. This Matcher heard white 
noise in his/her headphones and wore a blindfold (see Section 5.2.7 – Procedure for more 
details). In the test phase the same targets appeared in contexts requiring different 
descriptions enabling us to measure speakers’ referential misspecifications. 
Experiment 3 was designed as an interactive referential communication game with the 
participant playing the role of the Director (the speaker) and the experimenter and a lab 
assistant playing the role of Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 who interpreted the Director’s 
descriptions. Building on the design from Experiments 1 and 2, we sought to dissociate 
perceptual cues (the visual image of a listener) from pragmatic cues (knowledge of the 
identity of the actual listener). Inspired by Mol et al. (2011) and Barr et al. (2014) we de-
confounded pragmatic (Pragmatically Consistent vs. Inconsistent) and perceptual (Visually 
Consistent vs. Inconsistent) cues using a webcam communication setup where the visual 
experience of the Director was controlled independently of the pragmatic situation, so that 
who the Director saw and who the Director was speaking to did not always coincide. The 
Director sat in a separate testing room from both Matchers and viewed a separate computer 
monitor from the Matchers throughout the experiment. In the other room, both Matchers 
were seated next to each other and shared the same computer monitor. 
The experimental setup de-confounded perceptual and pragmatic cues as follows. First, to 
control who could hear the Director’s descriptions both Matchers wore headphones. The 
audio was configured so that only one of the two Matchers could hear the Director at a 
given time (please see Figure 14 for an overview of our design). The Director controlled 
which of the two Matchers was the addressee by manipulating an audio mixing board. 
Second, the Director was able to see into the Matchers’ room through a webcam (but not 
vice versa). Independent to the audio manipulation, at any given time, only one of the two 
Matchers was on-screen; this on-screen matcher may or may not have been the intended 
addressee. In other words, Directors were occasionally confronted with a situation in which 
they were seeing someone other than the person they were speaking to. 
We incorporated three main factors in this design: 
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Visual Consistency Factor 
Throughout the experiment the participant viewed the stimuli overlain on a live webcam 
image of one of the two Matchers (see examples in Figures 14 and 17). The factor of 
Visual Consistency refers to whether or not the Matcher the participant saw at the test 
phase was the same one (Consistent) they saw at training; or a different one (Inconsistent). 
If Horton (2007) and Horton and Gerrig (2005a) are correct in their assumption that 
speakers use conversational partners as memory cues, then we would expect participants to 
misspecify at the test phase (due to greater retrieval fluency) in this factor, when looking at 
the same Matcher they described the target item to during the training phase.  
 
Pragmatic Consistency Factor 
This factor refers to whether the intended addressee at test is the same (Consistent) or 
different (Inconsistent) from the intended addressee of the training phase. Similarly to the 
Visual Consistency Factor, if speakers use addressees as memory cues for conversation 
then we would expect greater misspecification when participants speak to the same 
Matcher during the test phase as they spoke to during training. Note that this factor was 
manipulated completely independently from Visual Consistency. 
Shift Direction Factor 
As with our first two experiments, this factor was included to vary the amount of 
information that Directors would have to provide in test trials relative to training. This 
variation was to prevent a situation in which Directors would learn that they need to alter 
the information at test in only one direction (e.g., always increase rather than reduce 
information). As such, in this experiment it was not a factor of primary theoretical interest. 
In the Singleton-Contrast level speakers entrained upon descriptions for a target object in a 
context where modifiers were not required (“the car”) and were then tested in a context 
requiring a modifier (“the family car”). In the Contrast-Singleton level this order was 
reversed: the speaker was shown a competitor object as well as the target item during 
training (e.g., car vs. sports car), leading speakers to entrain upon a modified expression 
during training. At test, the competitor was then replaced with a foil item, such that 
participants were able to simplify their description of the target item (“the family car” -> 
“the car”). Please see the previous description of this factor in Chapter 4 for further 
details. 
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Figure 14: Overview of the Visual Consistency and Pragmatic Consistency factors 
Under the Test Trial column above, we outline the different levels of the Visual Consistency 
and Pragmatic Consistency factors. During the training phase the Director (participant) always 
described the target item (e.g. “the car”) to the Matcher (yellow vs. orange) that he/she could 
see on the computer monitor while the off-screen Matcher wore a blindfold and listened to 
white noise. At the test trial we manipulated the Visual Consistency for the Director such that 
the participant either viewed the same Matcher as they saw during the training phase 
(Consistent) or the alternative Matcher who was off-screen during the training phase 
(Inconsistent). Additionally, we also manipulated the Pragmatic Consistency of the Matcher 
during the test trial: the Director either continued to describe the target item to the same 
Matcher as before (Consistent) or described the item to the alternative matcher (Inconsistent). 
Note that the red arrows highlighting the foil/competitor objects are for illustrative purposes 
and did not appear during the actual experiment. Similarly, the key shown for the Pragmatic 
Consistency factor in this figure is for illustrative purposes only. 
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An important aspect of this experiment was that it addressed the concerns raised by 
Brown-Schmidt et al. (2015) who highlighted that studies failing to find evidence in 
support of partner specificity in audience design are often characterised by a lack of partner 
interaction in their design (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brown & Dell, 1987). The authors 
argue that experiments that have more extensive interactions between participants show 
greater partner specific effects (e.g. Lockridge & Brennan 2002; Hanna et al., 2003). 
Further, research suggests that when participants are unable to interact with their partner 
this results in a lack of partner specific bindings being formed in memory (Brown-Schmidt, 
2009). To ensure that we accounted for these findings, live interaction with the addressee 
was a key feature of our experiment. Directors had the opportunity to engage directly with 
both Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 on different occasions throughout the experiment.  
5.1.3 – Describing Unconventional vs. Conventional Referents 
One potential issue with our design concerned the manipulation of Visual and Pragmatic 
Consistency. We acknowledge that it was unusual to decouple the speaker’s pragmatic 
knowledge from their visual experience. A possible outcome from this decoupling was that 
we would see no evidence for an effect of Pragmatic Consistency on misspecification rate. 
Should this arise, a concern might be that perhaps speakers were simply inattentive to the 
identity of the current intended addressee (the Matcher who could hear the speech through 
the headphones). To check that speakers were indeed sensitive, along with our main 
target/competitor stimuli we included a set of unconventional filler trials for which, based 
on Gann and Barr (2014), we expected to see strong effects of Pragmatic Consistency. 
 
These unconventional fillers included abstract drawings in grayscale that Directors would 
need to describe using complex descriptions (please see Figure 15 for an example of the 
stimuli). Since speakers lacked any experience describing these objects they would have to 
come up with their own descriptions which they could eventually shorten over time (Gann 
& Barr, 2014). A crucial test of whether speakers kept track of who they were interacting 
with on test trials was whether they continued to use a shortened description for an abstract 
object when talking to a new addressee who had never heard the description before.  
Following the methods of Gann and Barr, we measured description length in terms of 
number of words used to describe targets. Our hypothesis was that for a given target we 
would see a greater increase in description length from the last training trial to the test trial 
when the test addressee was not the same as the training addressee. Thus we expected to 
replicate the results of Gann and Barr (2014).  
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5.1.4 – Pre-registered Predictions 
All our predictions were pre-registered on the OSF (outlined in section 5.3.4 – Pre-
registered Analysis and Predictions). Our main prediction concerned the Visual 
Consistency factor. We predicted that speakers would misspecify referents at a higher rate 
in the Visually Consistent level than in the Visually Inconsistent level.  
 
5.2 – Method 
5.2.1 – Participants  
Forty subjects completed the experiment (31 Females, M=25.6 years). All subjects were 
recruited from the campus at the University of Glasgow. All subjects were Native English 
speakers. Subjects who were bilingual identified English as their first language. 
Participants were paid £6 for taking part in the study. One participant was replaced due to 
the use of ineffective descriptions during the task (continuously failing to adapt their 
utterances for the listener, please see Section 5.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant 
Responses in Chapter 4 for more details). Subjects gave written informed consent before 
beginning the experiment and were fully debriefed after the experiment had finished. Our 
procedures fully complied with the ethical code of conduct of the British Psychological 
Association.         
Figure 15: Example of six unconventional target items and the descriptions used by 
participants. 
	 99	
5.2.2 – Norming of Test Items 
The target and competitor items originally used in Experiment 2 were used in this 
experiment. These items were previously normed by 68 Native English speaking 
volunteers using the web-based surveyor SurveyMonkey (please see the pre-registration 
for Experiment 2 for details: https://osf.io/uq4k7/). Based on performance in Experiment 2, 
nine items were replaced for this experiment (8 items which were over-described in the 
Singleton-Contrast level, at a rate of more than 50% during the training phase and 1 
additional item which was replaced as participants had previously found it difficult to 
name the target). Nine new stimuli pairs were added to our original list (please see 
Appendix 6 for a complete list of the Target and Competitor objects used). 
5.2.3 – Experimental Setup and Task     
In each trial, the Director was tasked with describing a target object to a given Matcher so 
that the Matcher could then identify this object on his/her own screen. The intended 
Matcher (the “addressee”) then selected the target from an array of objects by pressing a 
number key. The Director’s view showed the target object within a grid containing images 
of other objects. In this experiment the grid was superimposed over a live webcam image 
of the Matcher visible behind the object images (see Figures 16 and 17 for examples). The 
Director was informed that in each trial both Matchers had the same objects on their 
monitor but that they were arranged in a different format to the grid that appeared on their 
screen. The Matchers’ view consisted of a black background screen with each of the 
potential target items presented in 3x3 arrangement (see Figure 17 for an example of this 
layout and the response pad used by both Matchers).  
5.2.4 – Design  
There were three factors in the design, Direction of Shift (Singleton-Contrast and Contrast-
Singleton), Visual Consistency (Consistent and Inconsistent) and Pragmatic Consistency 
(Consistent and Inconsistent) which formed a full-factorial 2x2x2 within-participant 
design. As explained previously, it was only the latter two factors (Visual and Pragmatic 
Consistency) that were of primary theoretical interest.  
5.2.5 – Materials and Sequencing of Trials 
We used the same Target and Competitor objects which were normed for Experiment 2 
(see Section 5.2.2 – Norming of Test Items for details on exceptions). Each display 
consisted of nine images of various objects displayed around the webcam image of the 
Matcher (see Figure 17 for an example of the layout). The experiment contained 12 blocks 
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of trials, each consisting of 4-6 training trials for each of four different target picture trials 
followed by a test phase with single test trials for each of the four targets. We use the term 
“sequence” to refer to the collection of training and test trials all associated with a single 
target/competitor/foil triplet. Thus there were 48 sequences, each of which appeared an 
equal number of times in all eight conditions of the 2x2x2 design, counterbalanced using 
eight stimulus lists.  
For each sequence, the number of training trials was randomly selected, with a range from 
four to six. The motivation for varying training sequence length was to make the 
occurrence of the test trial unpredictable. Each experimental session had the same number 
of four-, five-, or six-length training sequences, and thus had a total of 240 training (=16 x 
(4 + 5 + 6)) and 48 test trials.  As well as incorporating unconventional filler items into our 
design we also included conventional fillers that had targets much like the main trials. This 
type of sequence was included so that it was not always the case that the displays within a 
sequence predictably changed from training to test (i.e., through the substitution of the 
competitor for the foil or vice versa). 
For the conventional fillers twelve sequences were included (one for each block) in which 
the display was identical from training to test. Six of these included a competitor so that 
the target must be described using a modifier. Each sequence included three training trials 
and one test trial, for a total of 48 trials. For the unconventional fillers there were three 
training trials and one test trial for twelve sequences (one for each block). Half of these test 
trials were presented when the speaker was talking to the same Matcher as the one they 
spoke to at the training phase (Pragmatically Consistent) and the other half were presented 
when the speaker was talking to a different Matcher from the one they spoke to during 
training (Pragmatically Inconsistent). Similarly, half of the test trials were shown in the 
Visually Consistent level (with the speaker looking at the same Matcher as the one that 
appeared during training) and the other half of these test trials were shown in the Visually 
Inconsistent level. 
In sum, in each session there were 240 training trials, 72 filler training trials (36 
conventional and 36 unconventional), 48 test trials, and 24 filler test trials (12 conventional 
and 12 unconventional), for a grand total of 384 trials. 
5.2.6 – Apparatus 
The experimental stimuli were presented on a 19” LCD Dell desktop computer monitor 
(4:3 aspect ratio, resolution 1024 x 768 pixels).  Participants were seated 45-55cm away 
	 101	
from the monitor.  A microphone was placed above the participant’s computer monitor to 
record their descriptions of the target object for each trial. The audio was tagged using 
Audacity 2.0.6 software.  
5.2.7 – Procedure 
Upon arrival each participant was given an instruction sheet detailing the task and their 
role during the experiment (see Appendix 7). Both Matchers were set up in an adjoining 
room to the Director and faced a computer monitor (see Figure 16). The layout of the room 
was designed to ensure both Matchers were able to move in front of the webcam when 
prompted to appear on screen. During the experiment each Matcher was referred to by 
colour (yellow and orange) and both Matchers wore coloured tags to ensure the participant 
was able to differentiate them from one another. Before the experiment began participants 
took part in a practice session that consisted of twelve training trials and four test trials. 
This enabled the participant to familiarise themselves with their role as the Director as well 
experience the experiment from the Matchers’ perspective.  
In order to discriminate the target object from the filler objects, the target for a given trial 
was highlighted within a green square in the director’s display (see Figure 16 and Figure 
17). The participant was informed that as the arrangement of images within the Matcher’s 
computer screen differed in an unpredictable way from that of the Director, they would 
have to describe the features of the highlighted item, rather than use the target’s on-screen 
location as a description.  
Before each block of training trials was presented, a notice was shown on-screen informing 
the Director which Matcher appeared on-screen (yellow or orange) and which Matcher was 
listening to their description (yellow or orange). This order was pre-determined and 
counterbalanced across participants. The notice also indicated that the off-screen Matcher 
was to put on the blindfold. The Director manipulated the audio channel using a 
crossfading slider on a mixing board. The Matcher who was not selected as the intended 
addressee heard white noise through his/her headphones to ensure that any speech from the 
Director was indecipherable. Half of the training phases were completed with the yellow 
Matcher as addressee, and the other half with the orange Matcher as addressee. The 
Matcher who was off-screen during training was always wearing a blindfold and could 
only hear white noise through their headphones. 
 
Just prior to the test phase another on-screen notice appeared indicating that the blindfold 
was to be removed, and designating which Matcher was to appear on-screen and which 
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Matcher was to hear the Director’s speech. The Director then switched the cross fader so 
that the indicated Matcher was able to hear the audio. Once the arrangements were 
completed one of the Matchers advanced to the first test trial. To avoid confounding the 
length of delay between training and test with the experimental factors, the on-screen 
notice appeared for a minimum of eighteen seconds. 
Audio recording of the Director’s response began simultaneously with the presentation of 
the main display. The trial ended when the Matcher listening to the description selected the 
object designated by the Director. After each individual trial the Matcher listening to the 
Director’s descriptions was prompted to press a keyboard button to continue to the next 
trial. Note that the Director could not see the Matchers’ screen and received no feedback 
regarding whether the trial was completed correctly. If the Director failed to provide 
sufficient information to identify the target, the Matcher was instructed to ask the Director 
for clarification (e.g. “which one do you mean?”). Any such clarification exchanges 
appeared in the audio recording for the trial and were noted during later transcription. 
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Figure 16: Outline of experimental set up and procedure for Experiment 3. 
The Director sat in a separate room from the yellow and orange Matchers and viewed the 
stimuli on a separate computer monitor. During each block of trials the participant viewed a 
live webcam image of one of the Matchers in the background of the computer monitor and 
also communicated with one of the Matchers via a microphone and a set of headphones. 
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A 
B 
Figure 17: Overview of the training and test trials in the Shift Direction factor. 
Panel A shows an example of the stimuli in the Singleton-Contrast level. The top half of the panel 
displays the Director’s (participant) view of the stimuli. The stimuli objects are displayed around 
the image of the Matcher on the screen. Note that the target object appears in a green rectangle on 
the Director’s screen (“the car”). After a series of training trials the test trial presents participants 
with the target object “the car” again, but unlike the training phase it also introduces a new 
“sports car” object. This may prompt the Director to underspecify their description of the target 
object to the Matcher (“select the car”). The training trials also present the “computer mouse” 
(highlighted by the red arrow) which acts as a foil for the “sports car”. The “computer mouse” is 
replaced by the “sports car” in the test phase. The bottom of Panel A shows the Matchers’ view 
of the stimuli during the training and test phase. Panel B shows the stimuli in the Contrast-
Singleton level with the alternative matcher on-screen. Note that in this case the competitor object 
– “the sports car” (highlighted with the red arrow) is also present in the grid during training, 
while at test it has been replaced with the foil object - a “computer mouse”. Please note that the 
red arrows highlighting the foil/competitor objects are for illustrative purposes and did not appear 
during the actual experiment. 
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5.3 – Predictions and Data Analysis 
5.3.1 – Main Measurements 
Our analysis focussed on two categories of measurements: (1) speech content and 
performance; in particular, use of a descriptive modifier and speech fluency; (2) 
differential onset latency, defined as the speech latency for the test trial minus the speech 
latency for the final training trial in each sequence. 
5.3.2 – Transcription and Coding of Audio Files 
For each of the 48 sequences for each Director, we transcribed and coded the audio 
recordings for two trials: (1) the last description of the target in the training phase; and (2) 
the test trial. The last training trial was needed in order to provide baseline data for the 
speech onset latency in the test trial, and to verify that speakers were not already 
misspecifying the referent during training. Each trial was transcribed and coded for fluency 
and adjective use.  
Similarly to Experiment 2 fluency was coded into one of five categories, as shown in the 
table below: 
 
We also coded whether or not a descriptive modifier was used, defined by the following 
categories:  
 
Modifier 
Code  
Description  Example(s)  
NO  No modifier  “car”, “the car”, “the silver car” * 
PR  Pre-nominal modifier  “family car” , “normal car” 
PO  Post-nominal modifier  “car, the family car”, “car, family one”  
DE  Deleted adjective  “fa—uh… just the car”  
AS  Addition due to self-repair  “car... family car ”  
AO  Addition due to other-repair  “car...” [Matcher: “Which one?”] “Oh, the family  
one”  
Table 20: Outline of item modifier categories with examples. 
Speech 
Code  
Description  Example(s)  
FL  Fluent speech “the family car”, “the car”, “car”  
UP  Unfilled pause (occurring after speech onset)  “the... silver car”  
FP  Filled pause (um/uh)  “um...  the car”  
RE  Repaired utterance  “car... yeah the family car”,       
“car...   uh…family car”  
LE Lengthened speech “the s(ssss…)ilver car” 
Table 19: Outline of speech fluency categories with examples. 
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Onset times of utterances were measured in milliseconds (ms). The following criteria were 
applied when identifying utterance onsets:  
• Trials were discarded if the speech was unidentifiable. 
• Any filled pauses or articles were ignored (um, uh, the); speech onset was 
identified as the first content word (e.g., adjective or noun), even if the adjective 
referred to colour rather than size (e.g., for “uh, the silver car” onset would be 
taken as the onset of the word “silver”).  
• If Directors corrected themselves after an error (e.g. “white car...eh sorry silver 
car”) onset of the correction (i.e. “silver”) was recorded. However, such repaired 
utterances were not used in the analysis of speech onset.  
* Note that a colour description was not coded as a modifier if it did not distinguish the 
target object from the competitor (for instance both the family car and the sports car were 
silver in colour). 
5.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant Responses 
We applied the same exclusion criteria for Experiment 3 as we implemented for 
Experiment 2. See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 – Exclusion Criteria for Participant Responses 
for a full outline of the criteria. Based on this criteria one subject and one stimulus pair 
(target and competitor items) were removed. Please see Appendix 8 for details. 
5.3.4 – Pre-registered Analysis and Predictions 
We pre-registered our analysis and predictions on the Open Science Framework. The basis 
for our estimate of a sample size of 40 participants and 48 items was derived from our pilot 
study which gave power of 85% for 36 participants and 48 items. This pilot study is 
available on github (https://github.com/dalejbarr/EESP2) and our pre-registration for 
Experiment 3 can be found on the Open Science Framework (OSF: https://osf.io/5yz3n/). 
As there were eight stimulus lists, the number of participants had to be a multiple of eight, 
and therefore we opted to move up to 40 participants. Given that for the current 
experiment, we improved our stimulus materials and used a more communicatively 
relevant memory cue (an image of the addressee, as opposed to the configuration of objects 
in the display), we assumed that the 85% estimate was a lower bound. Please see section 
3.3.4 - Pre-registered Analysis and Predictions outlined in Chapter 3 for details about the 
power calculation.  
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We made the following main predictions:  
1) Main effect of Visual Consistency: It was predicted that speakers would misspecify 
targets at a higher rate in the Visually Consistent level (i.e., when looking at the same 
Matcher at test as during training) than in the Visually Inconsistent level (i.e., when 
looking at a different Matcher). This test was pre-registered as one-tailed, with alpha = .05, 
we assumed a lower bound of power of 85%. This prediction was of key theoretical 
interest, as it is directly related to the “retrieval fluency” hypothesis explored in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
2) Main effect of Pragmatic Consistency: It was predicted that speakers would misspecify 
targets at a higher rate in the Pragmatically Consistent level (i.e., when speaking to the 
same Matcher at test as during training) than in the Pragmatically Inconsistent level (i.e., 
when speaking to a different Matcher). This test was pre-registered as  one-tailed, alpha = 
.05.  
3) Larger effect of Pragmatic Consistency than Visual Consistency: We included this final 
prediction as it would enable us to determine whether speakers weigh pragmatic 
consistency differently from visual consistency. Should we see main effects of Visual and 
Pragmatic Consistency we would opt to use the glht function from the R package 
multcomp to test the null hypothesis that the two effects are equivalent (two-tailed, alpha = 
.05).  
 
4) Main effect of Pragmatic Inconsistency on unconventional items: for this analysis 
(involving description of abstract objects), we predicted an interaction between Phase 
(training, test) and Pragmatic Consistency on description length, such that the effect of 
Phase would be larger in the Inconsistent level. We assessed this directional prediction for 
the interaction term using a one-tailed test with alpha = .05. 
Finally, for an additional analysis, we also tested the three main predictions above for a 
different dependent variable: differential onset latency. As with our first two experiments, 
differential onset latency was defined as the time taken to produce the first content word as 
measured from the onset of the display. Our prediction was that in cases where speakers 
appropriately specify targets at test, they would experience more difficulty and thus exhibit 
longer speech onset latencies in the Visually Consistent level than in the Visually 
Inconsistent level. Likewise, we expected a similar pattern for the Pragmatic Consistency 
factor. We tested these hypotheses using a one-tailed test (alpha = .05). This analysis only 
included trials where the target was appropriately specified both at the test trial as well as 
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in the last training trial before test. The dependent variable was the speech latency for the 
test trial minus the speech latency for the final training trial for that sequence; in other 
words, the change in speech latency incurred by abandoning the entrained description. Our 
power analysis suggested .93 power for a two-tailed test with N = 36.  
 
5.4 – Results 
5.4.1 – Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis for the production data (modifier use and speech onset) was 
performed using linear mixed-effects models with Directors (subjects) and sequence (item) 
as crossed random factors (Baayen, et al., 2008). All analyses attempted to use the 
maximal random effects structure justified by the design (Barr, et al., 2013), which implies 
by-subject and by-item random intercepts and by-subject and by-item random slopes for all 
three factors (Pragmatic Consistency, Visual Consistency, and Shift Direction) and their 
interactions. We derived p-values using the t-to-z heuristic (i.e., deriving p-values from the 
standard normal distribution for the t statistic), as this enabled us to perform one-tailed 
tests. Models were estimated using the lme4 package in R (version 1.1-7 or higher). All 
independent variables were deviation coded. The analysis of modifier use assumed a logit 
link and binomial variance function, whereas the analysis of onset times used an identity 
link with a Gaussian variance function. 
5.4.2 – Misspecification Rate 
Analysis of the misspecification data revealed no main effect of Visual Consistency. We 
found that manipulating whether the speaker was looking at the same Matcher at the test 
phase as they saw during training did not have a significant effect on misspecification rate. 
Indeed, the misspecification rate was in the opposite direction of our original prediction. 
Misspecification in the Visually Inconsistent level (looking at the alternative Matcher) was 
at 63% in comparison to the Visually Consistent level (looking at the same Matcher) which 
was 57%, pre-registered one-tailed test, z = -2.69, p = 0.99 Figure 18 shows the breakdown 
of misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction for both Visual and Pragmatic Consistency. 
Our analysis did not reveal a significant effect of Pragmatic Consistency on 
misspecification rate. In this factor the rate of misspecification was the same in the 
Pragmatically Consistent level (60%) as it was in the Pragmatically Inconsistent level 
(60%), pre-registered one-tailed test, z = -0.62, p = 0.27. There was no significant 
interaction between Visual and Pragmatic Consistency, z = 0.29, p = 0.77.  
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Table 21: Misspecification rate (%) across Visual Consistency, Pragmatic Consistency and Shift Direction 
factors. 
Visual 
Consistency 
Pragmatic 
Consistency 
Shift Direction Misspecification  
Rate (%) 
Consistent Consistent Singleton-Contrast 56.2 
Consistent Consistent Contrast-Singleton 58.7 
Consistent Inconsistent Singleton-Contrast 56.1 
Consistent Inconsistent  Contrast-Singleton 58.7 
Inconsistent Inconsistent Singleton-Contrast 58.9 
Inconsistent Inconsistent Contrast-Singleton 67.6 
Inconsistent Consistent Singleton-Contrast 59.1 
Inconsistent Consistent Contrast-Singleton 65.3 
Shift Direction Modifier Code Misspecification Rate (%) 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Other-repair 58.2 
Singleton-Contrast Addition due to Other/Self 4.2 
Singleton-Contrast  Pre-Nominal Modifier 0.2 
Singleton-Contrast No Modifier 4.2 
Singleton-Contrast Deleted Adjective 0.2 
Contrast-Singleton Addition due to Self-repair 0.4 
Contrast-Singleton Post-Nominal Modifier 16.7 
Contrast-Singleton Pre-Nominal Modifier 76.0 
Contrast-Singleton Pre/Post-Nominal Modifier 0.7 
Contrast-Singleton Pre-Nominal/No modifier 0.5 
Contrast-Singleton No Modifier 2.4 
Contrast-Singleton Deleted Adjective 3.2 
Table 22: Misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and type of modifier. 
B A 
Figure 18: Panel A displays the percentage of fluent trials (%) by Shift Direction and Visual Consistency 
factors. Panel B shows the percentage of fluent trials (%) by Shift Direction and Pragmatic Consistency. Note 
that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the grand means across each level of 
the Shift Direction and Visual/Pragmatic Consistency factors. 	
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Table 21 shows the misspecification rate (%) across all three main factors (Visual 
Consistency, Pragmatic Consistency and Shift Direction). Table 22 shows the 
misspecification rate (%) by Shift Direction and type of modifier. Results revealed no 
significant three-way interaction between Shift Direction x Visual Consistency x Pragmatic 
Consistency, z = 0.33, p = 0.74. Although Shift Direction was not of primary theoretical 
interest for this study it is worth noting that participants misspecified more frequently at 
the Contrast-Singleton level (62.6%) compared to the Singleton-Contrast level (57.6%). 
However, there was no significant effect of this factor on misspecification rate, z = 1.12, p 
= 0.26. Additionally, Shift Direction did not interact significantly with either of the Visual 
Consistency (z = -1.03, p = 0.3) or Pragmatic Consistency (z = -0.65, p = 0.52) factors. 
5.4.3 – Differential Speech Onset Latency 
Our prediction was that participants would produce longer onset latencies (an indication of 
greater difficulty altering the content of their description) in both the Visually Consistent 
level and the Pragmatically Consistent levels. Analysis of the differential onset latency 
(mean test trial onset – mean onset of final training trial) revealed no main effect of Visual 
Consistency, one-tailed test, t = 0.68, p = 0.25. Participants showed similar onset times for 
both the Visually Consistent level (average 897.1ms) and the Visually Inconsistent level 
(average 912.1ms). Analysis also revealed no significant effect of Pragmatic Consistency 
on differential onset latency, one-tailed test, t = -0.29, p = 0.39. Mean onset for 
Pragmatically Consistent level was 881.8ms compared to 926.3ms for the Pragmatically 
Inconsistent level. There was no significant interaction between Visual and Pragmatic 
Consistency, t = -0.48, p = 0.63. Table 23 provided a breakdown of the mean onset change 
for each level of the Visual and Pragmatic Consistency combinations. Figure 19 shows the 
differential onset latency broken down by Shift Direction for both the Visual and 
Pragmatic Consistency factors. 
No.  
Trials 
Visual 
Consistency 
Pragmatic 
Consistency 
Training 
Onset (ms) 
Test Onset 
(ms) 
Mean Onset 
Change (ms) 
182 Consistent Consistent  1406.2 2257.7 863.2 
186 Consistent Inconsistent 1418.5 2355.3 930.3 
161 Inconsistent Consistent 1408.8 2310.7 902.5 
161 Inconsistent Inconsistent 1472.1 2393.0 921.8 
Table 23: Mean onset change across Visual and Pragmatic Consistency factors. 
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Although not of primary concern in relation to our main predictions, we did find a 
significant effect of Shift Direction on onset latency, t =  -6.08, p = <0.01. Participants 
took longer in the Singleton-Contrast level (1262.6ms) compared to the Contrast-Singleton 
level (535.9ms) to produce a relevant description for the listener. Furthermore, there were 
no significant interactions between Shift Direction and Visual Consistency (t = -0.51, p = 
0.61) or Shift Direction and Pragmatic Consistency (t = 1.61, p = 0.11). Finally, there was 
no significant three-way interaction (Shift Direction x Visual Consistency x Pragmatic 
Consistency) on onset latency, t = -0.53, p = 0.59. 
5.4.4 – Unconventional Referents Analysis 
This manipulation involved trials where participants were prompted to describe 
unconventional, abstract objects. As mentioned previously, one possible outcome for the 
misspecification analysis was that we would see no evidence for an effect of Pragmatic 
Consistency on misspecification rate. Since it was unusual for us to decouple the speaker’s 
pragmatic knowledge from their visual experience, one potential concern with this result 
was the ambiguity of whether speakers’ failed to adapt their referential descriptions 
because they were inattentive to the identity of the addressee or whether they were aware 
of the addressee’s identity but that the Pragmatic Consistency factor was not effective in 
Figure 19: Panel A displays the differential speech onset latency (ms) for the by Shift Direction and 
Visual Consistency factors. Panel B show the differential latency for Shift Direction and Pragmatic 
Consistency factors. Note that each grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the 
grand means across each level of the Shift Direction and Visual/Pragmatic Consistency factors 
B 
A 
A 
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influencing their referential descriptions. Thus to check that speakers were actually 
sensitive to the identity of the current intended addressee (the Matcher who could hear the 
speech through the headphones) we opted to follow Gann & Barr (2014) in including a set 
of unconventional fillers to our study. We expected to find a main effect of Pragmatic 
Consistency with these unconventional items. Our hypothesis was that for a given target 
item we would see a greater increase in description length from the last training trial to the 
test trial when the test addressee was not the same as the training addressee (i.e. in the 
Pragmatically Inconsistent level).  
In our analysis we measured description length in terms of number of words used to 
describe targets. Our analysis was performed using a linear mixed-effects model with 
Directors (subjects) and sequence (items) as crossed random factors (Baayen et al., 2008). 
Analysis used the maximum random effects structure justified by the design (Barr et al., 
2013), which implied by-subject and by-item random intercepts and by-subject and by-
item random slopes for our two main factors (Perceptual Consistency and Pragmatic 
Consistency). A Poisson link function was chosen to reflect the distribution of our 
dependent variable – count data (number of words). 
Our analysis of the unconventional items did reveal a significant main effect of Pragmatic 
Consistency on description length, one-tailed test, z = -4.49, p < 0.01. Thus we 
successfully replicated the findings of Gann & Barr (2014). Participants used longer 
descriptions when the addressee was not the same at the test phase (mean = 10.6 words) 
compared to when they were speaking to the same addressee (mean = 8.2 words). 
Furthermore, our analysis revealed that 32 out of our 40 participants showed this main 
effect – indicating that the Pragmatic Consistency factor provided a strong, effective 
manipulation. We found no significant effect of Visual Consistency on description length 
of unconventional items, z = -1.19, p = 0.23. Participants showed a similar description 
length when looking at the same addressee (mean = 9.3 words) compared to looking at a 
different addressee (mean = 9.5 words) at the test phase. 
Table 24 provides an overview of the mean word count broken down by both Visual 
Consistency and Pragmatic Consistency factors. Figure 20 displays the average description 
length on test trials in both the Visual Consistency and Pragmatic Consistency factors. 
Finally, we found no significant interaction between Pragmatic and Visual Consistency 
factors, z = -1.11, p = 0.27. 
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5.5 – Discussion 
In our third experiment we created a new paradigm to further investigate the retrieval 
fluency hypothesis for referential encoding. In this study we attempted to dissociate the 
perceptual cues (visual image of the listener) from the pragmatic cues (knowledge of the 
identity of the actual listener) that the speaker experienced whilst producing referential 
descriptions for the addressee in an interactive communication game. This design also 
enabled us to test the assumption of partner specificity – which forms a key component of 
Visual 
Consistency 
Pragmatic 
Consistency 
Mean Train 
Word Count 
Mean Test 
Word Count 
Difference  
(Test-Train) 
Consistent Consistent  7.1 8.2 1.1 
Consistent Inconsistent 6.7 10.4 3.7 
Inconsistent Consistent 6.5 8.2 1.7 
Inconsistent Inconsistent 6.3 10.8 4.5 
Table 24: Mean word count by Visual and Pragmatic Consistency factors. 
Figure 20: Panel A displays the average description length at the test phase in the Visual Consistency factor. 
Panel B shows the average description length on test trials in the Pragmatic Consistency factor. Note that each 
grey line represents a single participant. The red circles represent the grand means across each level of the 
Shift Direction and Visual/Pragmatic Consistency factors. 	
A B 
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the memory-based model of referential communication (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 
2005a; Horton & Gerrig, 2016).  
The results of Experiment 3 did not reveal any evidence suggesting that participants 
followed a retrieval fluency heuristic. We found no main effect of Visual Consistency,  in 
fact there was a trend in the opposite direction of our prediction. We predicted that 
participants would experience greater levels of retrieval fluency when viewing the same 
Matcher (via the webcam video) at the test phase as they saw during the training phase. It 
was expected that when speakers were shown the visual image of the Matcher who had 
also appeared at the training phase this would cue the speaker to use the previous 
expression they used to describe the target item – even when that description was no longer 
communicatively relevant at the test phase (much like the Consistent level of the Training-
Test Consistency factor in Experiment 2). However, speakers’ rate of misspecification at 
test trials was numerically higher in the Inconsistent level (63%) compared to the 
Consistent level (57%) of the Visual Consistency factor.  
In addition to this, we also failed to find a main effect of Pragmatic Consistency on 
misspecification. We expected participants to make more referential errors when they were 
describing the target item to the same Matcher at the test phase that they spoke to during 
the training phase. However, consistent with Gann and Barr (2014) participants 
misspecified at the same rate (60%) regardless of whether they were describing items at the 
Pragmatically Consistent or Inconsistent level. Shift Direction did not have a significant 
effect on misspecification rate – although speakers did overspecify more often (Contrast-
Singleton level, 62.6%) than underspecify (Singleton-Contrast level, 57.6%). 
Although it was not a primary component of our analysis we did find a significant effect of 
Shift Direction on differential onset latency. Similarly to Experiment 2, participants took 
longer to adapt their description in the Singleton-Contrast level (1262.6ms) compared to 
the Contrast-Singleton level (535.9ms). This result suggests that participants had greater 
difficulty adapting their descriptions (to add in additional referential detail) in the 
Singleton-Contrast level compared to the Contrast-Singleton level.  
A key manipulation in this experiment was the implementation of unconventional filler 
trials that enabled us to test whether the Director was keeping track of the identity of the 
intended addressee during the test phase of the experiment. Following Gann and Barr 
(2014), we included abstract grayscale drawings that the Directors were required to 
describe. These items required participants to provide complex and often detailed 
descriptions in order for the listener to be able to correctly identify the target image. 
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Crucially, in our pre-registration, we noted that a non-significant effect in the Pragmatic 
Consistency factor may prompt the concern that the speaker was inattentive to the identity 
of the current intended addressee. The unconventional test trials enabled us to address this 
concern. We expected to see strong effects of Pragmatic Consistency for the 
unconventional items – with participants providing longer descriptions at the Inconsistent 
level (when there was a new Matcher at the test phase).  
The results supported our hypothesis with speakers providing significantly longer 
descriptions for new addressees (mean = 10.6 words) compared to old addressees (8.2 
words) at the test phase. This was an effective manipulation with 32 of our 40 participants 
showing this effect. Crucially, there was no significant effect of Visual Consistency on 
description length. Participants provided a similar description length when looking at the 
same addressee (mean = 9.3 words) compared to when looking at the alternative addressee 
(mean = 9.5 words). The significant effect of Pragmatic Consistency suggests that 
participants engaged in audience design and were aware when they were talking to a 
different Matcher at the test phase from the one they described target items to during 
training. This result mirrors Gann and Barr (2014) who note that “ideal speakers” will be 
sensitive to the addressee’s informational needs – using the same amount of words for an 
old referent when speaking to a new addressee as they would do when describing a new 
target item to that same addressee.  
Gann and Barr (2014) assessed onset latency of descriptions for old and new addressees 
and found no significant difference in onset. This suggests that speakers avoided 
underspecifying old referents to new addressees through a process of monitoring and 
adjustment rather than through additional planning. Whilst we did not test for this effect in 
our current experiment, it is possible that speakers’ adopted a similar strategy when 
describing old referents to new addressees. Thus the successful adaptation of a shortened 
description could possibly be explained by the fact that speakers adapt their utterances 
incrementally (Pechmann, 1989). It is relatively easy for speakers to incrementally add 
additional information to a reduced description without having to undergo extra planning 
(Gann & Barr, 2014). Notably, since speech is incremental by nature, it is more difficult to 
avoid producing overspecified descriptions as it is not possible to incrementally delete 
information that has already been altered (Gann & Barr, 2014). 
In this study we manipulated the speaker’s perceptual experience (a referential cue that is 
usually strongly correlated with common ground), in an attempt to test whether additional 
episodic representations available in memory influence reference generation. Since our 
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first two experiments lacked communicative relevance we considered this to be a key test 
of our retrieval fluency hypothesis. The results obtained underline a lack of support for our 
theory. Although we did not find evidence in support of the retrieval fluency hypothesis we 
did obtain a significant effect with our unconventional filler trials. This result indicates that 
the majority of participants were aware of the instances in which they were talking to a 
different Matcher. Crucially, this knowledge did not improve the accuracy of their 
descriptions (misspecification rate was identical in the Pragmatically Consistent vs. 
Inconsistent level).  
If the memory-based model is correct in its assumption of partner specificity, then we 
would have expected participants to be partner specific in their choice of description – 
using the Matcher at the training phase as a cue to generate descriptions. It therefore 
appears very unlikely (at least in the current experimental setting) that speakers’ used the 
conversational partner they spoke to during training as a memory cue for designing 
referential utterances on test trials. 
In the following chapter, I will outline the theoretical implications of this result in 
combination with an overview of the findings from each of our three experiments. 
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Chapter 6 – General Discussion 
	
 
6.1 – Summary of Experimental Findings 
The three experiments presented in this thesis set out to test the retrieval fluency hypothesis 
for reference generation. This hypothesis proposed that rather than repeatedly consulting 
common ground with a conversational partner, speakers make snap judgements regarding 
the contextual appropriateness of a referring expression using heuristic assessments. 
Crucially, our hypothesis proposed that speakers would judge the appropriateness of a 
referential expression as a function of retrieval fluency – the relative ease with which an 
expression comes to mind (Oppenheimer, 2008). As noted in Chapter 2 this hypothesis has 
two important theoretical components: (1) that speakers store “referring episodes” that link 
together referents, contexts, and expressions; and (2) that speakers make use of the strength 
with which referents and contexts cue the retrieval of expressions as an index of the extent 
to which such expressions are contextually appropriate.  
Our hypothesis was influenced by the work of Horton and Gerrig (2005a) and also by 
Gann and Barr (2014) who applied the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973) to partner specificity. We suggested that the fluency with which a 
speaker’s expressions are retrieved would be dependent upon the degree that the referent 
and the retrieval context match the original encoding context. Our hypothesis therefore 
proposed that expressions with strong memory signals would be more likely to be deemed 
contextually appropriate by the speaker – resulting in less consideration of context and a 
shorter delay in speech production, relative to expressions yielding weaker memory signals 
(see Gann & Barr, 2014 for original proposal).  
A key aspect of our study was its potential to serve as a further test of Horton and Gerrig’s 
(2005a) memory-based model for referential communication. This influential theory 
proposes that many apparent instances of audience design can be explained by automatic 
memory processes (Horton & Gerrig, 2016). An important feature of the memory-based 
model is the idea that conversational partners act as memory cues that prompt the retrieval 
of referential information. We noted that Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) proposal is similar 
to Gann and Barr (2014) in arguing that the strength of the memory encoded will influence 
how the speaker incorporates this information into production (see also Brennan and Clark, 
1996).  
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We previously highlighted an overall lack of empirical support for Horton and Gerrig’s 
model (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brown-Schmidt & Horton, 2014; Brown & Dell, 1987; 
Kronmüller & Barr, 2007, 2015). Given that the memory-based model relies on the 
concept of resonance – a parallel search of memory which makes it possible for a range of 
associated information to become available on the basis of relatively local cues (Horton, 
2008, Ratcliff, 1978), we find it surprising that studies that offer support for this model 
(e.g. Gorman, et al., 2013; Hanna, et al., 2003) often fail to account for the effect that these 
additional episodic representations will have on memory. In our series of experiments we 
set out to de-confound these additional contextual effects (e.g. visual similarity between 
past and present contexts, the colour of objects in an array) from common ground. 
In Experiment 1 we had participants play the role of “Director” in a referential 
communication game. Participants were presented with a series of grids containing letters 
of various sizes and colours and were tasked with describing the highlighted target letter to 
the “Matcher” (experimenter). Along with the target letter we manipulated the appearance 
of the “competitor” and “foil” items that alternated between training and test trials. This 
Shift Direction factor (Singleton-Contrast vs. Contrast-Singleton) was implemented in 
order to force the speaker to vary the amount of information they had to provide in the test 
trials relative to the training trials.  
A crucial aspect of this study concerned the presentation of the context that the target items 
appeared in. We attempted to de-confound the effects of memory from common ground by 
manipulating the variability of the visual configurations in which the targets appeared – a 
communicatively irrelevant aspect of the stimuli. Thus participants entrained upon 
descriptions in either the Low Variability Context or the High Variability Context. We 
expected that when speakers entrained upon descriptions in the Low Variability level 
(stimuli appeared in a very similar configuration across trials) they would experience a 
greater level of retrieval fluency in the test phase of the experiment – causing them to 
produce more referential misspecifications.  
However, the results of Experiment 1 failed to provide evidence in support of the retrieval 
fluency hypothesis. We found no difference in misspecification rate (17%) across the 
levels of the Context Variability factor. Unexpectedly, when speakers misspecified a 
description in Experiment 1 they were significantly more likely to underspecify than 
overspecify their utterance. This result was particularly surprising given that most evidence 
indicates an effect in the opposite direction - with overspecification more common in 
referential communication (e.g. Deutsch & Pechmann 1982; Engelhardt et al., 2006). 
	 119	
Notably, participants also produced significantly less fluent descriptions (speech without 
pauses or misspecifications) in the Singleton-Contrast level compared to the Contrast-
Singleton level – indicating that participants found it more difficult to add information to 
an established description than delete information from a previous utterance.  
Experiment 2 served as a further test of the retrieval fluency hypothesis. A key change was 
the implementation of pictures of everyday objects as stimuli as opposed to the letters 
shown in Experiment 1. This alteration was made in an attempt to make each target object 
more distinctive in the speaker’s memory – it was expected that this would enable the 
Director to build up stronger memory traces for their descriptions, creating more fluent 
retrieval of expressions at the test phase. We also introduced the Training-Test Consistency 
factor to this experiment. Unlike the Context Variability factor in Experiment 1, all 
training trials in this experiment were presented in a stable arrangement during the training 
phase. Instead we manipulated the consistency of the context between the training and test 
phase (Training-Test Consistent vs. Training-Test Inconsistent). Due to the higher 
similarly between training and test arrangements, we expected speakers to experience a 
stronger memory signal in the Training Consistent condition causing them to make more 
referential errors and engage in audience less effectively. 
Results from Experiment 2 provided weak statistical support in favour of the retrieval 
fluency hypothesis. Speakers misspecified descriptions more often in the Consistent 
Training-Test level (85%) compared to the Inconsistent level (80%), although this effect 
barely reached significance in a one-tailed test with a small effect size. We also found that 
speakers were much more likely to overspecify than underspecify their descriptions. This 
significant result was in contrast to Experiment 1, where we obtained a statistically 
significant underspecification effect.  
However, although these results were promising, we acknowledged that the cues that we 
manipulated in Experiment 2 perhaps lacked communicative relevance - making it difficult 
to apply these findings more broadly to everyday interactions. In Experiment 3, we sought 
to address this issue. Our final experiment sought to manipulate the level of retrieval 
fluency that the speaker experienced by using the conversational partner as a memory cue. 
This experiment differed from our first two studies as we included a second Matcher as 
part of our design. We implemented two main factors: Visual Consistency and Pragmatic 
Consistency and included the Shift Direction factor from Experiments 1 and 2. A crucial 
aim of this experiment was to increase communicative relevance by manipulating a 
referential cue that is normally strongly correlated with common ground. To do this we de-
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confounded the perceptual cue (visual image of the listener) from pragmatic cues 
(knowledge of the identify of the actual listener). 
Experiment 3 did not reveal any evidence that speakers followed a retrieval fluency 
heuristic when providing referential descriptions to addressees. We predicted that 
participants would experience stronger levels of retrieval fluency when viewing the same 
Matcher at the test phase as they saw during training. However, the trend was in the 
opposite direction from the predicted effect with participants producing more referential 
errors in the Visually Inconsistent level (63%) than the Visually Consistent level (57%) of 
the Visual Consistency factor. We also found no main effect of Pragmatic Consistency 
with speakers producing the same error rate (60%) for descriptions in both the 
Pragmatically Consistent and Inconsistent levels. Although the Shift Direction factor was 
not of primary interest in this study, we did find that speakers were more likely to 
overspecify descriptions (Contrast-Singleton level, 62.6%) than underspecify descriptions 
(Singleton-Contrast level, 57.6%). Unlike Experiment 2 however, this difference was not 
statistically significant.   
We found no significant effect of Visual Consistency on description length for 
unconventional referents. We did however find a significant effect for Pragmatic 
Consistency on description length for unconventional referents – speakers lengthened 
previously shortened descriptions of items at the test phase for new listeners. This result 
indicates that speakers successfully adapted their speech to engage in audience design. 
Moreover, this effect demonstrated a successful manipulation with 32/40 participants 
adapting their speech. This underlines an important point – participants were clearly able to 
keep track of who the intended addressee was, ruling out the possibility that they were 
inattentive to the identity of the current addressee in our study. 
Although we did not find evidence for a retrieval fluency effect in either Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 3 the fact that we obtained a high misspecification rate across all three 
experiments is an indication that speakers did indeed rely on their previously encoded 
memories of target item descriptions. In both Experiments 2 and 3, Directors overspecified 
descriptions during the test phase (e.g. using the description “Eden white cheese” when the 
word “cheese” would have been adequate or “pipe with a wooden section” when “pipe” 
would have been a sufficient description for the addressee to identify the target object). 
Had participants not relied on their previously encoded memories, there would have been 
an overall lower misspecification rate because the kinds of misspecifications we obtained 
would have been highly unlikely without the training experience. 
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We note that the underspecification effect obtained in Experiment 1 is in contrast to the 
rate of overspecification obtained in both Experiments 2 and 3. This result could be linked 
to the stimuli used in Experiment 1. Our first study presented participants with target 
letters as opposed to the target objects used as stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3. The use of 
target letters as stimuli in Experiment 1 tended to prompt speakers into using pre-nominal 
modifiers (e.g. “the big A”) when they adapted their description on test trials in the 
Singleton-Contrast level of the Shift Direction factor. In Experiments 2 and 3 speakers 
produced a higher rate of post-nominal modifiers when describing objects at the test phase 
in the Contrast-Singleton level (e.g. “candle, that’s not been lit”). It is possible that the 
nature of the stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3 made it easier for speakers to post-nominally 
modify their descriptions (leading to greater overspecification) compared to Experiment 1 
where post-nominal descriptions (e.g. “A, big”) were less common. Thus if the speaker 
initially failed to use a pre-nominal modifier on test trials in the Singleton-Contrast level of 
the Shift Direction factor in Experiment 1, it is likely that they continued to use their 
unmodified description (e.g. “A”). These unmodified descriptions would have been the 
same utterances originally generated during the training phase of the experiment. We 
believe that this may explain the significant underspecification effect obtained in 
Experiment 1. 
6.2 – Theoretical Implications 
The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, coupled with the small effect size of our 
significant result in Experiment 2, provide little evidence in support of the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis. In addition to this, our results fail to support Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) 
assumption that episodic memory effects are a key source of partner specificity in 
reference production. It is possible that there was something specific about our design or 
study implementation that could explain the lack of evidence in favour of our hypothesis. 
As mentioned previously in Chapters 1 and 5, a common criticism of studies which fail to 
find support for partner specificity in audience design, is the perceived lack of interaction 
experienced by participants (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2015). 
However, this is a concern that cannot be levelled at our study since all three experiments 
involved extensive interaction between the Director (participant) and the Matcher 
(experimenter). Across all three experiments the minimum number of training trials 
participants completed before being shown a target item in the test phase was 4 trials (6-9 
training trials for Experiments 1 and 2, 4-6 trials in Experiment 3). In Experiments 1 and 2 
participants completed a minimum of 336 trials describing target items to the Matcher. In 
Experiment 3 all participants completed 384 trials (number of training sequences for 
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specific items was randomised across subjects). Therefore participants had ample 
opportunity to interact with the addressee(s) and generate their own descriptions for target 
items.  
Furthermore, we would also point to Kronmüller and Barr (2015), who note that previous 
criticism from Brown-Schmidt (2009) has been particularly selective when identifying 
studies that fail to find partner specific effects due to a lack of interaction. Studies which 
have opportunities for participants to interactively establish common ground (Barr & 
Keysar, 2002; Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Shintel & Keysar, 2007) have also failed to find 
partner specific effects while other experiments that have found support for partner effects 
in memory (Horton & Slaten, 2012) have done so despite being non-interactive in nature. 
Our lack of support for the memory-based model is compatible with previous research that 
has argued against the idea of partner specificity. For example, we previously highlighted 
the work of Barr and Keysar (2002), who studied the use of referential precedents in 
communication. The authors argued that precedents are frequently used in conversation 
because they are available in memory and can be implemented to solve referential 
ambiguity - not because they are partner specific. Barr and Keysar (2002) initially 
predicted that when addressees interacted with a new speaker they would be slower to gaze 
at and reach out for target objects in their experiment. However, they found no significant 
difference in reaction times when participants heard the old speaker compared to the new 
speaker. Barr and Keysar’s results support the anchoring and adjustment model of 
referential communication – speakers and listeners use mutual knowledge only to identify 
and address coordination problems in communication (Barr & Keysar, 2002).  
The results of Experiment 3 in our study support a similar “adjustment” model for 
reverential communication. Despite a lack of evidence in favour of the retrieval fluency 
heuristic we found that speakers engaged in audience design when describing 
unconventional target items (increasing previously shortened descriptions when speaking 
to a new listener). In Chapter 5, we suggested, based on similar results obtained by Gann 
and Barr (2014), that participants avoided underspecifying old referents to new addressees 
through a process of monitoring and adjustment. Unlike Gann and Barr (2014), who 
provided evidence for this claim by measuring speech onset latency (see Chapter 5 for 
details), we did not specifically test for monitoring and adjustment in our study. However, 
our result does offer some support for Monitoring and Adjustment Model (Horton & 
Keysar, 1996). It is possible that speakers were not accounting for common ground in the 
initial planning of descriptions but were adapting descriptions for the addressee if and 
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when it was deemed necessary. It is likely that speakers would have achieved this by 
incrementally adding additional information to their previously shortened descriptions 
(Gann & Barr, 2014; Pechmann, 1989).  
It difficult to determine the extent to which our retrieval fluency hypothesis supports 
Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) Interactive Alignment Model since our study did not 
provide a direct test of their theory. We highlighted in Chapter 2 that the retrieval fluency 
hypothesis may be compatible with the Interactive Alignment Model because retrieval 
fluency could help to facilitate alignment. Perhaps had we varied the role of the participant 
during each of our experiments we could have tested some of the main assumptions of the 
model. For example, we could have had participants play as the Matcher on some trials as 
well as playing as the Director. This would have enabled participants to experience both 
conversational roles and may have facilitated greater alignment between the participant 
and the confederate. Alternatively, had we included two naïve participants instead of using 
the experimenter as the Matcher in Experiments 1 and 2 then this may have generated 
greater (and more natural) alignment between both interlocutors. We could have then 
tested the retrieval fluency hypothesis within this framework. 
However, we had clear methodological reasons for our study design. We opted to use the 
experimenter/lab assistant across all three experiments in order to ensure that participants 
interacted with a Matcher who knew when it was necessary to ask for additional 
descriptive information. Additionally, since the experimenter was playing the role of the 
Matcher they were able to provide quick feedback to the Director. We reasoned that fewer 
delays in response time from the Matcher would facilitate greater entrainment on 
descriptions for the Director (participant), which in turn, would help develop stronger 
memory traces of utterances. In theory, this would enable participants to experience 
stronger levels of retrieval fluency. 
The other reason that we opted to have participants only play the role of the Director was 
to enable them to gain experience of describing target items during the training phase 
across a series of trials (between 6-9 trials in Experiments 1 and 2). Since research has 
indicated that self-generated descriptions are re-used more frequently and are remembered 
better (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012; Knutsen, Ros, & Bigot, 2016) we reasoned that this 
design would maximise the retrieval fluency effects that participants experienced across 
trials during the training phase of the experiments. 
In Chapter 1, we noted our concern that support for Horton and Gerrig’s memory-based 
model has frequently been based on Horton’s (2007) study (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2009, 
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2012; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2015; Gorman et al., 2013; Horton, 2008; Horton & Slaten, 
2012). In his 2007 paper, Horton found that subjects were quicker to name pictures with 
labels that were linked to the current partner at the test phase in comparison to naming 
items with labels that were associated with an alternative partner. Horton argues that this 
finding supports the concept of partner-specificity in memory. However, we would urge 
caution in drawing conclusions from this study. The difference in onset between the 
current and alternative partner in Experiment 1 in this study was relatively low at 87ms (a 
similar conclusion in Experiment 2 was based on a difference of 67ms). Moreover, despite 
this relatively small effect, the author states this result reflects a “significant effect of 
partner context” (p.1120) with a p value of “p = < 0.06”. We also note that this difference 
in onset does not distinguish between a quicker onset time due to common ground between 
the speaker and the addressee or whether the quicker onset was due to the episodic priming 
of the picture labels associated with each addressee. Both of these factors are perfectly 
confounded in Horton’s study (2007). Notably, the significant effect that we obtained in 
Experiment 2 in favour of the retrieval fluency hypothesis did offer some support to the 
memory-based model. However, similarly to Horton’s (2007) study the effect size for own 
experiment was small (5% difference in misspecification rate between the Training 
Consistent and Training Inconsistent levels) with p = 0.03.  
In addition to these results, Brown-Schmidt and Horton (2014) recently failed to replicate 
Horton’s (2007) findings. This replication focused on the result of Experiment 1 and found 
that there was no significant difference between conversational partners. Participants were 
only 3ms faster to name pictures that were previously studied with the same partner (p = 
0.40). The authors carried out two additional studies that sought to further explore their 
initial findings. Notably, the second of these additional experiments was conducted as a 
direct replication at 99% power and failed to support Horton’s original work. Participants 
were 26ms slower to name items when they had studied labels with the same partner 
during training compared to the alternative partner (p = 0.36). This result further underlines 
an emerging lack of support for the memory-based model of communication.  
However, despite this strong effect Brown-Schmidt and Horton (2014) suggest that they 
may have obtained a different result if the partner in the experiment had not been 
“incidental” to the task. Additionally, they suggest if the similarity between items from 
training to test has been greater they may have obtained alternative results. They argue that 
“establishing more clearly motivated partner-item associations could help increase the 
likelihood that the presence of a specific partner would reliably prompt retrievals of 
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relevant knowledge” (p.7). We believe that the methodology and design implemented in 
Experiment 3 of our study addresses this issue. In our study, speakers entrained upon item 
descriptions with one of two conversational partners at the training phase and were then 
tested in both Visual and Pragmatic Consistency factors at the test phase. Both partners 
actively interacted with the speaker throughout the experiment and were therefore a critical 
component of main manipulation. This was in contrast to Horton’s (2007) original study 
where the partner simply read out object category clues to the participant from a 
worksheet. Although speakers took longer to provide descriptions at the Visually 
Inconsistent level than the Visually Consistent level (difference of 15.1ms) and also longer 
at the Pragmatically Inconsistent level than Pragmatically Consistent level (44.5ms) in our 
experiment, neither of these effects was significant (nor were there any significant 
interactions). Our study shows that even when the conversational partner took on a more 
significant role in the experiment (interacting frequently with the participant) there was a 
lack of evidence in favour of partner specificity. Furthermore, speakers generated their 
own descriptions for target items (rather than being cued as was the case in Horton’s study) 
further increasing the partner-specific item associations that were formed during the 
training phase. 
Although Brown-Schmidt and Horton’s (2014) work has significant implications for the 
study of memory in referential communication the results of this study have been 
overlooked in recent review papers. For instance, Horton and Brennan (2016) provide an 
overview of the memory-based account in the context of metarepresentation without 
highlighting the null effect obtained by Brown-Schmidt and Horton (2014) or drawing on 
previous research that has failed to support the memory-based account. Similarly, Horton 
and Gerrig (2016) published a review article aimed at expanding their memory-based 
theory. The authors also used this article as an opportunity to comment on studies that have 
“weakened” their original claims. Despite using this paper to provide a comprehensive 
overview of their memory-based account the authors fail to fully address the implications 
of Brown-Schmidt and Horton’s study – merely explaining the results as a consequence of 
“relatively-arbitrary partner-item associations” which may have been “too tenuous” to 
enable interlocutor identity to act as a cue in memory (Horton & Gerrig, 2016, p. 791). We 
believe we have addressed some of the concerns raised by Brown-Schmidt and Horton, 
(2014) and Horton and Gerrig, (2016) in our third experiment. As noted above we failed to 
find evidence in favour of partner specificity in memory when we controlled for the 
additional episodic effects experienced by speakers when providing referential 
descriptions.  
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6.3 – Limitations 
Our experiments serve as a further test of Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) theory and have 
important implications for the underlying assumptions of the memory-based model. 
However, we acknowledge there are limitations with our study. Notably, we obtained no 
effect of Context Variability in Experiment 1 nor did we find significant effects of 
Pragmatic Consistency or Visual Consistency in Experiment 3. In fact, if anything there 
was a trend in the opposite direction of our main prediction for the Visual Consistency 
factor. In Experiment 2 we did find a main effect of Training-Test Consistency on memory 
with participants misspecifying more frequently in the Training Consistent level. However, 
the effect size for this result was relatively small (difference of 5% between conditions).  
Nevertheless, we have shown evidence that participants experienced some episodic effects 
whilst providing descriptions to addressees during the test phase of our experiments. One 
indication of this was the rate of misspecification across all three experiments in our study. 
Speakers’ consistently misspecified descriptions – either overspecifying by providing too 
much information in Experiments 2 and 3, or by underspecifying descriptions as was the 
case in Experiment 1. As we alluded to previously, these misspecification effects would 
not have been present had it not been for the episodic memories that were developed 
during the training phase of each experiment. Additionally, in line with this, we would also 
point to the data from our unconventional referent analysis in Experiment 3. Our results 
showed participants engaged in successful audience design – lengthening old descriptions 
of objects for new addressees who had not seen the target item before. This result implies 
that speakers had formed episodic memories of descriptions they had previously used and 
were able to recall and adjust these utterances when required.  
One possible explanation for the lack of significant episodic effects in our study is that 
perhaps speakers only kept minimalistic information in their episodic traces during 
communication. Thus our experiments may have not been sensitive enough to identify 
episodic effects that were present for speakers. Perhaps if we were to re-test our hypothesis 
over a longer period of time we may obtain results that would be more favourable for the 
memory-based model (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). In effect this would compare the episodic 
traces created in the lab in our current study to longer-term traces similar to those 
developed in everyday interactions.  
We therefore suggest that focussing on the scope of the memory traces formed by the 
speaker over a prolonged period of time may provide a greater insight into whether 
interlocutors take advantage of partner specificity when engaging in referential 
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communication. There is some evidence in the literature that would support this idea. As 
mentioned previously, Barr et al.’s (2014) results supported the concept of partner 
specificity in memory - addressees looked more quickly and reliably at a target image 
when the addressee’s friend read out the description compared to when the description was 
read out by the lab assistant. Crucially, Barr et al. (2014) took advantage of the common 
ground that was already established between pairs of friends that participated in this study. 
When the designer of descriptions was a friend, addressees were able to rely on a shared 
reference that was based on social familiarity and experience. In our study, if participants 
had been given a longer period of time to consolidate their memories of the item 
descriptions during the training phase, perhaps we would have seen more evidence of 
partner specificity and common ground for specific utterances. Future studies may wish to 
consider entraining speakers on referential descriptions across a series of testing sessions 
that occur on separate occasions before then testing whether the speaker relies on partner 
specificity when generating descriptions. This may enable speakers to build up a stronger 
retrieval fluency of memories and develop greater partner specific effects. 
The idea of having multiple training sessions is supported by literature that shows the 
benefits of distributed practice in memory. The distribution of multiple study opportunities 
or practice sessions has shown a robust improvement in memory in word based tasks (e.g. 
Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006; Janiszewski & Sawyer, 2003) and also 
picture tasks (Hintzman & Rogers, 1973; see Benjamin & Tullis, 2010 for an overview of 
this literature). Furthermore, research shows a marked improvement in memory for 
participants who are allowed to sleep after processing new information. During sleep 
newly encoded memory traces (in addition to older related memories) are continually 
reactivated. In this way, new memories are progressively added to pre-existing knowledge 
networks (Born & Wilhelm, 2012). Evidence suggests that sleeping facilitates 
consolidation – strengthening and stabilizing memories formed before sleep onset 
(Maquet, 2001; Rasch & Born, 2013; Walker & Stickgold, 2006). Thus sleep appears to 
stimulate the re-processing of new memories and assists with their integration into long-
term memory (Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Stickgold & Walker, 
2013).  
For example, in a language acquisition and processing study Dumay and Gaskell (2007) 
had participants learn fictitious words that overlapped with real words (e.g. “cathedruke vs. 
cathedral”) and compared groups of participants who learned the words in the evening (pm 
group – before sleep) or in the morning (am group – after sleep). The authors found that 
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lexical competition between the fictitious words and real words was not observed after 
immediate exposure nor after a full day awake. Participants’ only experienced lexical 
competition when they had enjoyed a night’s sleep after learning the competitor words. 
This finding underlines the impact sleep has on memory consolidation (Dumay & Gaskell, 
2007) and is a factor that should be considered when testing the memory-based model.  
In Chapter 2, we noted that previous research has distinguished between recollection and 
familiarity in memory (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonelinas et al., 2010). A potential limitation of 
our study is that we did not dissociate the metacognitive effect of retrieval fluency from the 
cognitive effects that may have been experienced due to familiarity in our experiments. 
Across all three experiments we attempted to manipulate the retrieval fluency experienced 
by participants. However we did not include an independent measurement to validate the 
extent of these fluency effects. Perhaps we could have included a memory test for 
participants at the end of the experiment to determine the strength of the memory formed. 
This could have taken the form of recognition test where participants were required to 
identify whether an object had been seen before or not  (old vs. new). This would have 
enabled us to determine whether participants showed sensitivity to our experimental 
manipulations outwith the communicative context they were originally presented in. 
Nevertheless, as we have highlighted previously in this chapter, the high misspecification 
rate obtained across all three experiments is a strong indication that participants 
successfully formed episodic memories of the items they were shown. 
Finally, we would also comment on the recent debate that has highlighted potential 
concerns of using confederates in language production and dialogue tasks (Kuhlen & 
Brennan, 2013). In all three of our studies, the experimenter or a lab assistant undertook 
the role of addressee. Whilst this is common practice in dialogue studies – we 
acknowledge that ideally we would have tested our hypotheses using speaker and listener 
who were both naïve to the purpose of our study.  
One potential issue with this set-up was that the Matcher (experimenter) always knew 
which item within the array was the target object (although this was never actually 
revealed to the participant). As a result of this, the experimenter quickly became familiar 
with the descriptions participants commonly used to identify referents during the 
experiment. In some instances it was therefore possible that the Matcher was able to 
identify a target object from an inadequate description produced by the Director. Had the 
addressee been naïve they may have required additional information from the speaker. This 
factor may have affected the overall misspecification rate of descriptions even further than 
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the rate in our current study. Additionally, participants knew that the Matcher was the 
experimenter, which could have influenced their descriptions for target objects. For 
example, some speakers may have adopted a more lackadaisical approach to reference 
production – under the impression that the experimenter would ask for more information if 
they provided an inadequate description (the Matcher was instructed to say “which one do 
you mean?” if the description was insufficient). However, it is unlikely that these factors 
would have influenced the overall outcome of our study. Although there are pragmatic 
benefits of using confederates in language production experiments, future research should 
attempt to avoid doing so when possible.  
 6.4 – Future Directions/Closing Remarks 
The research in this doctoral thesis tested for the retrieval fluency hypothesis for audience 
design. Across three experiments we found little evidence supporting our hypothesis. 
Crucially, our results also fail to support Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based 
model for referential communication. In Experiment 3 of our study we did not find 
evidence of partner specificity in memory – a key component of Horton and Gerrig’s 
original model. Given that the memory-based model is a prominent theory in referential 
communication our results (coupled with Brown-Schmidt and Horton’s 2014 recent failed 
replication) highlight a need for additional research to address some of the key 
assumptions of this model.  
In light of our results, we would encourage others to attempt to replicate the original 
effects of partner specificity on memory (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). In 
particular, in order to build upon our findings, it is crucial that researchers attempt to do so 
whilst also de-confounding the effects of memory from common ground. This will enable 
us to get a clearer idea of whether partner specificity acts as critical cue for memory or 
whether other aspects in the communicative environment also play an important role. As 
well as making new attempts to test Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) memory-based model we 
would encourage others to attempt to replicate the effects obtained in our retrieval fluency 
experiments – particularly the results obtained in Experiment 3 where we de-confounded 
both visual and pragmatic cues using two separate addressees.  
Whilst we appreciate that Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a) original paper was designed to 
promote further discussion of the role of memory in referential communication, we believe 
that future research should be more specific when generating hypotheses that test for 
memory effects in common ground. For example, whilst arguing that memory acts as a 
proxy for common ground, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) are generally non-specific in 
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hypothesising how or when this is likely to happen. This makes it relatively easy for 
researchers to claim support for the memory-based model. Since episodic memory is a 
crucial component of our everyday interactions – it is important to be more specific when 
hypothesising about its role in reference production. In the future, researchers should state 
more clearly how memory is expected to impact upon common ground and in what 
circumstances these effects would be likely to occur. 
With this in mind we would encourage researchers to be as transparent as possible when 
generating their hypotheses. When designing our study we pre-registered our hypotheses 
and analysis procedures on the Open Science Framework (OSF) before beginning data 
collection. We believe this to be an important step in increasing clarity and promoting 
replication in psychology. In order to advance the study of audience design in 
communication we would encourage researchers to commit to pre-registration. Going 
forward, this will help to address any lack of transparency in the literature and aid attempts 
to replicate important findings that help shape our understanding of the impact of memory 
on referential communication. Clearly, we also believe future research should seek to 
address some of the additional issues that we have raised above. Whilst the idea of partner 
specificity in memory is appealing, our results highlight that there is still some ambiguity 
as to whether speakers use their communicative partner as a memory cue in audience 
design.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: 
 
Participant Instruction Sheet for Experiment 1: 
 
Social Description Task – Information Sheet 
 
In this experiment you will play the role of the Director and the experimenter will play 
the role of the Matcher. You will be seated at a computer monitor and presented with a 
series of 5x4 grids containing different letters.  In each trial a single letter will be 
highlighted by a yellow outline. Your task is to verbally describe this letter so that the 
Matcher is able to identify it on a separate computer monitor (please see Fig. 1 below). 
Although, the Matcher’s monitor will contain the same letters as those that appear on 
your screen, they will be arranged in a completely random order. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the letters will appear in the same locations as those shown on your 
screen. In order to provide an accurate instruction to the Matcher, you must avoid using 
the spatial location of the target letter in your description. You may, however, describe 
the letter in any other way that you think may help Matcher to locate the target item. 
Throughout the experiment your responses will be recorded and your eye movements 
will be tracked. There will be an opportunity to take a break during the experiment. 
 
Please ask the experimenter now if you have any questions about your role in the 
experiment. There will be a full debrief after the experiment is finished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	1:	Example	of	the	display	on	the	Director’s	screen.	The	
Director	will	describe	the	highlighted	target	letter	(‘u’	in	this	
example)	to	the	Matcher.	Once	the	Matcher	has	selected	the	
letter,	a	new	trial	will	begin.	
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Appendix 2: 
 
Error rate of Participants removed from analysis in Experiment 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Note that Session ID 43 was also removed due to continued use of overly long descriptions across 
all trials in the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session ID 
 
Shift Direction Number of Invalid 
Trials 
Error Rate (%) 
1 Singleton-Contrast 17/24 70.8 
8 Singleton-Contrast 19/24 79.2 
9 Singleton-Contrast 15/24 62.5 
16 Singleton-Contrast 18/24 75.0 
24 Singleton-Contrast 24/24 100.0 
34 Singleton-Contrast 24/24 100.0 
36 Singleton-Contrast 22/24 91.7 
37 Contrast-Singleton 24/24 100.0 
40 Singleton-Contrast 18/24 90.0 
44 Singleton-Contrast 15/24 62.5 
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Appendix 3: 
 
List of Target and Competitor/Foil Objects for Experiment 2: 
 
Target Competitor Foil 
Egg in shell Egg yolk White flower petal 
Family car Sports car Grey computer 
mouse 
Wall clock Digital clock ‘Dr. Beats’ speakers 
Office phone Mobile phone Remote control 
Reading glasses Drinking glasses Test beakers 
Kitchen knife Swiss army knife USB stick 
Mountain bike Motor bike ‘Go’ Kart 
Leather glove Boxing glove Bean bag 
Gold key Car key Ping pong bay 
Riding saddle Bicycle saddle Golf Putter 
Camcorder CCTV camera Hairdryer 
Computer mouse Mouse Squirrel 
Orange Orange slice Sunset picture 
Sun hat Cowboy hat Wooden bowl 
Gun Toy gun Hook 
AA battery Car battery Box 
Bedroom lamp Lava lamp Rocket 
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Money (notes) Money (coins) Bolts and screws 
Boot Car boot Breadbin 
Red apple Green apple Pear 
Bicycle helmet Builders helmet Mellon 
Acoustic guitar Electric guitar Frying pan 
Garden spade Beach spade Spatula 
Horse Rocking horse Cradle 
Mirror Hand mirror Wreath 
Bumblebee B letter D letter 
Smoking pipe Kitchen pipe Flute 
Chair Baby highchair Ironing board 
Candle Melted candle Vase 
Teapot Teapot with cosy Woolly hat 
Fan Electric fan Drain cover 
Yellow t-shirt (men’s) Yellow t-shirt 
(women’s) 
Yellow tea towel 
Padlock unlocked Padlock locked Handbag 
Cheese Blue cheese Sponge 
Wine glass Glass of red wine Decanter 
Coffee cup Coffee cup and saucer Plant pot 
Saw Electric saw Blender 
Bat Baseball bat Chopsticks 
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Human eye I letter L letter 
Headphones Headphones (ear buds) Ear plugs 
Ballpoint pen Pen without lid Pencil 
Spoon Wooden spoon Wooden spatula 
Bin Pedal bin Black jug 
School bell Bicycle bell Bauble 
Open umbrella Closed umbrella Nail file 
Potatoes Peeled potatoes Lemons 
Lighter with flame Lighter Flask 
Door long handle Door knob Globe 
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Appendix 4: 
 
Participant Instruction Sheet for Experiment 2: 
 
Social Description Task – Information Sheet 
 
In this experiment you will play the role of the Director and the experimenter will play 
the role of the Matcher. You will be seated at a computer monitor and presented with a 
series of 5x4 grids containing different objects.  In each trial a single object will be 
highlighted by a green outline. Your task is to verbally name this item so that the 
experimenter is able to select it on a separate computer monitor (please see Fig. 1 
below). 
  
Although, the experimenter’s monitor will contain the same objects as those that 
appear on your screen, they will be arranged in a completely random order. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that the objects will appear in the same locations as those shown on your 
screen. In order to provide an accurate instruction to the experimenter, you must avoid 
using the spatial location of the target item in your description. You may, however, 
describe the item in any other way that you think may help the experimenter to locate 
the target object.   
 
Throughout the experiment your responses will be recorded and your eye movements 
will be tracked. There will be an opportunity to take a break during the experiment. 
 
Please ask the experimenter now if you have any questions about your role in the study. 
There will be a full debrief after the experiment is finished. 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
Figure	1:	Example	of	the	display	on	the	Participant’s	screen.	The	Participant	will	identify	
the	highlighted	target	object	(“car”	in	this	example)	to	the	Experimenter.	Once	the	
Experimenter	has	selected	the	letter,	a	new	trial	will	begin.	
	
An	example	of	the	
type	of	grid	that	
you	will	see	à	
“Click	on	the	
car”	
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Appendix 5: 
 
 
Error rate of Participant removed from analysis in Experiment 2: 
 
 
 
List of Stimuli Items removed from analysis across all participants in Experiment 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session ID Shift Direction Number of Invalid 
Trials 
Error Rate (%) 
4 Singleton-Contrast 13/24 54.2 
Target Object 
 
Competitor Foil Shift Direction Error 
Rate (%) 
Bedroom lamp Lava lamp Rocket Singleton-Contrast 55.6 
Bicycle helmet Builders helmet Mellon Singleton-Contrast 68.4 
Bumblebee B letter D letter Singleton-Contrast 52.6 
Computer mouse Mouse Squirrel Singleton-Contrast 72.2 
Mountain bike Motor bike ‘Go’ Kart Singleton-Contrast 57.9 
Office phone Mobile phone Remote control Singleton-Contrast 78.9 
Reading glasses Drinking glasses Test beakers Singleton-Contrast 55.6 
Spoon Wooden spoon Wooden spatula Singleton-Contrast 63.2 
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Appendix 6: 
 
List of Target and Competitor/Foil Objects for Experiment 3: 
Target Competitor Foil 
Egg in shell Egg yolk White flower petal 
Family car Sports car Grey computer 
mouse 
Wall clock Digital clock ‘Dr. Beats’ speakers 
Kitchen knife Swiss army knife USB stick 
Leather glove Boxing glove Bean bag 
Gold key Car key Ping pong bay 
Riding saddle Bicycle saddle Putter 
Camcorder CCTV camera Hairdryer 
Orange Orange slice Sunset picture 
Sun hat Cowboy hat Wooden bowl 
Gun Toy gun Hook 
AA battery Car battery Box 
Money (notes) Money (coins) Bolts and screws 
Boot Car boot Breadbin 
Red apple Green apple Pear 
Acoustic guitar Electric guitar Frying pan 
Garden spade Beach spade Spatula 
Horse Rocking horse Cradle 
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Mirror Hand mirror Wreath 
Smoking pipe Kitchen pipe Flute 
Chair Baby highchair Ironing board 
Candle Melted candle Vase 
Teapot Teapot with cosy Woolly hat 
Fan Electric fan Drain cover 
Yellow t-shirt (men’s) Yellow t-shirt 
(women’s) 
Yellow tea towel 
Padlock unlocked Padlock locked Handbag 
Cheese Blue cheese Sponge 
Wine glass Glass of red wine Decanter 
Coffee cup Coffee cup and saucer Plant pot 
Saw Electric saw Blender 
Bat Baseball bat Chopsticks 
Human eye I letter L letter 
Headphones Headphones(ear buds) Ear plugs 
Ballpoint pen Pen without lid Pencil 
Bin Pedal bin Black jug 
School bell Bicycle bell Bauble 
Open umbrella Closed umbrella Nail file 
Potatoes Peeled potatoes Lemons 
Lighter with flame Lighter Flask 
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Wrapping Bow Crossbow Hairpin 
Crocodile  Crocodile Inflatable Green surfboard  
Carrots  Carrots chopped Orange pegs  
Wall plug Sink plug White cd  
Bicycle helmet Crash helmet Bowling ball 
Nail for hammer Finger nail Raw chicken breast 
Vase  Vase with flowers Grass tuft  
Pizza  Pizza slice Cake slice 
Mouse wired Mouse wireless Black/silver ring 
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Appendix 7: 
 
Participant Instruction Sheet for Experiment 3: 
 
You will play the role of the “Director” and will verbally name the TARGET item 
(highlighted by a green outline) to one of two Matchers who will sit in a separate room 
from you. Figures 1 & 2 below show the two people who will be listening to your 
descriptions. They will interact with you through a live webcam video. Only one Matcher 
will be able to hear your description at a time. The Matcher who appears on the screen 
may not be the person listening to your description. 
 
In the examples shown in Figures 1 & 2 the target item is the car. You would describe 
this item to the listener (e.g. “Select the car”) so that they are able to identify it on 
their computer monitor. Figure 3 shows the view of the Matchers’ screen. They will 
select the item you describe using the corresponding numbers on their keyboard. 
 
Before we start we will have a practice session! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kieran will be the ORANGE Matcher. 
+ 
Caitlyn will be the YELLOW Matcher. 
2. 
1. 
3. 
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Appendix 8: 
 
Error rate of Participant removed from analysis in Experiment 3: 
 
 
Item removed from analysis across all participants in Experiment 3: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Session ID Shift Direction Number of Invalid 
Trials 
Error Rate (%) 
4 Singleton-Contrast 13/24 54.2 
Target Object 
 
Competitor Foil Shift Direction Error 
Rate (%) 
Wrapping Bow Crossbow Hairpin Singleton-Contrast 94.1 
1. 
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